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Abstract 
 
The study of primate intelligence, and specifically of general intelligence, has progressed 
rapidly in the last two decades, however several issues remain unexplored. While 
neuroanatomical volume measures (NVMs) such as brain size, neocortex size, and absolute or 
relative size of other brain regions have been frequently framed as substrates for general 
intelligence, such claims are largely based on simple correlative analyses. Furthermore, while 
factor analytical techniques have identified a general factor among cognitive abilities when using 
datasets of species’ mean performances, there have been no examinations of whether the 
common factor is predictably more strongly present in some primate lineages than in others, and 
whether relations among brain regions are similarly stronger in some primate lineages than in 
others. Here, such issues in the comparative literature on primate intelligence are addressed in a 
new set of studies that present two main novel contributions to the scientific understanding of 
primate intelligence: 
First, the evolutionary patterns of the history of changes in general intelligence in 
primates is examined and compared to those behind the history of changes in brain size and the 
size of brain regions most commonly used in comparative cognition studies. Studying 
evolutionary patterns behind a trait permits examining how conserved it is across evolutionary 
time, how fast it has evolved, and the degree to which it has evolved in a particular direction 
(i.e., if natural selection regimes have been consistent). Phylogenetic comparative methods 
employed on datasets of primate species reveal that general intelligence has evolved at a faster 
pace than NVMs and it has evolved more consistently towards a selection optimum. In contrast 
to the overall emphasis given in the literature to brain size and neocortex ratio as substrates for 
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intelligence, the NVM with results that most strongly approached the patterns identified for 
general intelligence is residual cerebellar size (relative to body size). 
Secondly, a hypothesis is advanced that species higher on general intelligence exhibit a 
stronger manifold (i.e., higher factor loadings) as general intelligence has previously been 
empirically associated with ecological generalism, rather than with specialism. As such, 
cognitive specialization and independence among abilities should be a hallmark of species that 
have not evolved strong general intelligence. The Continuous Parameter Estimation Model 
(CPEM) is used in a dataset of cognitive abilities in primate species, and largely confirms the 
hypothesis forwarded. However, when the same analytical approach is replicated using data on 
sizes of brain regions, it is found that brain size fails to predict or coevolve with factor loadings 
of brain regions. Similarly, telencephalon size (a brain structure that holds several of the regions 
theoretically proposed to serve as substrates for intelligence) fails to predict the strength of factor 
loadings of telencephalic regions.  
This set of studies supports the notion that the comparability between the evolution of 
general intelligence and the evolution of volumes of neuroanatomical structures is more limited 
than previously thought. Alternative substrates for general intelligence are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Scientific interest in the evolution of how cognitive abilities are organized or interrelated 
has seen a rise in nonhuman primate literatures. Importantly, the increased discussion has not 
been driven simply by the formulation of theories, simulations, or speculations, but has included 
empirical data and a multitude of analytical approaches at the cross-species level (Deaner et al., 
2006; Fernandes et al., 2014; Reader & Laland, 2002; Reader et al., 2011), at the individual 
differences level (Shaw & Schmelz, 2017; Galsworthy et al., 2014; Hopkins, Russell, & 
Schaeffer, 2014), and at a mixed level (i.e., comparing individuals of different species; Herrmann 
et al., 2007; Woodley of Menie et al., 2017). 
The notion that many cognitive abilities are not independent when primate species are 
compared, but rather grouped into somewhat broad domains (e.g., social intelligence, physical 
intelligence) is not novel or uncommon (Whiten & Byrne, 1988). Recently, however, hypotheses 
and examinations of the possibility of an existing common overarching factor among many 
abilities, including social and physical ones, have been advanced in primatology, both at the 
cross-species level (Deaner et al., 2006; Reader et al., 2011) and the individual differences level 
(Burkart et al., 2017). These publications involve studies both of laboratory tasks and of 
ethological observations of behavior, and follow decades of more anecdotal reports of the 
capacity for generalization of cognitive problem-solving across domains in many primate 
species. It is common to find descriptions of the capacity for object categorization and 
comprehension of generalized identity; categorization of abstract relations, and thus the capacity 
to interchangeably rely on different entities within a category to flexibly solve problems; insight 
into the affordances of tools or strategies without the use of a trial and error approach; 
understanding of object permanence; theory of mind and the capacity for deceit (countering the 
12 
 
expectations that an individual imagines that others have of it); and foresight in the form of 
anticipated problem solving or anticipated making of tools (indicative of some degree of 
planning). These capacities suggest that individuals of many species are capable of generalizing 
from one domain to another, to translate applications, and mentally manipulate information not 
only in parallel with physical manipulation of objects. Some researchers propose that the 
integrated set of such complex abilities is a “tool kit” with interdependences (Emery & Clayton, 
2004), reflecting a system of cognitive abilities that arguably interact. Rigorous tests of general 
intelligence need to rely on more than these non-systematic observations however. 
Findings of a general factor among performance scores on cognitive tasks when 
comparing individuals in a species indicate that individuals that perform well on one particular 
cognitive problem tend to perform well across others. This factor, frequently called Spearman’s 
g, suggests that variations among individuals in performance are largely systematic across types 
of problems. For g to exist, some variation in performance must exist among individuals in the 
given species, even if it is small. The existence of a general factor across species, on the other 
hand, indicates that when species are compared in terms of their mean performance on several 
cognitive problems, those that have high average performance on a particular problem tend to 
perform well on average on others as well. This factor has been called G, to make it clear that a 
higher level of analysis is employed, rather than emerging from individual differences (Burkart 
et al., 2017; Fernandes et al, 2014). Studying G permits examining the macroevolution of 
cognitive abilities, whereas g more strongly reflects individual differences and thus 
microevolutionary processes.  
While identifying G on a cross-species design suggests that there is a common latent 
factor behind multiple problem-solving cognition-related capacities that differentiates taxa, it 
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does not necessarily imply, by itself, that all taxa have an equally-cohesive g factor. It could very 
well be the case that, while most species in the dataset where G was identified are likely to 
exhibit a g factor, some may perform poorly on most tasks because perhaps they have specialized 
cognition for one or only a few narrow domains of problems. In other words, not necessarily all 
g factors are configured the same way (Arden & Zietsch, 2017), even if the identification of G in 
a given data set indicates that most species in it must, to a considerable extent, exhibit statistical 
integration (i.e., correlation) among the abilities tested. This is a research problem still to be 
resolved. Although all studies in the present work are concerned with G, Chapter 2 specifically 
will attempt to tackle this issue and examine if some primate taxa exhibit more weakly related 
cognitive abilities than others. While the study of g in nonhuman animals has progressed quickly 
with a multitude of studies demonstrating its highly replicable existence, heritability, and 
presence of additive genetic variance (Burkart et al., 2017; Galsworthy et al., 2014), 
comparatively few studies have focused on G, which thus necessitates further empirical 
attention. 
The relatively recent laboratory studies systematically comparing primate species on 
cognitive tasks support the existence of the common, overarching factor G at the cross-species 
level (Deaner et al., 2006, Shultz & Dunbar, 2010). Taxa exhibiting high performance in certain 
tasks tend to do well across others as well. However, reliance solely on laboratory data to test the 
presence of a general factor of intelligence factor among species may have limitations, for 
several reasons: (a) laboratory tests can favor some species (i.e., being unfair to particular 
species), for example due to motor dexterity, visual acuity, or comfort in the setting; (b) 
laboratory tests may not reflect natural conditions (being thus ecologically invalid), and (c) data 
on laboratory tasks are available for a few species. For this reason, for example, Deaner and 
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colleagues (2006) had to avoid traditional factor analytic approaches and instead apply 
alternative statistical techniques simply to circumvent the amount of missing data and the little 
overlap among species in types of tasks on which they were tested.  
As an alternative to this approach, Reader and colleagues (2011) collated counts of 
behaviors reflecting cognitive skill in the wild, from the existing primatological literature, to 
examine the existence of G in the primate order. Such data were made available for 69 primate 
species for five categories of behavior: tool use, extractive foraging, innovation, social learning, 
and tactical deception. Factor analyses using these five measures have confirmed the extraction 
of a common factor, explaining approximately 65% of their variance (Reader et al., 2011; further 
details are given in Chapters 1 and 2). The importance of this effect is compounded by the 
observation that this cross-species G factor is extremely robust to controls for a variety of 
potential confounds (e.g., phylogenetic relatedness, geographic proximity, group and population 
size, brain and body size, and exclusion of data from captive specimens). It is also compounded 
by the observation that measures that are more central to G (i.e., that exhibit stronger factor 
loadings) have evolved faster in primates and are less conserved across evolutionary time 
(Fernandes et al., 2014).  
The factor analytic techniques employed in recent studies on cross-species cognitive data 
inform that G exists as a consistent and robust latent factor across primate species, but they do 
not reveal any more information about it. Its evolutionary history is unclear. Is the convergence 
of different abilities into the overarching factor present throughout primate history, or have 
correlations among abilities changed across evolutionary time? Has the evolution of G in primate 
phylogeny occurred in a particular direction (i.e., an optimal level)? And what are the biological 
substrates for the evolution of G in primates? Any evolutionary account of intelligence must 
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attempt to tackle these unexplored issues so that a clearer understanding of the nature of G is 
possible, beyond a description of its internal factor structure. Moreover, although intelligence 
studies in humans have been conducted for over a century as a prominent research area within 
psychology, these have not revealed information about the deep history of general intelligence, 
made possible through a comparative approach. Thus further comparative studies of general 
intelligence are required. 
 
1. The Evolutionary History of G: What Is It, and Are the Most Commonly Studied 
Neuroanatomical Measures Convergent with It? 
 Phylogenetic comparative methods developed especially in the last two decades permit 
insight into the evolutionary trajectory of traits, not possible to be estimated before (Peñaherrera-
Aguirre & Fernandes, 2018). A phylogeny is a representation of the evolutionary relatedness 
among groups of organisms; most commonly, the groups of organisms specified in phylogenies 
are species. A phylogeny of species contains information about which are sister lineages (i.e., 
having speciated more recently, such as chimpanzees and bonobos), and which are more distant 
(such as chimpanzees and ring-tailed lemurs), also informing when the lineages diverged. In 
other words, phylogenies contain information about how many million years ago a common 
ancestor for a given set of species gave rise to daughter lineages. Present knowledge on the 
phylogenetic tree of primate species is considerably precise, permitting comparative studies to 
employ it (Arnold et al., 2010; Perelman et al., 2011). 
Just as a family tree is a useful tool for examining the history of a trait, a phylogenetic 
tree is useful for examining the evolutionary history of traits of interest. This is now feasible with 
data on extant species or populations, and relies on reconstructing the history of the traits in 
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question. With that approach, it is possible to examine how a trait has evolved (e.g., slow or fast; 
exhibiting conservatism or lability across time), and the mode of selection driving its evolution 
(e.g., directional and consistent selection across clades, or fluctuating; or rapid early in history 
and decelerating subsequently as niches were already filled), as will be presented in more detail 
in Chapter 1. Detailing the mathematical procedures behind such phylogenetic comparative 
methods is beyond the scope of this work, but knowing that they exist and what their affordances 
are leads to the realization that little has been done to understand the evolution of intelligence, 
even in primates – arguably the most frequently studied order in psychology. Using well-
validated measures of cognitive abilities already demonstrated to converge into a common factor 
in primate species to examine the underlying evolutionary patterns and processes, is the primary 
goal of the present work. This will be addressed in Chapter 1. 
 Furthermore, it is possible to further understand a trait by understanding what it is related 
to (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) and its biological substrates. Overwhelmingly, neuroanatomical 
volume measures (NVMs) are studied as substrates for intelligence and defended explicitly as 
proxies for it (Shultz & Dunbar, 2010). However, comparative studies have not produced a 
single, unified picture of the relationship between such measures and intelligence. Healy & 
Rowe (2006) summarized the state of the field as one of a bewildering array of correlations 
between NVMs and behavioral traits, a picture which shows little sign of resolving. This is 
because multiple measures are used (e.g., brain size, neocortex size, hippocampus size), through 
multiple operationalizations each (e.g., absolute size, size relative to the rest of the brain, or 
residualized against body size), and their correlations to intelligence are analyzed through several 
methods by different authors (e.g., bivariate correlations, multiple regressions; Barton, 2012; 
Deaner et al., 2000). Most striking is the overreliance simply on the correlational approach, as a 
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means to examine which NVM best represents intelligence. While the correlative approach does 
serve as one indication of the similarity in trajectories between two variables across evolutionary 
time, it should be seen exactly as simply an indicator of it. Complementary approaches are 
needed. This point is not made in the comparative literature. Take two hypothetical examples to 
illustrate this point: 
(a) Let i and j be two brain regions, whose volumes for five species being analyzed are 
[1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000] and [1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, 1005]. The correlation 
between i and j is objectively 1.0, but it is clear that changes in size across species in 
region i are immensely larger than changes in region j. They are thus evolving at 
overwhelmingly different rates in spite of a perfect correlation as measured by Pearson’s 
r coefficient. 
(b) Let m and n be two brain regions, with a correlation of .5 in terms of how their sizes vary 
across species. This magnitude is considered an important relation in the comparative 
literature on neuroanatomy and cognition and is more representative of relations actually 
observed than the 1.0 relation between i and j in example (a) (Deaner et al., 2000, 2007; 
Shultz & Dunbar, 2010). However, while the hypothetical region m exhibits consistent 
directional selection for increases in size, changes in region n somewhat resemble a 
random walk (i.e., with a much less consistent direction). Even though they share 25% of 
variance, the overwhelming 75% of specific variance in each of the two regions means 
that the selection regime behind them may be considerably different: even though part of 
changes in m are in the same direction as changes in n, a non-negligible number are in the 
opposite direction. 
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Compounding the limitations of the correlative approach, no consensus has been reached as 
to which measure and operationalization is the most correlated to intelligence (Barton, 2012; 
Deaner et al., 2000, 2007; Dunbar, 1992; Healy & Rowe, 2006; Shultz & Dunbar, 2010). 
The present set of projects will examine the validity of the common approach of relying on 
NVMs as indicators or substrates of intelligence by testing the comparability of evolutionary 
trajectories of cognitive and neuroanatomical volume data in the primate phylogeny, and the 
comparability of the evolution of interrelations among components of general intelligence to the 
evolution of interrelations among neuroanatomical regions. 
The last decade has seen publications with a large amount of data on NVMs, increasing 
both the number of species and the number of specimens and measurements per species for data 
on volume of the brain and its regions (Isler et al., 2008; Navarrete et al., 2018). This strongly 
complements the frequently employed data originally collected by Stephan and colleagues 
(1981), based on one or a few specimens for each primate species, and allows confident 
estimations of the comparability of evolutionary trajectories for NVMs so that they can be 
contrasted to the results for G. Still, scarcely have neuroanatomical data been examined for their 
evolutionary patterns with phylogenetic comparative methods – brain size in primates has been 
examined for its degree of phylogenetic conservatism, but nothing else (Kamilar & Cooper, 
2013), while certain brain regions, such as cerebellum size, have been examined for their 
evolutionary rates only (Smaers et al., 2018). Analyses of both conservatism and evolutionary 
rates have been done on G (Fernandes et al., 2014). However, tests of fit for evolutionary models 
that indicate what selection regimes G and NVMs have been exposed to in primate phylogeny 
have simply not been conducted, let alone contrasted. Chapter 1 will thoroughly compare G and 
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the commonly studied NVMs in all of these aspects of evolutionary history: evolutionary 
conservatism, evolutionary rates, and selection regimes accounting for species differences. 
 
2. Do All Species Need General Intelligence? Potential Variations In the Strength of the 
Manifold 
 Factor analysis reveals the average strength of correlations among measures on a given 
sample (Woodley of Menie et al., 2015). As already reviewed, studies that employed factor 
analytic techniques on measures of cognitive performance using data on primate species have 
revealed that, on average, abilities are integrated (i.e., they exhibit correlations and a single, 
common factor explains a large portion of their variance). However, it is possible that in some 
primate taxa, cognitive abilities are more integrated than in others: It is plausible that species low 
on G have simply not evolved a strongly integrated G factor – they have not required a domain-
general cognitive system that recruits from more specialized abilities of more narrow domain. As 
such, species exhibiting low levels of G may perform well (and perhaps even excel) in some 
abilities independently of others, rather than exhibiting consistency in performance across tasks. 
While consistency across tasks implies strong factor loadings for most or all cognitive tasks, 
species with high performance in few tasks would show more unique, task-specific statistical 
variance. The novel statistical approach of continuous parameter estimation (Gorsuch, 2005) 
contains affordances that make feasible such an examination of variations in factor loadings in a 
dataset of species, as will be proposed and implemented in Chapter 2. 
 Examining this novel hypothesis, like examining the evolutionary trajectories of G 
compared to those of NVMs, illuminates what is known about the nature of G by going beyond a 
simple description of its average factor pattern. A hypothesis that clades differ in how related 
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cognitive abilities are, as fully outlined and unpacked in Chapter 2, derives from and requires 
evolutionary reasoning about the purpose of G. Species facing adaptive problems or 
opportunities that require G should not only evolve higher levels of it, but more generality of 
performance (i.e., successful problem-solving for multiple diverse challenges). As such, if this 
hypothesis is supported, it can be concluded that G is aptly termed general intelligence.  
 Just as the approach of looking at the comparability between G and NVMs through the 
lenses of phylogenetic comparative methods (rather than again through correlations) permits a 
novel perspective on that research problem, examining whether G exhibits factor loadings that 
are stronger in some taxa than in others permits a novel solution to the problem of whether G is a 
widespread phenomenon. The debate as to the existence of G has relied mostly and repeatedly on 
traditional factor analyses (Burkart et al., 2017); the approach proposed here permits testing the 
balanced notion that G is widespread in those species that need G for their local problem-solving 
and thus for their adaptation; in others, a manifold need not exist. In other words, whether factor 
loadings reveal a common factor in some taxa, but not in others, can be tested in a systematic and 
predictable manner. 
 
3. Are There Equivalent Variations in the Strength of the Manifold among Brain Regions? 
Further Tests of the Comparability between G and the Neuroanatomical Volumetric 
Approach 
 Considering the overwhelming weight given to NVMs in the comparative literature on 
cognition so far, further tests of the similarity of their evolutionary history to that of cognitive 
abilities are needed. In keeping with the goal of contrasting the evolutionary trajectory of G and 
of NVMs, it is important to realize that the relationship between (a) brain size and (b) the 
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strength of correlations among sizes of brain structures can also be tested. This parallels the tests 
done in Chapter 2, and permits examining if there is any systematic and predictable variation in 
how strongly brain structures are associated in terms of their size. 
 Studying this also has the potential of elucidating why some researchers conclude that 
brain structures have varied in size in concert through time whereas others argue for independent 
or so-called mosaic evolution of brain regions (Finlay et al., 2001; Smaers & Soligo, 2013). Like 
the debate about which NVM best predicts intelligence, the debate between those that defend 
mosaic evolution of brain regions and those that argue for concerted changes in sizes of brain 
regions has failed to examine potential reasons for variation among clades in extent of concerted 
or mosaic brain evolution. It is possible that in some clades, mosaic evolution is more strongly 
the norm, whereas in others the converse is true (Barton & Harvey, 2000). Larger brains, if 
indeed reflective of intelligence, may necessitate more coordination among structures, perhaps 
leading to concerted evolution of brain regions. This will be tested in Chapter 3. 
 
4. General Significance 
 Because tests of hypotheses implemented in the following studies are novel both in 
theory and in statistical application of relatively recent approaches not yet used in the G 
literature, caution will be used by carefully examining potential confounds and alternative 
analytical designs1. Together, these three studies have the potential of revealing signs of 
adaptative value in increasing levels of G in primate history, increasing strength of its manifold, 
and its comparability to so often used NVMs. Such a comparison is essential, considering the 
 
1 However, so as to not have the reader distracted from the main objectives of each study, several 
of these complementary analytical approaches will be presented in the Appendices. 
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weight that volumetric measures for the brain and some brain regions have carried for decades as 
the golden standard of substrates of intelligence in primate studies, leaving other putative 
anatomical substrates of intelligence (e.g., myelination, neuron density, short- and long-range 
connectivity, and even gyrification; Dicke & Roth, 2016; Roth & Dicke, 2012) with little 
attention, and perhaps consequently, little available comparative data. Already in 1979 (p. 85), 
noticing how simplistic or limited this approach might be, Ralph Holloway expressed the 
concern that: 
 
“By cathecting on size alone, all evolutionary paradigms become reduced to natural or 
genetic selection operating on incremental size increases and behavioral efficiency, 
which always has the underlying implicit structural argument that ‘intelligence’ equals 
‘brain size.’” 
 
The studies in the present work assess if future steps in studies of the neuropsychology of 
intelligence could benefit from continued exploration of the volume measures as substrates for 
G, or if further attention should be given to alternative characteristics of the brain. Together, they 
also have the potential of informing the degree to which G exhibits signs of adaptive value, and 
how much it varies predictably across species not only in size, but also in internal structure. By 
the same token, they have the potential of informing if associations among sizes of brain regions 
vary predictably across primate species. These insights can help guide future directions for the 
study of general intelligence and NVMs. 
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Chapter 1. Macroevolutionary Patterns and Processes for General Intelligence (G) and for 
Commonly Used Neuroanatomical Volume Measures in Primates: Low Convergence 
Indicates Largely Independent Selection Regimes 
 
1. Introduction 
Measures of cognitive performance are found to be highly associated in comparative 
analyses of primate species, giving rise to a common factor of intelligence G. The G factor is 
found both for ethological counts of novel problem-solving abilities (as measured, for instance, 
through the observation of innovation rates, extractive foraging, tool use, tactical deception, and 
social learning; Reader et al., 2011) and for controlled, laboratory tasks (Deaner et al., 2007). In 
fact, these methods lead to correlated indices of general intelligence at the cross-species level 
(Reader et al., 2011). These findings replicate evidence of a g factor across many mammal 
species studied so far, including primates and also rodents (for reviews, see Burkart et al., 2017; 
Galsworthy et al., 2014; Shaw & Schmelz, 2017).  
Importantly, it appears that measures on which G loads more strongly have been a main 
focus of selection pressures throughout primate evolutionary history, more so than the more 
specialized abilities, as the former exhibit faster evolutionary rates and more lability (Fernandes 
et al., 2014). In other words, G-central indicators display less evolutionary conservatism from 
ancestor to daughter lineages, with closely-related species tending to have more rapidly diverged 
with respect to more G-loaded measures of performance. These findings suggest that primate 
species with high success in solving a particular task also tend to exhibit high success in other 
cognitive adaptive challenges, and that a general factor is thus more parsimonious than 
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explanations involving the evolution of distinct and specialized abilities (for a review, see 
Burkart et al., 2017). 
 In spite of the increased interest and largely consistent findings on general intelligence 
across primates, there has been little empirical exploration of the neurological bases of general 
intelligence apart from correlative analyses with volumetric measures. The ‘folk impression’ - 
that brain size or the size of certain regions reflects intelligence (and thus can be used to track 
this across evolutionary history) - has been fundamental in the research traditions of 
anthropology and, more specifically, primatology. This intuitive impression has been a 
component of evolutionary thinking since its early history – Darwin (1871, p. 145), for instance, 
presumed that no one would doubt “that the large size of the brain in man, relatively to his body 
with that of the gorilla or orang, is closely connected with his higher mental powers”. This notion 
has also permeated influential works in zoology throughout the 20th century (e.g., Jerison, 1973). 
Many authors suggest that neuroanatomical volume measures (NVMs) can and should be used as 
a “proxy for intelligence” at the cross-species level (Shultz & Dunbar, 2010, p. 259). A long-
lasting debate exists about which NVM (i.e., the whole brain, the neocortex, the hippocampus, 
etc.) is mainly responsible for intelligence, while assuming that at least one of these measures is 
to a large extent responsible for the evolutionary trajectory of intelligence across the primate 
order. Each measure appears to exhibit associations with cognitive performance at the cross-
species level, but it is also essential to understand the limitations so that a comprehensive 
comparison can be made and questions that help us move forward can be better framed. A 
review of the information available regarding each of the most commonly used and defended 
NVMs, and of their relations to G, is conducted below, before the novel phylogenetic analyses 
on them and on G are detailed and compared as an original contribution of the present Chapter. 
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1.1. Brain Size 
 Empirical evidence supports the view that absolute brain size predicts cognitive ability in 
comparative studies of mammals (e.g., Barrickman et al., 2008; Byrne & Corp 2004; Deaner et 
al. 2007; Lefebvre et al., 2004; Reader et al., 2011), and specifically in primates it shows higher 
evolutionary correlations with G than other commonly used NVMs, such as the residual of brain 
volume against body size, neocortex volume and neocortex ratio (i.e., the ratio of neocortex 
volume relative to the volume of the rest of the brain), among others (Deaner et al., 2007). 
Absolute brain size appears also to be predictive of related traits, such as problem-solving tasks 
requiring self-control (MacLean et al., 2014). Species differences in proxies for broader 
intelligence tests, such as the transfer index test, are also predicted by absolute brain size (e.g., 
Gibson et al., 2001). As bigger brains can contain more neurons (and brains of larger size than 
expected for a given body size may contain what is commonly called extra neurons; Jerison, 
1973), the rationale is simply that bigger brains must have more processing capacity. Moreover, 
as G by definition is a complex and domain-general trait, it is not expected to be highly 
localized, but to draw from networks involving many brain regions, justifying the interest in total 
brain size as a substrate for G. Considering the strong allometric relations between body and 
brain size, and between brain size and the size of specific regions of the brain, many researchers 
use relative, residualized volume measures as an indicator of intelligence (for a review, see 
Healy & Rowe, 2007). These approaches have largely replaced the early reliance on the 
encephalization quotient (for a recent review, see Peñaherrera-Aguirre et al., 2017) which is 
highly unreliable as its equation varies strongly depending on which species are added and which 
are removed from the model. 
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 Brain size is clearly also used due to the principle of parsimony. As it has a considerable 
correlation with the size of most brain structures, and a non-negligible correlation with several 
non-volume measures that may affect cognition, such as gyrification, it is argued to serve as a 
good catch-all measure to explain intelligence (Falk & Gibson, 2001).  
However, approaches relying on brain size, be it absolute or relative to body mass, are 
not without criticisms and there is evidence that makes its defense as the best neuroanatomical 
measure for G dubious at best. Apes, including humans, and monkeys do not exhibit the largest 
brain, either in absolute terms or relative to body size (Dicke & Roth, 2016), contradicting the 
contention that this is a good neuroanatomical measure of intelligence. Furthermore, different 
innovation rates and problem-solving capacities are observed in species with similar brain sizes 
(Forss et al., 2016; Navarrete & Laland, 2015), indicating that other substrates for cognitive 
performance need to be invoked. These criticisms of the brain size approach are not new, 
however. Several scholars have expressed concerns with the recent rise of interest in absolute 
brain size in the field of complex cognition (e.g., Chittka & Niven, 2009; Healy & Rowe, 2007), 
renewing doubts and criticisms expressed decades ago (e.g., Holloway, 1966a,b), and 
considering that the field was developing in the direction of analyzing more fine-grained 
neuroanatomical candidates for intelligence rather than examining a broad and unspecific proxy 
such as brain size (Healy & Rowe, 2007). 
 
1.2. Major Candidate Brain Structures 
1.2.1 Neocortex size 
The neocortex has been proposed by many researchers to be responsible for complex 
cognitive information processing, especially in the form of the social brain hypothesis (Barton, 
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1996; Dunbar, 1992; Dunbar & Shultz, 2007; Shultz & Dunbar, 2010). This hypothesis proposes 
that, in order to cognitively monitor social interactions in increasingly complex groups (in terms 
of size and forms of relations) in primate evolution, larger neocortices were necessary. As such, 
it is a hypothesis about cognitive processing and executive functions (Shultz & Dunbar, 2010), 
rather than necessarily specifically about general intelligence. Still, the neocortex has been 
compared to other volume measures in examinations of the best neuroanatomical predictors of 
intelligence (e.g., Deaner et al., 2007), and also to ethological counts of intelligence-related 
behaviors (social learning, tool use, and innovation rates; Reader & Laland, 2002). However, 
neocortical size also correlates importantly with rates of tactical deception at a cross-species 
level in primates (Byrne, 1996), a variable that does appear to be an integral part of the G nexus 
(Fernandes et al., 2014; Reader et al., 2011). 
The case for the neocortex as a neuroanatomical indicator of intelligence, is further made 
by Kaas and Herculano-Houzel (2017), who suggest that, given the positive relation between 
neocortical volume and number of neurons, a larger neocortex has more neurons to analyze 
sensory inputs. Furthermore, the expanded cortical sheet would contain more cortical areas, 
permitting more computationally intensive information processing and storage, and decision 
making. However, they argue that this should manifest as cognitive specialization (Kaas & 
Herculano-Houzel, 2017), whereas general intelligence is, by definition, generalized contrary to 
this expectation, reducing the plausibility of the hypothesis of cognitive evolution focused on 
cortical complexification as a candidate explanation. 
The most common use of neocortex volume as a proxy for intelligence is the neocortex 
ratio (Dunbar, 1992; Shultz & Dunbar, 2010), operationalized as the size of the neocortex 
divided by the size of the rest of the brain. However, it too is not without criticism: It has been 
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questioned why the neocortex ratio would be a proper statistical approach to understanding the 
evolution of the neocortex, as the enlargement of any other parts of the brain would decrease the 
neocortex ratio, leading to expectations of lower intelligence. It is unclear why enlargements in 
other areas, several of which are known to be involved in complex cognition and to be part of 
neural circuits that include the neocortex, should be interpreted as decreasing intelligence 
(Gibson et al., 2001). Neocortical volume residualized against body size has also been used as an 
approach occasionally, although more in the sociality literature than in cognition studies (Deaner 
et al., 2000). 
Among components of the neocortex, the frontal lobe has been central to much 
discussion especially for the evolution of human intelligence. A common assumption is that high 
relative enlargement of the frontal lobe is the hallmark of human brain evolution. However, 
recent evidence using correctly scaled measures and phylogenetic approaches indicates that no 
such relative enlargement has occurred (Barton & Venditti, 2013), either for humans or apes in 
general. In fact, several non-hominoid branches in the primate phylogeny exhibit faster 
evolutionary rates than those for the former taxa. 
 
1.2.2. Cerebellum size 
More rarely discussed, but still tested and highlighted especially in more recent 
publications, is the potential role of the cerebellum in intelligence. It has been argued that an 
excessive emphasis on neocortical volume has obscured the putative role of the cerebellum and 
led to its relative neglect (Barton, 2012). Several lines of research indicate that cognitive 
capacities are predicted by cerebellar size, be it its absolute size or relative to broader measures 
such as body size. Firstly, as cerebellum size increases in primate lineages, its neuron density 
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exhibits a much less noticeable decline compared to the neuron density decline in larger 
neocortices (Barton, 2012). Secondly, the cerebellum has undergone rapid evolutionary 
expansion in the great ape clade (which also exhibits high G; Reader et al., 2011) (see Miller et 
al., 2019, for a brief review). Along with such volume increases, there are more cerebellar-
neocortical connections in apes (Barton, 2012; Rilling, 2006), with these two structures possibly 
evolving as a coordinated system (Barton & Harvey, 2000). While the cerebellum is usually 
considered to mainly have a role in motor control, it has long been proposed that it actually is a 
modulator and augmenter of neurologic function: Connections to motor areas would increase the 
skill of movement, while connections to cognitive areas would improve the skill of thought-
intensive problem solving (Leiner et al., 1989; Snider, 1950). Thus the observed increased 
connectivity to neocortical areas may be responsible for increased general cognitive ability.  
Evidence has accumulated that the cerebellum is involved in many cognitive domains, 
including planning and decision-making, associative learning, working memory, spatial and 
episodic memory, mental rehearsal, event prediction, and imitation (for a review, see Barton, 
2012). In fact, cerebellar size (residualized against body size and brain volume) is more 
predictive than neocortical size of tool use and extractive foraging (measures implicated in 
general intelligence; Reader et al., 2011; Fernandes et al., 2014) (Barton, 2012). More recent 
evidence suggests that evolutionary increases in cerebellar size, especially in the lateral 
cerebellar hemispheres, are correlated with general intelligence in primates through multiple 
independent evolutionary occurrences (Smaers et al., 2018). Considering these lines of evidence 
altogether, cerebellar size must be considered as one of the main and increasingly studied 
candidates in terms of the volumetric substrates of G. 
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1.2.3. Hippocampus size 
Although also rarely proposed as being directly responsible for broad, general 
intelligence, the hippocampus is often invoked as a structure that is integral to the information 
maintenance and cognitive control functions of the neocortex, especially the pre-frontal cortex 
(Blair, 2006), and as such figures as a candidate region for neuroanatomical regions responsible 
for executive functions (e.g., memory and attention) and intelligence when its absolute size is 
used to predict these variables (Shultz & Dunbar, 2010). Although positive associations are 
found with executive functions, little has been explored about its relationship with G as it is 
uncommon to examine hippocampus size in comparative analyses of intelligence, especially 
considering the limited amount of data on hippocampal volume for primates compared to other 
measures, and considering that the differences among primate species in hippocampal size are 
slight (Stephan et al., 1981). 
  
1.3. Beyond Correlations 
That volumetric measures of the brain, the neocortex, and the hippocampus all show 
correlations with intelligence is little debated. However, examining the evolutionary associations 
among traits, and therefore testing whether one may function as the main factor for variation in 
another during evolution is a more complex endeavor than simply looking at the correlations 
between variables. Inferring evolutionary processes for traits from correlations across extant 
species can be misleading. A trait that exhibits strong correlation with another may be under a 
different selection regime, display a different evolutionary trajectory, and only constrain the 
evolution of the other trait (thus permitting a window of variability within which no evolutionary 
influence may be exerted), rather than function as a driver of its evolution. This case can be 
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illustrated with recent studies that have identified different evolutionary trajectories for brain and 
body size in spite of strong correlation: Analyses of cichlid adaptive radiation indicates that body 
size exhibited recent bursts of rapid evolution that were not found for brain size – the latter 
evolved in a gradual manner (Gonzalez-Voyer et al., 2009). Many selection mechanisms may be 
responsible for the relative evolutionary independence of phenotypically and genetically related 
traits, among which it has been found, in a study of pinnipeds, that body and brain size 
evolutionary trajectories may be decoupled by sexual selection (Fitzpatrick et al., 2012). Other, 
hypothetical, scenarios are also possible: increases in brain size in a lineage may require body 
sizes that accommodate them, but larger body size may have already evolved before due to 
predation risk or other selection pressures. A similar rationale may be applied to the association 
between intelligence and NVMs: it is not necessarily the case that they need to evolve in tandem. 
G and certain (or all) NVMs may have been under different selection regimes and thus may 
exhibit different evolutionary trajectories, in spite of correlations. 
Another issue with the volumetric approach to understanding intelligence is that 
comparative studies indicate that neuronal density and gray matter density in many structures of 
the brain tend to be smaller in species with a larger brain volume (Barton, 2006; which also 
applies to the frontal lobes; Semendeferi et al., 2011). As such, evolutionary increases in NVMs 
can be deceptive: For example, in apes the cerebral cortex represents 70-82% of brain mass 
(more than in other primates) but holds only 19-30% of brain neurons (similar to or less than 
other mammals; Herculano-Houzel, Collins, Wong, & Kaas, 2007). Consequently, it is an 
expansion of white matter that is favored in larger brains to maintain conduction speed (Barton, 
2006; Herculano-Houzel et al., 2010; Wen & Chklovskii, 2005), with processing power increases 
thus not being the main outcome of the evolution of larger brains. While increased connectivity 
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between closely positioned neurons may exist in larger brains, it is decreased among different 
regions of the brain in spite of a higher number of axons in the white matter (Semendeferi et al., 
2011). As general intelligence is influenced by cortical connectivity, it is likely to have 
considerable independence from brain or neocortex volume, being also importantly influenced 
by other, non-volumetric factors. 
 It is undeniable that NVMs and intelligence show correlation at the cross-species level. 
However, to further understand the associations of G and NMs and examine the degree to which 
they share an evolutionary history, it is necessary to compare their evolutionary processes, 
namely what selection regimes they have been under, and to test if they are convergent. It is also 
essential to compare their rates of evolution, because even though they may be evolving in the 
same directions (with one increasing when the other increases, and decreasing when the other 
decreases, and thus are positively correlated across evolutionary history), G might be evolving at 
a faster rate than NVMs, thus necessitating that other covariates be invoked as potential 
substrates. The present study aims to address these questions. 
In sum, this study has the goal of examining the evolutionary history of G in primates as 
compared to that of the above commonly employed and defended neuroanatomical volume 
measures. Exploring all possible brain areas, each operationalized in many ways (e.g., absolute 
size, residualized against body size, or using its ratio to the rest of the brain, etc.) would 
constitute a largely exploratory approach that invites capitalization on chance and makes theory 
construction difficult. Rather, only already used NVMs and their specific operationalizations that 
have led to positive correlation coefficients with intelligence measures will be examined. Thus, 
this study builds on previous hypotheses and evidence. 
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2. Method 
2.1. Measures 
2.1.1. G 
Data on G were compiled by Reader and colleagues (2011), covering over 4000 
publications, and 69 species including four ethological dimensions or classes of cognitive 
abilities (social learning, tool use, innovation, and extractive foraging). Observed instances of a 
five dimension (tactical deception) were obtained from Byrne and Whiten (1988). These five 
variables refer to ethological counts of behaviors recorded in the literature (i.e., the primary data 
collection). Ethological counts for each of the five categories of behavior were registered in the 
database for each species (i.e., the secondary data collection), and residualized against research 
effort for the respective species (i.e., the number of ethological works published in general for 
each species across literatures; Reader et al., 2011).  
To permit an understanding of the meaning of G, it is important to conceptualize the five 
cognitive abilities comprised in it: 
(i) Tool use: The employment of an object to alter the form, position, or condition of another 
object, organism, or the user itself. This is a classic intelligence measure in 
primatology, and in anthropological studies of human evolution (see Matsuzawa, 
2001; McGrew, 1993) as performance on this domain is considered a direct indicator 
of the capacity to control one’s immediate environment (Darwin, 1871; Gibson and 
Ingold, 1993; Washburn, 1959; Wynn, 1988). Tool use has been demonstrated to be 
associated with other indices of intelligence in primates and other animals (Lefebvre 
et al., 2004; Reader & Laland, 2002). 
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(ii) Extractive foraging: The capacity to identify, access, and therefore obtain food items that 
are concealed in some way (e.g., buried, covered, or encased within a shell). This 
capacity relates to general intelligence both theoretically and empirically (Gibson, 
1986, Parker and Gibson, 1977, Reader et al., 2011; van Schaik and Isler, 2012), and 
exhibits considerably high evolutionary lability and evolutionary rates among primate 
species (Fernandes et al., 2014). 
(iii) Innovation: A new solution to complex social or technical problem, or the application of 
an already-existing solution to a novel complex problem. It relates to the capacity to 
ontogenetically adapt to new environmental conditions, and is thus considered a 
proxy for intelligence (Lefebvre et al., 2004; Reader & Laland, 2002; Sol et al., 2005, 
2008). 
(iv) Social learning: The capacity to learn skills and acquire information from family 
members and others in the social group. Social learning is often considered a central 
component of social or Machiavellian intelligence (Byrne & Whiten, 1988, 
Humphrey, 1976; Whiten and Byrne, 1997) and associated with broader intelligence 
(Reader et al., 2011). 
(v) Tactical deception: Behaviors that attract the attention of others to or away from self to 
confuse, mislead, manipulate, exploit, take advantage of, or otherwise damage others 
to one’s benefit in a way that gives the appearance of non-malevolence (Byrne & 
Whiten, 1985). This capacity is also central do Machiavellian intelligence. In spite of 
exhibiting the lowest factor loadings from G and lowest evolutionary rates among 
these five ethological measures of cognitive ability (Fernandes et al., 2014), its 
evolutionary lability is higher than that of most mammalian traits, even behavioral 
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(Blomberg et al., 2003) and its factor loading from the G factor is moderate to high 
(Reader et al., 2011). 
 
For a much expanded conceptualization, a review of existing operationalizations used in 
the original ethological observations compiled by Reader and colleagues (2011) for the 
databased used in the present study, and behavioral examples of the five cognitive abilities, see 
Appendix A. 
 
Primary Data Collection 
 Reader et al.’s (2011) database includes publications from a wide span of years, with thus 
primary data collection having been implemented at different moments of the development (and 
refinement) of ethological methods. Many initial observations recorded (although certainly a few 
recent ones as well; see Appendix A for examples) derive from unstructured field observation 
and are anecdotal in nature. Such pilot observations, however, were essential for the 
development of basic understandings of primate behavior and the subsequent organization of 
detailed, rigorous ethograms. Ethograms, progressively more used across time in the primary 
data contained in the database employed here, are inventories of behaviors organized 
taxonomically; that is, there is commonly a hierarchical categorization of behaviors (Herring, 
2017), ranging from very specific behaviors (e.g., visually following the gaze of kin), to broad 
categories of interrelated behaviors (e.g., social behavior, including the above example, but also 
play behaviors, affiliative behaviors, etc.). Though ethograms may vary from research group to 
research group based on their particular focal interest, definitions included in ethograms tend to 
be based on previous observations, discussions, and agreements available in the literature. 
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Through the refinement of ethograms, the purpose of clear, pre-established definitions was 
noted: Many authors initially did not carefully provide an explicit definition of their behaviors of 
focus in their reports, analyses, and discussion (Shumaker et al., 2011). Note that careful 
application of the detailed definitions reviewed in Appendix A, in the ethological observations 
published throughout the primatological literature and collated by Reader et al. (2011), were left 
to the primatologists who submitted the records, and in some cases their scope was probably 
stretched or reduced. Careful adherence to strict and detailed definitions increased as ethological 
practices were refined and inter-observer reliability sought. 
Importantly, the field of ethology, including its use in primatology, has evolved to rely on 
multiple observers, and to prioritize records exhibiting high inter-observer reliability. Though the 
estimation of reliability is still more common in studies relying on a laboratory setting (e.g., 
Povinelli et al., 2009) and personality assessment (Briffa & Weiss, 2010), it grew over time as an 
important aspect of all ethological observations. Studies have been developed exclusively to test 
inter-rater reliability of ethogram-guided observations in the wild, demonstrating that, with 
proper training and ethogram clarity, very high inter-observer reliability estimates are attained 
(e.g., Coelho & Bramblett, 1981).  
Many methods for behavioral measurement have been developed, for diverse and 
complementary, but sometimes partly overlapping purposes (MacDonald, Stewart, Stopka, & 
Yamaguchi, 2000). Considering the number of publications included in the database compiled by 
Reader and colleagues (2011) and their spread across decades, these alternative approaches have 
each been used numerous times in the database. As such, methodological approaches for primary 
data collection in studies collated in the database used in the present study were not 
homogeneous. Sampling methods include: 
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a) Ad libitum sampling, where behaviors are recorded in an informal, non-systematic way 
but as much as possible is recorded. This approach is most useful for pilot observations to obtain 
a survey of potential behaviors of future focus; 
b) Focal sampling, where attention is given to one individual specifically but to all its 
behaviors, and its observations may or may not be systematically guided by an ethogram. This 
approach is especially useful if the researcher is interested in long, complex behavior that cannot 
be easily identified if attention is diffused across the community or sparsed across time; 
c) All-occurrance sampling, where attention is given to a specific type of behavior, 
irrespective of which individual is performing it, providing information on the natural rate of 
occurrance of a behavior of interest; 
 
Irrespective of the approach employed, data sampled can also be recorded in a variety of 
ways, employed to varying degrees throughout the literature used as source for the database used 
in the present study: 
a) Continuous: The duration, frequency, and sequence of all behaviors are recorded; 
b) Instantaneous: Current behavior(s) identified in a predetermined interval (e.g., every 
30 seconds) are recorded and detailed; 
c) One-zero: Current behavior(s) identified in a predetermined interval are only marked 
as eithered having happened or not, with not detailed descriptions. 
 
Certain combinations predominate: focal sampling and continuous record; scan sampling 
and instantaneous record; and focal sampling and one–zero record. Instantaneous and one-zero 
approaches can be useful to obtain a general idea of the distribution of behavior states in a 
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community, being most useful if potentially observable behaviors of interest are easily 
identifiable and of relatively long duration, otherwise they can be missed. Simultaneous and 
continuous focal sampling of all observable individuals in a group is arguably the most accurate 
and information-rich combination of approaches, but it is not commonly attainable, and unlikely 
that most studies in the database used in the present study employed this combination 
(MacDonald et al., 2000). Computer-based recording and the use of software to subsequently 
track and identify individuals and behaviors has facilitated the implementation of simultaneous 
and conitnuous focal sampling of as many individuals as possible, but it is both recent (thus not 
being readily widespread in most of the past accumulated literature and therefore the present 
database) and frequently invasive to the community, compared to alternative but more limited 
technologies (e.g., radiotracking) or compared to a single-researcher observation in certain 
circumstances that might alert or arouse individuals observed. Moreover, though continuous 
focal sampling can be information-rich, systematic comparisons of sampling and recording 
approaches have shown that instantaneous (i.e., interval) recording can in certain situations be 
not only more efficient but also reduce bias, as it is easier to employ in difficult conditions and 
may reduce researchers' bias toward certain forms of behaviors (Rose, 2000). 
 
Secondary data collection 
Judgment of whether a given behavior pattern sampled, recorded, and published qualified 
in one of the five categories of behavior was made the expert author of each original article 
(Reader et al., 2011). For instance, behaviors originally described as “novel”, “innovative”, 
“creative”, “never seen before”, among close synonyms, were included in the “innovation” 
category. Similarly, behavior descriptions containing keywords that connoted that an individual 
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learned about resources, the environment, or others from conspecifics (rather than by 
themselves) were included in the “social learning” category. As previously argued by Lefebvre 
(1997) and Reader and colleagues (2011; Reader, 2003; Reader & Laland, 2001), this approach 
avoids subjective bias on the part of the researcher responsible for collating data for the database. 
It must be emphasized that the behavior reports were not derived from uninformed casual 
observations, but rather came from experienced, established scientists extensively familiar with 
their subjects (Reader, 2003). Furthermore, observers themselves have more information about 
the context in which behaviors occurred than Reader and colleagues had for the collation of the 
database, and the context matters for the categorization of the behavior: for instance, the act of 
placing a potato inside a small body of water (as observed in Japanese macaques; Kawamura, 
1959) may be indicative of innovation, of tool use, or of deception, depending on the context in 
which it happens, and the particular purpose it serves in that specific behavior instance. If it is a 
novel occurrence, it may be classified as innovation; if instead the behavior is common in the 
species (as it is today in Japanese macaques) but the behavior in the case of this particular 
instance served to conceal the food item from conspecifics, then it may be classified as 
deception; and so on. 
Behavior descriptions and their categorization were admittedly sometimes broad enough 
to could satisfy more than one of the five broad categories. For instance, it was not uncommon to 
find descriptions of social tool use, innovative tool use, innovative deception, among other 
combinations. To avoid conflation and thus overestimation of the strength of the positive 
manifold, such cases were not counted as duplicates, but rather only counted once if one aspect 
predominated (e.g., either tool use or innovation in the case of innovative tool use), or deleted 
altogether from the database if no clarity existed (Reader et al., 2011). 
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Secondary data collection was implemented by multiple researchers. After having 
established search, consideration, and collation rules, they worked independently for the first 
10% of records examined in order to estimate inter-rater reliability. Martin and Bateson’s (1986) 
index of concordance was used to this end. High agreement was attained, ranging from .83 to .95 
depending on which of the five cognitive abilities was considered (Reader, 2003; Reader & 
Laland, 2001). 
Though the present study employs Reader and coleagues’ (2011) database, see the 
Discussion section for a proposal on future, long-term avenues of novel efforts for secondary 
data collection and therefore future refinements in what is possible to be estimated from the 
database. 
 
Statistical Estimation of G 
In previous literatures using this dataset, a G factor was estimated in an exploratory 
fashion using principal components analysis, principal axis factoring (Reader et al., 2011), and 
subsequently using unit weighted factor scoring (Fernandes et al., 2014). These approaches led to 
highly convergent factors. Even so, as factor loadings produced with principal components 
analysis and principal axis factoring in small samples are less reliable than those computed with 
unit-weighted factoring because of large standard errors (Figueredo et al., 1995; Gorsuch, 1983), 
the G factor used in the present analysis was derived from the unit weighted factor estimated by 
Fernandes and colleagues (2014). It explained 62% of the variance among the five cognitive 
capacities (see Chapter 2 for further details on the factor estimation and for factor loadings, 
which replicated the results of Fernandes et al., 2014). 
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2.1.2 Brain size 
Data on 3813 specimens corresponding to 176 non-human primate species are available for 
overall brain size (Isler et al., 2008). Measurement is highly reliable, not needing correction 
formulae, given very high inter-researcher reliability in the estimations made (Isler et al., 2008). 
Moreover, for the overwhelming majority of data points, the original collecting locality and other 
information for the specimens are known, thereby avoiding misclassification with respect to 
sister species. Data from sources other than Isler and colleagues’ own measurements were added 
from the literature by the original authors for species with insufficient data. 
 
2.1.3. Neocortical, cerebellar, and hippocampal size 
Stephan and colleagues amassed a database comprising the volumes of multiple 
neuroanatomical regions for 45 primate species. As is common practice for neuroanatomical 
analyses involving primate species (e.g., Deaner et al., 2007; Dunbar, 1992; Shultz & Dunbar, 
2010), this database will be employed. However, it will be combined with recently published 
data made available by Navarrete and colleagues (2018) on more species and more specimens for 
many of the same species, totaling a 67-species database for the neocortex, hippocampus, and 
cerebellum. 
 
2.1.4. Body mass 
Data on body size, obtained from (Isler et al., 2008), permits residualizing NVMs against 
it to examine if it is relative or absolute NVMs that exhibit more evolutionary similarity to G. 
The updated data source compiled by Isler and colleagues will be used, as it not only includes 
original data for the same species as brain size, but also adds data points reported in previous 
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publications that focused on examining the validity of body mass measurement in primatology. 
Chief among these is Smith and Junger’s (1997) effort to examine the shortcomings of previous 
sources commonly employed in comparative analyses, and to provide updated, more reliable 
estimates.  
 
While it served the field immensely by motivating discussions about the neuroanatomical 
basis of intelligence for decades, the encephalization quotient will not be included in present 
analyses as a measure in analyses given (1) the now almost unanimous agreement upon its severe 
statistical limitations and biases, (2) its inferiority to absolute or residualized NVMs in its 
capacity to predict intelligence, and (3) its high variation in encephalization values assigned to 
species depending on which are included in analyses (for reviews, see Falk & Gibson, 2001; 
Peñaherrera-Aguirre et al., 2017). 
For species with non-negligible sexual dimorphism, female measures will be used as is 
common practice (Isler et al., 2008), considering that the larger male size is generally mostly the 
result of intrasexual competition (Mitani et al., 1996; Plavcan & van Schaik, 1997) rather than an 
ecological adaptation for higher cognitive processing. 
All variables will be log-transformed prior to analyses as is common practice in 
comparative studies, due to the observed high skewness inherent in cross-species data (Harvey, 
1982). NVMs that are commonly residualized against body size in the cognitive literature will be 
included in both raw (i.e., absolute) and residual form in the analyses2. Residuals will be 
 
2 It should be noted that controlling for the so-called ‘effects’ of body size on the traits 
studied (on the basis that it may constrain/influence their evolution) is a common but 
controversial approach. It has been argued that controlling for size also removes adaptive 
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computed with ordinary least square regressions (OLS). The proportion of the neocortex to the 
rest of the brain (i.e., neocortex ratio), a common index in the comparative literature, will also be 
included in addition to raw variables and residuals. However, following Shultz and Dunbar’s 
(2010) inclusion of the raw hippocampal volume only, and given the lack of other comparative 
studies that focused on residual hippocampal data specifically in general intelligence analyses, 
here the hippocampus volume will not be residualized against body size. 
For all analyses, a phylogenetic tree will be obtained from 10ktrees.fas.harvard.edu 
(Arnold et al., 2010). Phylogenetic trees represent the pattern of relatedness among species, with 
speciation events as nodes and daughter lineages that result from speciation as branches 
emanating from a node (for illustrative examples, see Figures 1.1 and 1.2; and Figure 2.2 from 
Chapter 2 for a real example from the primate order). Arnold et al. (2010) made available a 
consensus tree for the primate order, relying both on molecular data and fossil data available on 
the literature. Considering one goal of the present study involves estimating evolutionary rates of 
change on measures across time, the phylogenetic tree selected had branch lengths representing 
time elapsed since speciation (i.e., so-called ultrametric tree), with the horizontal axis of the tree 
reflecting time in millions of years. Furthermore, most phylogenetic comparative methods that 
will be used in the present study, including estimation of trait conservatism, have been developed 
 
variance (stemming from adaptations to maintain functional equivalence or from a common 
cause of variation in size and in the trait in question; Fleagle, 1985; Jeschke & Kokko, 2009; 
Roff, 2011; Smith, 1980), thus reducing the power of the traits as predictors of intelligence when 
applied to NVMs (Deaner et al., 2007). Interpretations of results of residualized measures are 
done with caution, considering this caveat. 
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for this type of tree topology (Garamszegi, 2014). Data for traits of interest, to be analyzed using 
the phylogenetic tree through the methods described below, can be entered for extant species 
(i.e., at the tips of the tree). Rather than being independent data points, the data for the species 
have a pattern of interdependence determined by the tree topology, and this permits estimating 
(a) how conserved the trait in question is, (b) the rate of change for the trait across time (i.e., 
branch lengths for the tree), (c) the fit of several selection models to explain the extant species 
variation in the trait; as fully detailed in the section below. 
 
2.2. Analyses  
2.2.1. Phylogenetic signal 
Phylogenetic signal (PS), frequently termed conservatism or inertia, refers to the degree 
of trait preservation across evolutionary time in a phylogeny. It reflects how much sister lineages 
are more similar to each other than to more distantly-related lineages on a given trait being 
analyzed. If a trait has been largely conserved and has not been too labile across evolutionary 
time, closely-related lineages will be highly similar to each other, more so than to distantly 
related species. Traits with null (i.e., 0) phylogenetic signal thus exhibit as much difference 
among sister lineages as they do among lineages that were separated further back in time, 
indicating that even in short evolutionary spans separating sister lineages, evolution has led to 
considerable divergence and the trait is thus highly labile. This suggests that a strong selection 
force has operated on at least some of the lineages, making them differ markedly from sister 
lineages. On the other hand, traits with a PS value of 1.0 exhibit high conservatism, meaning that 
sister lineages have not differentiated importantly on the trait. Note that high conservatism does 
not imply that the trait has absolutely stagnated and exhibited a complete lack of change 
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throughout all the phylogeny – this would be an unrealistic scenario as, across millions of years 
separating lineages, some changes are bound to occur. Instead, a trait is considered conserved 
(with PS of 1.0) if its changes across time are the result of a perfectly random walk (also termed 
Brownian motion; Felsenstein, 1985) where its values on the various lineages in the phylogeny 
go back and forth in no consistent direction. As in Brownian motion there is no consistent, 
directional selection on the trait but rather changes in random and varying directions, distantly 
related species will on average differ more markedly on the given trait than sister species that 
have just speciated, simply because distantly related species have had more time for random 
variations produced by the Brownian motion. As such, high PS values indicate that most species 
have not been under any important and consistent selection regime, although random changes 
still make lineages slowly diversify across millions of years. 
Figure 1.1 provides an illustrative example of scenarios that would lead to low and to 
high PS estimates in body weight, an immediately relatable and easily understandable variable. 
While in Figure 1.1A values for sister species are more similar than when they are compared to 
more distant species (exhibiting PS close to 1.0), in Figure 1.1B values are just as dissimilar 
when comparing closely-related species as when comparing distantly-related species (exhibiting 
PS close to 0). Note that, in Figure 1.1A, sister species do not need to have identical values for 
PS to be considered high and conform to a Brownian motion expectation. Although the 
phylogenetic tree used in analyses in the present study are much larger, the rationale applies 
equally: Low values on PS indicate that, on average, sister lineages are just as dissimilar as 
distant lineages. 
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Figure 1.1. Illustrative examples of high and low phylogenetic signal. (A) High 
phylogenetic signal scenario for body mass for four hypothetical primate species: Closely-related 
lineages are more similar than distantly-related ones. (B) Low phylogenetic signal scenario for 
the same trait: Closely-related species differ markedly in body size, approximately just as much 
as they differ on average from distantly-related species. 
 
Pagel’s λ and Blomberg et al’s K (Kamilar & Copper, 2013; Nunn, 2011) will be used to 
estimate PS for all variables in the present study. Both indices of phylogenetic signal will be 
used considering that there is no consensus in the literature as to which index better reflects the 
true pattern of conservatism (Münkemüller et al., 2012). K as a statistic tends to be an 
underestimate of true PS at low to intermediate levels, and λ tends to be an overestimate at 
intermediate to high levels, in simulation studies. As such, K and λ have produced considerably 
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divergent results in simulations and in empirical data (Fernandes, 2014; Münkemüller et al., 
2012), sharing as little as 34% of the variance in estimated PS at times. A more accurate 
estimation of PS can be obtained using both metrics.  
Moreover, K contains a unique feature: It permits the assessment of whether a trait is 
more conserved than expected under Brownian motion, whereas λ estimates range from 
absolutely no conservatism (0) to Brownian motion (1). A value higher than 1 therefore can be 
estimated for K, without an upper bound. Values higher than 1 indicate that close relatives are 
even more similar to each other than would be expected if a Brownian motion existed, 
suggesting that trait stagnation has taken place. Recall that Brownian motion is frequently a 
parsimonious model for most traits that are not under strong selection because it allows for 
random changes to slowly crop up in traits across time (Felsenstein, 1988); K > 1 on the other 
hand indicates that even random changes have been reduced or halted across evolutionary time, 
suggesting not only a lack of directional selection for changes but also strong constraint on any 
changes altogether. The higher than 1 the value for K, the stronger the stasis across time. This 
appears to be the case, for instance, of absolute brain size in primate phylogeny (Kamilar & 
Copper, 2013). 
 
2.2.2. Evolutionary rates 
Trait changes across time do not necessarily occur at the same rate for different variables. 
Traits under directional selection, for example, may exhibit rapid changes, making lineages 
differentiate from each other rapidly. Taking the average amount of difference on a given trait 
among lineages, and weighting it by the time span of the phylogenetic tree yields an estimate of 
the average evolutionary rate for the trait; that is, the amount of change per million years. Figure 
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1.2 illustrates how evolutionary rates may be inferred from tip data (i.e., extant species). Note 
that the estimates of evolutionary rates indicate the average rate observed for the phylogenetic 
tree as a whole, whereas estimation of the precise evolutionary rate at any particular point in time 
in the phylogeny would require data on ancestor lineages (i.e., data on specimens that lived in the 
past, between the root and the tip of the phylogeny, rather than solely using tip species data). 
 
Figure 1.2. Illustrative example of the outcomes of two different evolutionary scenarios 
of evolutionary rates, upon the body mass of three species. (A) Low average evolutionary rate, 
reflecting small variance among species values in body mass. (B) Faster average evolutionary 
rate, reflecting larger variance among species values in body mass. 
 
Potentially even under Brownian motion where trait changes occur in random and 
frequently change directions, trait changes may occur at fast rates, provided that the trait has 
little to no impact on fitness (even when its values vary widely). This has been demonstrated in 
simulations (Revell et al., 2008), but is an unlikely scenario with real data, as it is unlikely that a 
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trait (especially related to cognition or neuroanatomy) would permit wide and fast variations in 
random directions without impacts on fitness. As such, it is expected that, if fast evolutionary 
rates are identified for the traits in the present study, they will be on variables that exhibit a small 
phylogenetic signal (rather than the random walk of Brownian motion) and which exhibit signs 
of directional selection towards an optimum (see Section 2.2.3 for a description of how this will 
be assessed). 
Evolutionary rates will be estimated with the Geiger package for R. Geiger estimates the 
average evolutionary rate for a given trait in the phylogeny (in this case, the phylogenetic tree for 
the primate order) by calculating the difference in scores among sister lineages and weighting 
that difference by the length of their branches (i.e., the time elapsed since they speciated), in 
millions of years. Then, taking the results for all pairs of lineages, the aggregate weighted 
difference is produced for that trait. This reflects how much, on average, primate lineages have 
changed per million years for the trait in question. NVMs and G can thus be compared in terms 
of their evolutionary rates by repeating this procedure for each measure described in the 
Measures section. Standardized scores (Z-scores, with evolutionary rates reflecting average 
number of standard deviations of change in each measure per million years) will be used as 
standardized scores are ideal for comparing traits that have different metrics (Hunter & 
Hamilton, 2002). Clearly, G and volumetric measures are not measured in the same metric, thus 
standardizing them permits a meaningful comparison. Note that, as previously described, all 
variables will be log-transformed for all analyses, a practice that also helps avoid overestimation 
of evolutionary rates for the traits with high average values (Adams, 2013; Gingerich, 2009; 
O'Meara et al., 2006). To protect against the possibility that the evolutionary rate reported for 
any variable is inflated by the standardization process, the coefficient of variance of all variables 
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was checked for comparability. No inflation was detected. The rationale, procedure and results 
for this check are described in Appendix B. 
 
2.2.3. Selection regimes 
As reviewed above, Brownian motion is a common approximation of the pattern of 
evolution behind traits. Recall that Brownian motion refers to the null model of evolution of a 
trait simply reflecting the passage of time, with no particular direction of trait change (i.e., 
consistent increases or decreases) and no alteration in the evolutionary speed (i.e., acceleration or 
deceleration), but rather reflecting a random walk under a stable rate (Nunn, 2011). Many traits 
in animal datasets and specifically in the primate order do not conform to Brownian motion 
evolution (Blomberg et al., 2003; Kamilar & Cooper, 2013). Testing for a phylogenetic signal 
shows if traits are not as conserved as would be expected under a Brownian motion model, but 
does not clarify why one trait exhibits high lability and another exhibits high conservatism in the 
phylogeny of interest; that is, simply testing for the phylogenetic signal of a trait does not tell us 
why they have diverged or failed to diverge from the Brownian motion expectation. To examine 
what selection regime led to divergence from the Brownian motion null expectation for any 
given variable, several models have been developed that each add a parameter to the null model 
testing the fit of Brownian motion to data (for a review, see Peñaherrera-Aguirre & Fernandes, 
2018; Hernández et al., 2013). These parameters each test an aspect of evolution; for instance, 
one tests whether the trait exhibits a sign of having accelerated in evolutionary rate (thus 
becoming more of a target of selection), another tests whether the data for the variable conform 
to a pattern of niche filling whereby rapid change in the root of the phylogeny is followed by 
progressively more stagnation in evolutionary changes. While no model single-handedly 
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provides a detailed, comprehensive explanation of evolutionary changes in the trait in question 
neither do they provide nuances about microevolutionary specificities for any single lineage in 
the phylogeny, the models each test a possible scenario of the selection regime governing the 
general pattern of evolution for that trait. As such, they each signal about an aspect in the overall 
trend for the trait being analyzed, and help us understand why that trait exhibited low or high 
phylogenetic signal or low or high evolutionary rates. As each alternative model adds exactly 
one parameter relative to the Brownian motion model, the fit and significance of each can be 
tested using a likelihood ratio test. 
Each trait will be examined under three evolutionary models: acceleration, early burst, 
and Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU), as detailed below (cf. Peñaherrera-Aguirre & Fernandes, 2018; 
Hernández et al., 2013). 
I) Acceleration: Changes in a trait of interest may have become more essential to 
evolutionary success (i.e., survival and reproduction), having thus become more intensely the 
target of selection for modifications. This model tests whether the evolutionary rate for changes 
in a given trait has accelerated (Pagel, 1999). Relative to the Brownian motion model, it adds the 
parameter 𝛿, which when larger than 1 suggests accelerated evolution towards the tree tips, and 
thus taxon-specific adaptations; values lower than 1 suggest deceleration over evolutionary time.  
II) Early burst (EB): The possibility that lineages in a clade exhibit quick diversification 
in a trait followed by slowed change is a common hypothesis in ecology (Moen & Morlon, 2014) 
and may also lead to deviation from Brownian motion. This phenomenon is expected when new 
ecological niches open up and become saturated over time. The EB model (Harmon et al., 2010) 
permits testing this possibility by assessing slowed evolution. It differs from the previous model 
in that it estimates whether there has been an exponential decrease of the evolutionary rate of the 
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trait over time (Peñaherrera-Aguirre & Fernandes, 2018), by adding the parameter a relative to 
the Brownian motion model. When this parameter is estimated as zero it is equivalent to 
evolution under Brownian motion, whereas it is assumed that there is niche-filling (i.e., rapid 
change) followed by an exponential decrease of evolutionary rates if the value is less than 0. 
III) Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU): An adaptive problem or a set of adaptive problems can 
sometimes exist for multiple taxa, which converge towards an adaptation. An optimal value 
(with directional selection towards it) may thus exist for a trait across taxa; for instance, pressure 
may have existed somewhat consistently towards a higher level of intelligence across many 
primate lineages. The OU model tests a parameter (α) against the Brownian motion null model, 
for the strength of a selection force; that is, a selection pressure towards a certain value for most 
taxa in the phylogeny (Hansen, 1997). Although often associated with stabilizing selection, the 
OU model actually simply examines whether the trait is being selected toward an optimum point, 
which can be achieved not only through stabilizing selection but also through directional 
selection (Ingram et al., 2012). The α values estimated by the OU model can range from 0 to 
infinity.  
While a value of 1 for 𝛿 and a value of 0 for a and α mean perfect conformation of the 
data to Brownian motion for the variable being analyzed, no other standard values for cutoffs or 
comparisons exist, other than comparing the estimates against those found for other variables in 
the study, and testing their significance against the Brownian motion model. In other words, 
values range to negative and positive infinity, and their purpose is to be used to compare several 
traits, in addition to examining which significantly depart from the Brownian motion 
expectation. Likelihood ratio tests will be used to determine whether the fit of each model for 
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each measure was statistically different from Brownian motion. This will permit objectively 
determining if the models were a better fit than this null hypothesis.  
 
3. Results  
3.1 Phylogenetic Signal  
The phylogenetic signal (PS) for G, cerebellum size, and neocotex size was low when 
estimating K, and low to medium when estimating λ. It was consistently higher (reflecting less 
evolutionary lability and thus stronger conservation) for other NVMs. These results are presented 
in detail in Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1.  
Phylogenetic signal estimates (Pagel’s λ and Blomberg’s K) reflecting the degree of 
conservatism of general intelligence (G) and of the neuroanatomical volume measures in the 
primate phylogeny 
Measure λ K 
G factor .62*† .13* 
Residual brain size .96*† .34*† 
Residual neocortex size .44*† .43† 
Residual cerebellum size .46* .18* 
Neocortex ratio .88† 1.74† 
Absolute brain size .99† 3.31*† 
Absolute neocortex size .99† 1.46† 
Absolute hippocampus size .98† 1.00† 
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Absolute cerebellum size .99† 1.68† 
Absolute body mass .99† 1.98† 
Note: * denotes the parameter value is significantly (p < .05) different from the Brownian motion 
model; † denotes the parameter value is significantly higher than zero. 
 
Only residual cerebellum size and G exhibited a K value not significantly higher than 0 
(and in the case of λ, only residual cerebellum size). This indicates that only in these variables 
primate lineages have differentiated radically relative to ancestor taxa (and therefore to sister 
lineages), retaining only a small or negligible degree of conservatism, while other measures 
retain an important degree of conservatism in spite of millions of years of speciation. Recall that 
a PS value of 0 indicates that sister taxa are no more similar to each other than they are to distant 
lineages, indicating that selection completely erased or replaced the pattern of shared ancestry on 
the variable in question producing intense changes in most lineages (either towards converging 
values, or towards disparate values across lineages). Analyses of selection regimes presented 
subsequently in this Chapter will help elucidate what selection regime(s) is or are behind the 
high evolutionary lability of G and residual cerebellum. 
Still, not only in G and residual cerebellum size, but rather in all residualized variables, λ 
was found to be significantly lower than the expectation of Brownian motion (PS = 1.0), 
suggesting that these variables exhibit at least some evolutionary lability. This was also the case 
for all residualized variables and the G factor when K was used to estimate PS, except for 
residualized neocortex size. Recall that, theoretically, variables perfectly conforming to 
Brownian motion exhibit a random walk of slow changes in varying directions, making sister 
lineages more similar to each other than they are to distant relatives. Such traits would be 
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considered conserved. In contrast, G and residualized NVMs exhibit a phylogenetic history with 
a significant sign of selection relative to the conservation assumption of the Brownian motion 
value of 1.0, although only G and residual cerebellar size exhibit PS not significantly different 
from 0. 
A different picture was found for absolute (i.e., non-residualized) NVMs and body mass 
however, which not only exhibited the highest or close to highest possible λ values, but also 
surpassed 1.0 in K estimates in most cases, indicating that they are even more conserved than 
expected through Brownian motion. Recall that K > 1 suggests stasis or severe constraint in 
evolutionary change, leading sister taxa to be even more similar to each other than in cases 
where there is random slow change in varying directions; it appears that absolute NVMs conform 
to this pattern, especially brain size, showing a K value more than three times higher than would 
be found if it conformed to Brownian motion. 
To summarize, the pattern of evolutionary lability estimated through λ and K suggests 
that variability with respect to absolute NVMs and body mass tend to be selected against or 
constrained in the primate phylogeny. Once controls for body mass are implemented for NVMs, 
it can be shown that there is some lability, but usually not as much as for G except for the 
cerebellum and, to a lesser degree, the neocortex.  
 
3.2 Evolutionary Rates 
In analyses of evolutionary rates, non-residualized G and residualized G exhibited higher 
rates relative to NVMs, which were almost all below .05, as displayed in Figure 1.3. The 
exception is cerebellum size, both with and without body size residualization: its evolutionary 
rates were approximately two thirds as fast as those for G. Although residual neocortex size and 
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residual brain size exhibited higher evolutionary rates than the remaining NVMs, their rate was 
only approximately half of that observed for the residual cerebellum. These results permit 
ranking of the examined NVMs into three main groups in terms of evolutionary rates: (1) 
residual and absolute cerebellar size were fastest, (2) residual neocortex and residual brain size 
were intermediate, and (3) other NVMs and body size were slowest, evolving up to an order of 
magnitude more slowly than G. 
 
Figure 1.3. Estimated evolutionary rate in standard deviations per million years of G, of 
neuroanatomical volume indicators residualized and non-residualized against body mass, and of 
body mass, in a comparable metric after Z-score transformation. Bars represent standard errors of 
the mean. 
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3.3 Selection Regimes 
A similar pattern of contrast between G, residual cerebellum and residual neocortex, and 
other measures, is suggested by the selection model comparisons, as presented in Table 1.2. The 
δ estimates were of high magnitude for G, around an order of magnitude higher than those 
estimated for residualized NVMs except for the cerebellum (presenting intermediate values), 
whereas non-residualized NVMs exhibited either no acceleration, or negative acceleration in the 
case of brain size (which is compounded by a negative, exponential acceleration identified with 
the a parameter of the early burst model). In accordance with this difference among measures, G 
exhibited a strong trend toward a selection optimum throughout the phylogeny, as can be 
observed with the α parameter of the OU model.  
 
Table 1.2.  
Parameter estimates for rate of acceleration, early-burst (EB), Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU), and 
phylogenetic signal (PS) models of evolution of species-level general intelligence (G) and of the 
neuroanatomical volume measures in the primate phylogeny 
Measure Acceleration (δ) Early burst (a) Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (α) 
G factor 49.43* .00 .34* 
Residual brain 4.28* .00 .03* 
Residual neocortex 7.25* .00 .08* 
Residual cerebellum 19.74* .00 .14* 
Neocortex ratio 1.23 .00 .02 
Absolute brain size .19* -.06* .00 
Absolute neocortex size 1.01 .00 .00 
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Absolute hippocampus size 1.43 .00 .00 
Absolute cerebellum size .59 -.04* .00 
Absolute body mass .42 -.03* .00 
Note: The early-burst parameter a was constrained to have an upper ceiling of 0.0, as positive 
values represent the opposite of an evolutionary early burst, an expectation already tested in the 
Acceleration model. 
 
Recall that the three selection models tested are not mutually exclusive, but rather they 
are tested against the assumption of Brownian motion in each trait. Identification of significant 
and very high estimates of δ and α for G and, to a lesser extent, for residualized NVMs 
(especially the cerebellum) indicate that in more recent primate history the rate of evolutionary 
change in these variables has increased compared to the rate estimated for the early history of 
primates, and that these accelerated changes have not occurred in random directions but rather 
mostly toward an optimum. Combined with results of previous analyses, it can be inferred that 
such accelerated changes toward an optimum were mostly increases in G and in the size NVMs 
relative to body size for most primate clades (Reader et al., 2011) though the present analyses by 
themselves are not designed to indicate direction, especially in the absence of data for ancestral 
species. 
Additional analysis testing the relative weights of fit for the alternative models (Table 
A2.2, Appendix B) indicate that the acceleration and OU models are highly parsimonious for G. 
In contrast, the residualized NVMs assumption highly rejected the Brownian motion null 
hypothesis but the favored model was simply one of trait lability – indicating that they are not 
highly conserved traits but fail to exhibit a clear trend in a particular direction or in acceleration 
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or deceleration across evolutionary time. Again, the exception was residualized cerebellar size, 
for which the best fitting models were the acceleration and OU model just as in the case for G, 
although parameter estimates were not as high for the cerebellum as they were for G (see Table 
1.2). Non-residualized NVMs, on the other hand, exhibited Brownian motion as the most 
parsimonious model, or in some cases they conformed to EB, with negative acceleration. 
 
4. Discussion 
This study aimed to compare the evolutionary patterns (i.e., phylogenetic conservatism, 
evolutionary rates) and processes (i.e., strength of selection regimes and changes therein across 
the phylogeny) of general intelligence (G) and neuroamatomical volume measures (NVMs) in 
the primate order. While numerous previous studies have assessed the correlation strength of G 
with NVMs, it has become clear in the phylogenetic comparative methods literature more 
broadly, that correlations do not necessarily imply shared evolutionary processes or evolutionary 
causation, with correlated traits not uncommonly exhibiting disconcerted patterns and processes 
of evolution (e.g., Fitzpatrick et al., 2012; Gonzalez-Voyer et al., 2009). While largely 
exploratory in nature, as a first examination of the strength of evolutionary convergence between 
G and the most commonly used NVMs, it was hypothesized that at least some differences would 
be identified, as (1) the case for other neural factors behind intelligence has been convincingly 
made multiple times, which would require that volumetric measures are not perfectly convergent 
with G, (2) the size of the brain or its components is frequently negatively associated with 
neuronal density, and (3) profuse debates over which NVM is the best proxy for G have led to 
the identification of several limitations and generally in moderate effect sizes. 
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 It is clear that NVMs are employed as proxies for intelligence because of how easy it is to 
measure them, compared to histological indices, and because of the predictive power that size 
measures have upon some other neurological indicators. For instance, the encephalization 
quotient was of interest because of its hypothesized relation to the concept of "extra neurons" 
(above the number of neurons necessary to operate a body of the size of the species in question; 
Jerison, 1973). However, the multiple analyses conducted in the present study led to largely non-
converging results when comparing G and most NVMs (with exceptions discussed below), 
suggesting a low similarity in their evolutionary patterns and processes. Overall, G appears to 
have been more evolutionarily labile, with faster and accelerating evolution that, on average, 
shifted the trait towards an optimal value rather than evolving at or close to a random walk. 
While in terms of evolutionary lability (measured through λ and K), two NVMs were comparable 
to G (residual cerebellum and neocortex volumes), multiple lines of evidence indicated that the 
evolutionary histories of NVMs are not highly comparable to that of G: 
1) Evolutionary rates were found to be fastest for G, slow for absolute NVMs and 
slowest for body-size-corrected NVMs, suggesting the evolution of brain size and its 
components is at least partly tied to the evolution of body size in primates, and not 
remarkably fast. The evolutionary lability of G appears tied to a high evolutionary 
rate, a finding previously identified by Fernandes and colleagues (2014) for the 
specific cognitive abilities comprising G as well. 
2) Deceleration of evolutionary rate was identified for brain size and body mass, and in 
contrast strong positive acceleration was found in the case of G. Residualized NVMs 
exhibited comparatively small or null acceleration. Again, this suggests that, for G, 
evolution at the tips of the tree has been strong, as opposed to the case of NVMs, 
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especially when they still retain variance associated with body size. This body-size 
related deceleration of evolutionary rate in primates confirms previous findings by 
Cooper and Purvis (2010).  
3) Weaker or null selection trends were found toward an optimum for controlled and 
uncontrolled NVMs, whereas a stronger trend toward an optimum value was found in 
the case of G (as measured by the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model parameter α). As 
argued by Revell and colleagues (2008), selection toward an optimum can lead to 
high evolutionary lability in the phylogeny, which was empirically confirmed in the 
case of G in primates. 
Cerebellar and, to a lesser degree, neocortical volumes, when residualized against body 
mass presented the most similar model fit results compared to G, in addition to similar 
phylogenetic signal estimates, even though there were still striking differences in most 
parameters – in multiple cases parameter estimates being more than twice as large for those 
found for cerebellar and neocortical volume measures. It is counter-intuitive that non-
residualized brain size exhibited the least comparable parameter estimates and model fit results 
relative to G, while an important correlation exists between these two variables (Deaner et al., 
2007), a point which further compounds the low generalizability in the interpretation of 
correlation coefficients, in that they may poorly reflect underlying evolutionary processes. It 
must be noted that, while brain size and G may be moderately correlated, over evolutionary time 
the proportional changes in G size appear much larger than the proportional changes in brain 
size. As such, while changes appear to occur in somewhat converging directions across 
evolutionary time for these two traits, the amount of modification observed for G appears more 
than an order of magnitude higher, with brain size being, in contrast, much more conserved. 
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It is possible that correlations of NVMs with G may reflect constraints imposed by the 
former upon the development of cognitive abilities. Their generally modest correlation 
magnitude may indicate that a given size of an NVM accommodates a wide range of values in 
cognitive abilities, but beyond that window increases in volume are necessary for further 
increases in cognition. This possibility is akin to the proposed relationship between body mass 
and brain size itself (e.g., Gonzalez-Voyer et al., 2009). As such, it would not be invalid to use 
NVMs as a proxy for intelligence in the absence of cognitive data given their considerable 
phenotypic correlation, so long as there is awareness of the increasingly clear limitations of this 
approach when dealing with their evolutionary interpretations. 
 
4.1. Moderate Similarity Between G and Residual Cerebellar, and to a Lesser Extent, 
Neocortical Volume 
It is striking that, of all NVMs and their operationalizations examined, cerebellar size 
residualized against body size displayed the most similar results to those for G. Phylogenetic 
signal for the cerebellum was significantly different from 1 (i.e., from the assumption of 
conservatism) just as in the case of G. While their evolutionary rates and fit to selection regime 
models were not identical, residual cerebellar volume appears to have evolved faster than other 
NVMs, and exhibited considerable acceleration and a selection trend towards an optimum. The 
fact that rates, acceleration, and trend towards an optimum were all somewhat lower than G but 
not radically divergent suggests that, while this neuroanatomical structure is not a sufficient 
substrate for G, it may serve as an important substrate. This seems especially plausible 
considering recent evidence that cerebellum size has changed in lockstep with overall cognitive 
ability (Smaers et al., 2018), and also specifically with technical or physical aspects of 
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intelligence (Barton, 2012). Cerebellar size also exhibited rapid expansion in great apes (taxa 
that have high G; Deander et al., 2006; Reader et al., 2011), more so than the neocortex (Barton 
& Venditti, 2014) while exhibiting less reduction in neuron density (Barton, 2012). It is possible 
that technical intelligence, requiring cerebellar specialization (given its role in sensory-motor 
control and in learning complex movement sequences), was central to the evolution of 
intelligence. This is in line with findings by Fernandes and colleagues (2014) and novel findings 
presented in Chapter 2 that tool use exhibits the strongest factor loadings in primate G and is the 
ability most correlated to others in species of high G, among the five abilities examined. Tool 
making involves carefully organized, well-coordinated motor-sensory sequences and having a 
template of these actions in mind; the cerebellum (in connection with cerebral sensory-motor 
areas) is a strong candidate substrate for this capacity. As such, it has been argued that, under 
certain ecological circumstances present in the evolutionary history of some primate taxa, the 
evolution of higher connectivity among regions involving executive, perceptual, and motor 
regions was necessary for complex cognitive abilities such as innovation (Navarrete & Laland, 
2015). It is also possible that the cerebellum functions as an augmenter of the activity of other 
brain structures (Leiner et al., 1989; Snider, 1950); as such it would enhance cognitive skill when 
projecting to regions largely responsible for it. As reviewed subsequently in Chapter 2, the 
evolution of larger brains in primates has been accompanied by an expansion in white matter, 
with increased myelination compensating for the long range of connections; it is likely that this 
has permitted the cerebellum to not only maintain but arguably increase its influence on other, 
cortical areas, facilitating the motor coordination characteristic of intelligent problem-solving. 
Surprisingly, relative to the number of studies examining or proposing a role of overall 
brain size or neocortical size in intelligence, the role of the cerebellum is extremely understudied 
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and understated. Further attention to cerebellar size in relation to cognition in primates is 
warranted.  
It is also somewhat puzzling that neocortical volume residualized against body size is a 
rarely used operationalization of neocortical size in comparative studies, with researchers instead 
relying on the neocortex ratio (e.g., Dunbar, 1992; Shultz & Dunbar, 2010) or overall brain size-
related measures (e.g., Deaner et al., 2007; Gibson et al., 2001). The results of the present study 
suggest that relative neocortical volume is, second to residual cerebellar size, the most similar to 
G in terms of low phylogenetic conservatism, intermediate evolutionary rate and rate 
acceleration, and some sign of evolutionary changes toward an optimum size. While the role of 
the neocortex is cognition is well-discussed in the comparative and human cognition literatures 
as reviewed at the outset of this study, further attention should be given to how it is 
operationalized in comparative studies, considering that the ratio approach exhibits high 
divergence from G in their evolutionary patterns. 
 
4.2. Putative Alternatives to Volumetric Measures 
Questioning the application of size-related neuroanatomical measures to understanding 
intelligence is not in itself a novel endeavor. The idea that the reorganization of systems internal 
to the brain reflected evolutionary changes in cognitive abilities better than the size of the brain 
of subcomponents is not uncommon or recent (Holloway, 1966a,b). More recent reviews of the 
literature point to a plethora of studies that indicate how evolutionary reorganizations of the 
cortex are common (Preuss, 2001). 
How might G have been selected for across primates, net of brain volume? Even metrics 
that had results most comparable to those of G, such as residual cerebellar size, were still 
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noticeably different in evolutionary rates and the fit of selection regime models, not appearing as 
sufficient substrates for the remarkable evolution of primate intelligence. There are several 
possible scenarios proposed and explored in animals in general and specifically in primates as 
well. These alternatives are more than likely complementary to each other as substrates for 
intelligence, and complementary to the low to moderate role of NVMs identified in the present 
study, rather than full substitutes. The alternatives outlined below appear as highly promising 
future avenues for further research, although limited amounts of data are available for analyses 
on primates at the current moment. A small number of data points exist for non-volumetric 
potential correlates of G, outright preventing their immediate use in analyses as phylogenetic 
comparative methods require a minimum of approximately 15-20 species for sufficiently reliable 
estimates. 
1) Gyrencephaly, which is characterized by an increase in the degree of convolutedness 
of a brain, could have increased the surface area available to accommodate more complex 
neuroanatomical structures and attendant cognitive systems without having to proportionately 
increase volume (although some increases are necessary and observed, and thus a partial positive 
correlation exists; Gibson et al., 2001). Gyrification may also have evolved to operate in 
combination with other features. For instance, folding may reduce connection length among 
cortical areas (Hofman, 2001). 
2) An increase in the degree of myelination, which facilitates increased information 
processing speed, may be another factor behind intelligence. As with humans (e.g. Jensen, 2006), 
differences in glial density and myelination (both involved in processing efficiency) should be 
comprehensively examined across samples of primate taxa. Preliminary evidence comparing 
species qualitatively suggests an important role of myelination in cognitive ability (Dicke & 
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Roth, 2016), as well as a role of progressive myelination in the maturation of cognition within 
species across taxa (Gibson, 1991). 
3) Processing power, so far a largely neglected area in intelligence studies, is also a 
potential candidate. While it would be extremely unlikely that any single localized area that has 
evolved in a largely independent fashion would be responsible for general intelligence (given the 
necessity of this domain-general process to recruit from a multitude of cognitive resources), 
several interconnected localized areas, working as a circuit, may be candidates for explaining the 
evolutionary trajectories of general intelligence. While the overall correlation between brain size 
and neuron density is negative (small to moderate), there are excepted areas that may be of 
interest to studies of intelligence evolution, such as area 10, where there is relatively more 
variation off the allometric line (Semendeferi et al., 2001). Moreover, candidate areas identified 
from within-species analyses (e.g., Colom, Jung, & Haier, 2006; Duncan et al., 2000; Haier et 
al., 2004, 2005) should be of potential to comparative analyses. 
4) Cortical microanatomy should also be examined. New interneural projections for 
increased connectivity in complex networks that accommodate intelligence would necessitate 
enlargement of existing pyramidal cells (or the generation of new pyramidal cells) in the areas 
from which projections are made, in order to support new axon collaterals (Preuss, 2001). 
Dicke and Roth (2016; Roth & Dicke, 2005) make a compelling case that the best fit 
between brain traits and intelligence in animals, at the cross-species level, involves a 
combination of several factors that determine general information processing capacity, such as 
the total number of cortical neurons, neuron packing density, interneuronal distance, and axonal 
conduction velocity, in addition to other factors such as pulse width, gyrification, and differential 
allocation of connection to nearby versus distant areas (cf., Hofman, 2001). As such, there would 
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be no single measure that serves as a substrate for intelligence and therefore represents it, but 
rather a collection of integrated features such as those listed above, preventing exponentially 
costly increases in any given single factor that permits processing capacity. 
Caution rather than excessive assertiveness about the explanatory power of these 
alternatives is necessary before further empirical, comparative evidence, as brain and body size 
tend to overall correlate positively with several of these alternative measures, such as ratio of 
connections to neurons, numbers of gyri and fissures, size of several specific brain regions, and 
cerebellum (Gibson et al., 2001). As such, the common practice of employing controls and 
examining residuals when dealing with NVMs may be extended to these alternative measures. 
Moreover, the plausibility of any of these alternatives and possible future confirmation of their 
roles as substrates for intelligence does not negate the partial relation that NVMs have with G: 
The most essential point to be made is that NVMs are not a sufficient explanation of G as only 
some of the NVMs examined in the present study moderately replicated the evolutionary patterns 
and processes observed for G. 
 
4.3. Limitations and Future Directions 
Although used in multiple research programs due to its demonstrably high correlations 
with experimental data and qualitative rankings based on expert analysis, the ethological count 
approach to estimating G is not without its limitations. It rests upon the observed frequency of 
only five indicators of high cognitive ability and relies on controls for research effort as different 
species have received different amounts of scientific attention by research groups – some species 
exhibit an extreme paucity of data. Ideally, a larger number of indicators would be collated, and 
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a more systematic effort for uniform attention across taxa would exist, however such a concerted 
effort unfortunately does not yet exist.  
Nevertheless, it is extremely unlikely that the striking results observed in the present 
analyses were simply a function of measurement error. This is because random error is, contrary 
to systematic error, by definition likely to exist in all directions rather than consistently driving 
results toward a particular, specific trend. Were low PS (i.e., high disagreement among sister 
clades, possibly reflecting error in measurement) identified along with no clear evolutionary 
process behind it (i.e., null parameter estimates for the OU, acceleration, and EB models), a 
hypothesis about random error in measurement being responsible for results would be 
reasonable. However, in the present study, along with acceleration of evolutionary rates across 
time, a strong and consistent selection regime toward an optimum (i.e., with a direction) has been 
identified, which militates against the possibility of low reliability in trait estimation. Moreover, 
even though standard error of the mean estimates for G (e.g., in evolutionary rates) are larger 
than for NVMs, the average difference is so large (at times surpassing an order of magnitude) 
that any overlap in estimation is extremely unlikely. 
The point must be made that in comparative studies of NVM variation across species 
have been primarily limited to volumetric data published in few studies and are often based on 
measurements of very few specimens of each species (Stephan et al., 1981; Frahm, Stephan, & 
Stephan, 1982) except for the case of overall brain size. The amount of studies reanalyzing these 
data is surprisingly high (for a review, see Herculano-Houzel & Lent, 2005). As in the case of 
expansions and revisions of body mass data (e.g. Smith & Jungers, 1997), obtaining further data 
on these regions is imperative, and the inclusion of novel data by Navarrete and colleagues 
(2018) in the present study helps reduce bias. Furthermore, considering the lack of convergence 
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in the results presented in this study, it is recommended that neurological measures other than 
those of a volumetric nature be given future attention. Several of the alternatives outlined above 
are already known to be largely independent of NVMs (Herculano-Houzel & Lent, 2005) and 
may thus serve as good sources of complementary information for understanding the evolution of 
intelligence. 
 Preliminary analyses of clade-specific evolutionary patterns and processes within the 
primate order (e.g., comparing suborders, superfamilies, etc.) suggest that a strong agreement 
between G and NVMs is not found either (Fernandes, Peñaherrera-Aguirre, Woodley of Menie, 
& Figueredo, in preparation) and that moderate comparability of results for G is found only with 
residual cerebellar volume, much like the general results detailed here, in addition to 
comparability with the hippocampus. However, interesting trends arise that complement and 
inform previous research: For G, the largest selection regime difference appears to be that 
existing between apes and other primates, whereas (with the exception of residual cerebellar 
volume and absolute hippocampal volume) in most residualized and non-residualized NVMs, the 
largest selection regime difference appears to be between simians and prosimians, or between 
catarrhines (apes and Old World monkeys) and other primates. This compounds arguments by 
Gibson and colleagues (2001) to the effect that measures such as the neocortex ratio are not ideal 
for distinguishing apes from monkeys in terms of cognition, while lending partial support to 
some level of comparability between the hippocampus and general intelligence (Shultz & 
Dunbar, 2010) and to the already discussed moderate comparability between cerebellar volume 
evolution and the evolution of G. This should nevertheless not be exaggerated in view of the 
moderate discrepancies found even between G and the most comparable NVMs, cerebellum 
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included. Further analyses that delve into clade-specific comparabilities and discrepancies within 
the primate order should help illuminate the neural bases of general intelligence. 
 
4.3.1. Future database refinement: Collation of data on circumstances for behaviors, and 
categorization of subtypes of the five cognitive capacities, for the development of a taxonomy of 
behavioral problem-solving 
For decades, a differentiation has been made between how traditional psychometric 
approaches to personality and cognition see these traits, and how a behavior assessment approach 
sees them. While traditional approaches view personality and cognition as traits the individual 
has, the behavior assessment literature focuses rather on what the individual does (Hartman et 
al., 1979; Mischel, 1968). Instead of picking one of these schools, the studies that originated the 
database used here were interested in what organisms of a species have the capacity to do 
(Byrne, 2003; Reader & Laland, 2002; Reader & MacDonald, 2003; Reader et al., 2011). These 
databases hold counts of how many times each species was observed to execute a broad kind of 
behavior. Future steps are needed to improve the level of detail of what species have the capacity 
to do. Psychometric and behavior assessment approaches are successful precisely because they 
have not remained this simple. Specifically, the database would benefit from detail on: 
1) How the five broad categories of problem-solving can be subcategorized into more 
specific forms of behavior; 
2) How complex the behavior is observed to be in each species (note that different 
species can execute it to different levels of complexity, or with different efficiencies); 
3) Whether the species exhibits the behavior in all or in only few environments, and, in 
the case of the latter, what kinds of environments and conditions; 
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4) The frequency of the behavior in each species; 
5) Whether few or most individuals exhibit the behavior in each species; 
6) The ease with which a complex type of behavioral problem-solving is learned in each 
species; 
7) The capacity or lack thereof for some behaviors (e.g., pointing to convey information, 
fashioning complex tools with fine motor dexterity) in each species. 
 
The current form in which Reader and colleagues’ (2011) database exists does not permit 
detailing what specific kinds of behavior were examples of each of the five broad categories of 
behavior problem-solving, and therefore does not permit developing a taxonomy of behavior 
(where broad categories contain subcategories, and so on down a hierarchy, until specific 
behaviors are detailed). Note that, as already explained in the Method, to avoid subjective bias, 
each behavior description found in the literature by Reader and colleagues were included in one 
of the five broad categories based on each original author’s descriptions and classification, rather 
than based on any set of objective rules established by the researchers collating data onto the 
database. An important step towards the development of a taxonomy of problem-solving 
behavior is to establish overarching rules to permit a systematic categorization conducted by 
secondary data collectors (i.e., collators of the database) themselves. Such rules need not be 
subjective in the figurative sense of being superficial, imprecise, or not agreed-upon; rather, they 
can emerge from organized focus groups containing experts in the field. It is likely that some 
records of behavior that exist in the literature will not be amenable to classification into the 
taxonomy as many lack detailed descriptions (rather simply containing the original authors’ 
classification of what category of problem-solving the behavior was an example of). Even with 
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such losses in the numbers of usable published records of behavior, the initiative to develop a 
taxonomy with clear overarching rules for the classification of behavior should advantageously 
trade off, by reducing the number of usable studies somewhat but adding detail, precision, and 
therefore the potential to further understand the evolution of complex problem-solving. 
Regarding aspect number 1 in the above enumeration of improvements, it must be noted 
that a few studies using the same approach as employed in the database used here have already 
attempted to identify subtypes of some of the five broad categories of problem-solving, thus 
leading to a taxonomy of behavior. Whiten and Byrne (1991), for example, compiled a 
comprehensive taxonomic organization of tactical deception in primates which is readily usable 
for analyses (see Appendix A for a characterization of the categories of tactical deception 
behavior). However, other endeavors were either (a) based on within-species analyses of a single 
species (see the taxonomy of extractive foraging behavior based on snub-nosed monkey behavior 
detailed in Appendix A); or (b) limited to other taxa (e.g., birds) only, and to innovation and tool 
use, so far not including extractive foraging, social learning, and deception. As many as 12 
subcategories of innovation, and 5 of tool use, were extracted in a bottom up approach based on 
the ethological descriptions found in the avian literatures (Boire et al., 2002; Overington et al., 
2009). To illustrate, subtypes of tool use included tool use for feeding and drinking, and four 
forms of borderline tool use: dropping prey on a hard substrate, battering on an anvil, baiting, 
and holding prey with a wedge or skewer; Boire et al., 2002). Developing such taxonomies 
permits a thorough analysis of extant data (e.g., the phylogenetic analyses conducted for the five 
broad categories of problem-solving in the present paper could be equally conducted on each 
subcategory). The behavior taxonomies also permits the identification of unique or shared neural 
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substrates among the categories, when data on subcategories are compared to neural data using 
phylogenetic correlative methods. 
This does not mean, however, that a category is by nature always limited to the number 
of subcategories identified in a data collation; for example, tool use is not necessarily limited to 
these 5 categories in avian species. If a new form of tool use were described in the literature, 
such as tool use for self-grooming behavior, a thirteenth category would emerge from the data 
without impediment. Similarly, if a new type of innovation were described in the literature, a 
new type would be included in the taxonomy. It is especially important for hypothesis-driven 
ethological observations to test the existence of (possibly partly) independent forms of tool use, 
innovation, and of other kinds of complex problem solving behavior. Such a combination of 
bottom-up and top-down approaches to the outlining of a taxonomy of behavior would be most 
powerful in avoiding false positive and false negative (sub)categories. 
Having measures that contain gradations of frequency, complexity, ease of learning, 
among others mentioned above, one can compare, on each of these aspects: 
1) Between-species comparisons – thus using the normative approach, where central 
tendencies are identified for clades and analyses reveal how species differ from them. 
This permits analyzing the macroevolution of the traits in question. 
2) Within-species characterization– thus using criterion-referenced testing, where each 
species is understood in isolation relative to cutoffs in the traits’ scales. This permits 
assessing the degree of cognitive complexity of each species, without requiring 
macroevolutionary analyses, rather relying simply on comparing scores to arbitrary or 
established thresholds, much like the edumetric approach used in education research 
(Carver, 1974; Hartman et al., 1979). 
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 Furthermore, for some of the five broad categories of problem solving, but not all, data 
on the identity of the individual performing the behavior patterns and the circumstances 
surrounding each recorded behavior are described in Reader and Laland (2001). However, this is 
an outdated and incomplete database of even the few categories included, compared to the one 
used in the present studies. Future effort to detail the circumstances of behaviors would enhance 
the capacity for the development of a taxonomy, as it would facilitate understanding the purpose 
a behavior served: Returning to the well-known example of potato washing, knowing the 
conditions in which a behavior occurred permits understanding if the food item was immersed in 
water as a novelty (functioning as an innovation), or as a means to conceal it from conspecifics 
(functioning as tactical deception), or if a tool was involved (functioning as tool use), among 
other possibilities. While the act itself of immersing the food item in water is the same in all 
these circumstances, the function it serves varies. 
Future studies potentially relying on a refined database as per the recommendations 
forwarded here would avoid capitalization on chance if a confirmatory factor analytic approach 
were used with newly compiled data. Reader and colleagues (2011) and Fernandes and 
colleagues (2014) already employed exploratory techniques and revealed the main five 
categories of complex problem solving, with such publications serving as pilot both in terms of 
data compilation and identification of the main, broad factors. Though ethograms commonly lead 
to behavioral counts (especially if they are derived from a one-zero recording technique), they 
are amenable to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) as well as they involve quantitative data 
(Figueredo et al., 1992). Although unusual in the ethological literature, this particular study 
employed CFA to examine if factors extracted from data in fact confirmed the taxonomic 
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organization of behavior employed in the ethogram. In the revisions proposed here for the 
database, data recorded may not involve only counts, but rather continuous accounts of the 
behaviors (i.e., alternatives to one-zero recording), permitting, with even more accuracy, factor 
structure estimation using CFA. For revisions of the database, it would be especially useful to 
only include the primary studies with published and high inter-observer reliability, avoiding 
anecdotal records and initial pilot studies that relied on unstructured observations rather than on 
ethograms. Combining this set of rules for the new secondary data collection with confirmatory 
factor analysis would provide the scientific rigor expected of this growing area of study (Burkart 
et al., 2017). 
 
 In sum, limited comparability is currently found in terms of evolutionary trajectories of G 
relative to NVMs. Nevertheless, it is also important to compare G and NVMs in another sense: 
whether they are similar in the degree to which their internal structure changed over evolutionary 
time. In other words, it is possible that the strength of the manifold among cognitive abilities in 
G changed across the primate phylogeny, and it is also possible that the strength of the manifold 
among sizes of brain regions similarly changed. Chapter 2 will examine this possibility in G, and 
Chapter 3 will examine it with data on brain regions. The comparability between changes in 
internal structure of G and those in the internal structure of the brain will then be discussed and 
integrated with findings presented in this Chapter. 
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Chapter 2. Examining the Strength of Relations among Cognitive Abilities across the 
Primate Phylogeny: Clades of High Levels of General Intelligence Also Exhibit a Stronger 
Manifold 
 
1. Introduction 
Previous studies have tested the hypothesis that cognitive abilities in primates are 
organized in an integrated way, as reviewed in the Introduction and in Chapter 1 (see also 
Burkart et al., 2017). Nevertheless, they have not examined or demonstrated how the G factor of 
general intelligence has evolved – has it involved increasing levels of integration? Or was a G 
factor with many correlated abilities already present in the root of the primate phylogenetic tree?  
In the comparative literature, general intelligence is argued by some to allow an organism 
to excel in a wide variety of contexts requiring behavioral flexibility (Deaner et al., 2006). 
However, it is irrational to expect evolution to shape phenotypes that serve as adaptations to 
problems beyond the ecology of an organism’s ancestors. As such, along with many 
theoreticians, De Waal (2016, p. 12) has argued that “ranking cognition on a single dimension is 
a pointless exercise. Cognitive evolution is marked by many peaks of specialization. The ecology 
of each species is key.” Nevertheless, an important realization is that in their ecologies a 
considerable portion of vertebrate species face a diversity of challenges and, most importantly, 
novel challenges. In other words, their ecology is not conducive to specialization (Parker, 1978). 
As such, zoologists and ecologists have long attempted to understand what characteristics 
generalist species possess and how they are able to cope with multiple conditions, with general 
intelligence being an important candidate. 
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1.1. The Evolution of Correlations among Cognitive Capacities 
Because ecological specialists are able to use specific resources efficiently, they are 
favored in stable environmental conditions, whereas unpredictable or complex environments 
tend to favor generalists, as they do not rely on few specific, but rather on several diverse 
resources. Although behavioral generalism is not paid attention to as frequently as dietary 
generalism in literatures examining the ecological generalism-specialsm continuum, ecological 
generalism has long been proposed to be linked to behavioral flexibility, diversification of 
behavioral output, lack of neophobia, and proactive exploration of resources and of ways to 
access them. Empirical demonstrations of this relationship are longstanding (Glickman & 
Sroges, 1966; Parker, 1978; Visalberghi & Mason, 1983). 
Indirect evidence suggests that general intelligence may indeed be important for coping 
with novel challenges, serving as a generalist adaptation. Game-theoretic models suggest that the 
existence of novel challenges for resource acquisition selects for cognitive flexibility capacities 
that permit generalism and innovative foraging (Overington et al., 2008). In line with this, 
comparative studies using avian species indicate that the capacity for technical innovation (e.g., 
through novel searching and handling techniques during foraging) is a hallmark of generalism, 
predicting invasion success (e.g., through range expansion or introduction to new habitats; 
Lefebvre & Sol, 2008) and dietary and habitat breadth (Overington et al., 2011). Innovation rates 
and extractive foraging have also been shown to highly correlate with other technical abilities 
and social abilities in primate species, giving rise to a general factor of intelligence at the 
comparative level (Fernandes et al., 2014; Reader et al., 2011). 
 A large piece of the scientific puzzle regarding the putative association between 
intelligence and generalism is missing, however. If general intelligence is an adaptation to 
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ecologies that select for generalization rather than specialization, the internal structure of general 
intelligence itself should reflect this. Species that have undergone selection for higher general 
intelligence should exhibit stronger integration3 among various cognitive abilities than other 
species; that is, stronger intercorrelations should be observed among measures of problem 
solving, when examining problems of a different nature. If, on the other hand, species that 
exhibit high scores on general intelligence (e.g., as measured by the five problem-solving tasks 
in Reader et al., 2011) show weaker correlations among the cognitive abilities that constitute the 
general factor than others, it could be understood that their intelligence is rather specialized. In 
other words, in this case their high average scores would have been driven by performance in 
one or a few domains, rather than being generalized. 
While factor analyses of performance on different cognitive problems have already been 
conducted and show the existence of a general factor among primate species (as reviewed in the 
Introduction and Chapter 1), factor loadings reflect only the average association among variables 
in the sample being studied. Other techniques are needed to examine if the strength of 
associations varies among species (e.g., with higher factor loadings as a function of average 
general intelligence). Thus to understand if species of high general intelligence exhibit 
integration among cognitive abilities, one needs to combine factor analysis with techniques that 
 
3 The use of the term “integration” does not imply how cognitive abilities are associated, or that 
they are integrated in any clear neuropsychological way. It refers simply to stronger sets of 
correlations among abilities. How these stronger associations among abilities take place in the 
brain is also a matter of research. 
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permit datum-level estimation of factor loadings, such as the Continuous Parameter Estimation 
Model (CPEM; Gorsuch, 2005), as will be defended and detailed in the Method Section. 
 
1.2. Objectives and Hypotheses 
This study aims to examine whether the strength of factor loadings in a cross-species (i.e., 
comparative) general factor of intelligence in primates varies as a function of the general 
intelligence score itself. While CPEM has been used to examine if interrelations among 
indicators in a given common factor vary as a function of a third variable (or as a function of 
scores on the common factor itself) in humans, for intelligence and other psychological 
variables, this is the first application of this approach to cross-species analyses. 
The main hypothesis forwarded in this study is that higher general intelligence scores 
would predict higher factor loadings on the general intelligence common factor. As general 
intelligence is theorized to be an adaptation for novel, complex problem-solving in generalist 
species, it is predicted that cognitive abilities should be integrated, rather than exhibiting low 
factor loadings (i.e., being largely independent and thus specialized). 
An alternative hypothesis, namely that the factor loadings would be equally strong across 
taxa, would necessitate revisions to the ecological specialism and generalism literature. This 
alternative would mean that, irrespective of ecological conditions, species would exhibit the 
already-demonstrated moderate intercorrelations among cognitive abilities, having less than 50% 
of variance left for specialized abilities (as more than 50% were explained by the common, 
general intelligence factor; Fernandes et al., 2014; Reader et al., 2011). 
Finally, the polar opposite alternative that factor loadings would be weaker in species of 
higher general intelligence than in others would reduce the plausibility of general intelligence as 
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a relevant phenotype for understanding the nature of problem solving. This alternative would 
mean that it is exactly in species that exhibit low general intelligence that performance in 
problem-solving tasks correlate highly among themselves. As such, whenever a lineage evolved 
higher capacity to solve problems in one domain, it would be unlikely that the ability could be 
generalized to solving other kinds of adaptive problems. In other words, the existence of a strong 
manifold among problem-solving performance measures, in this scenario, would simply reflect a 
generalized inability for novel and complex problem-solving on the part of species of low 
average ability. It is argued that this scenario could not serve as support for the existence of a 
general factor of intelligence or for its reflecting ecological generalism. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Measures 
For consistency with Chapter 1, and considering their already demonstrated validity and 
robustness, the same five ethological measures of performance on cognitive domains utilized in 
Chapter 1 (originally compiled by Reader et al., 2011) will be employed for the present analyses. 
The G factor extracted from these abilities by Fernandes et al. (2014) will be used, just as in 
Chapter 1. Contrary to Chapter 1, where the abilities were not analyzed individually but only the 
G factor was used, the present study will use both on the five measures and on G. For a 
description of the five abilities, see the Method section of Chapter 1; for their expanded 
conceptualization, a review of existing operationalizations used in the original ethological 
observations compiled by Reader and colleagues (2011) for the database used in the present 
work, and behavioral examples, see Appendix A. 
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2.2. Analyses 
2.2.1. Estimating integration coefficients 
The G factor will be entered as a predictor of each of the five vectors of factor loadings 
(each vector corresponding to the part-whole correlation of each cognitive ability with the 
common factor), each in a separate analysis, totaling five analyses. This will permit testing 
whether species higher on the G factor exhibit a stronger manifold among abilities. The vector of 
factor loadings for each of the five cognitive abilities will be implemented with the Continuous 
Parameter Estimation Model (CPEM; Gorsuch, 2005; see also Figueredo et al., 2013 and 
Woodley of Menie et al., 2015, for detailed mathematical explanations of CPEM). 
CPEM permits the change in the covariance between two variables (such as a higher-order 
construct and one of its indicators; in other words, a factor loading) to be correlated to another 
variable. As such, rather than leading to a single factor loading estimate for the whole sample as 
in traditional factor analytic methods, CPEM allows one to estimate variations in factor loadings 
throughout the sample, and permits these variations to be predicted by another variable. For all 
cognitive abilities, continuous parameter estimates of factor loadings will be estimated by taking 
the cross-product of the standardized (z) scores of each species performance on the task with the 
common factor. 
When using more traditional methods (such as sample polytomization) for identifying 
changes in the strength of the correlation coefficient or of factor loadings between groups of 
species, it is necessary to acquire data for at least 75–100 species, so as to stabilize the 
correlation coefficients for comparison. On the other hand, as a graded method, CPEM does not 
necessitate the polytomization of continuous distribution (i.e., a division of the dataset into 
subgroups).  
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 Traditional factor analysis techniques permit estimating the average factor loading of the 
general factor upon each measure. CPEM will permit the estimation of the factor loadings of the 
G common factor upon cognitive capacities for each of the 69 primate species for each measure. 
These species-specific factor loadings will then be predicted by the general intelligence scores of 
species to test the research hypothesis. The main hypothesis will be supported if species with 
higher general intelligence exhibit stronger factor loadings; that is, stronger associations among 
the five cognitive abilities. This effect of G upon factor loadings is called “cognitive integration 
coefficient”, a term used throughout this text, as the predictive power of the common G factor 
upon species-specific factor loadings reflects the degree to which more intelligent species exhibit 
more strongly associated abilities. For clarity, Figure 2.1 illustrates how the latent common 
factor among cognitive abilities (the G factor) can (a) explain the variance in cognitive abilities 
through factor loadings represented in the black, solid arrows, and also (b) predict the variance in 
the factor loadings (i.e., CPEs) themselves through the gray, dashed arrows, with thus species of 
higher G exhibiting stronger factor loadings. The gray, dashed arrows will be referred to as 
cognitive integration coefficients throughout the present work, for brevity. 
If G predicts the factor loadings positively as hypothesized, this finding would mean that 
although one high-order factor explains on average 58-68% of the variance among the cognitive 
abilities studied in the primate order (Fernandes et al., 2014; Reader et al., 2011), for species 
with comparatively low general intelligence the high-order factor can explain considerably less 
than that and thus abilities are more independent (less general). Conversely, for species with high 
general intelligence the high-order factor would be able to explain more than 58-68% and thus 
abilities are more generalized.  
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 Figure 2.1. A hypothetical measurement model for a latent common factor among 
several observable traits, including factor loadings (i.e., part-whole correlations, represented in 
black solid arrows) and effects of the common factor upon the part-whole correlations 
(represented in gray, dashed arrows). The latter arrows are here termed “integration 
coefficients”. 
 
Note that the average of the CPEs for a given cognitive ability, taking all species in the 
sample, corresponds to the average factor loading of the G factor upon that cognitive ability in 
the sample4. These average factor loadings, one for each cognitive ability, will be reported as 
 
4 This procedure leads to identical factor loadings as would be produced by unit-weighted 
factor estimation. This is in fact a desirable technique to be used in the present sample 
(Figueredo et al., 1995 and Gorsuch, 1983). This is because factor loadings produced with 
Principal Axis Factoring and Principal Components Analysis in small samples are less reliable 
than those computed with unit-weighted factoring, considering that increasing standard errors of 
factor loadings with decreasing sample size prevents one from discriminating between the factor 
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well for reference. They should be identical to the already-reported average factor loadings from 
Fernandes and colleagues (2014). 
 
2.2.2 Phylogenetic Controls 
Species in a phylogenetic tree are not independent data points, but rather are related to 
some more closely than to others. A species’ trait value can be a direct response to its immediate 
ecology (thus reflecting natural selection pressure), but can also be inherited from ancestor 
lineages. Disentangling these two sources of contribution to traits is essential, and controlling for 
phylogenetic inheritance from ancestors is important in order to test the hypothesis that a trait (or 
several traits) are a response to ecological pressures. With this in mind, the same analyses 
described above will be conducted a second time, this time controlling for phylogenetic inertia 
(that is, inheritance of traits rather than novel evolution) in all variables. To achieve this, I will 
estimate phylogenetic independent contrasts (see description below) for each variable, then all 
steps of the analyses described in Section 2.2.1 of the present Chapter description will be 
repeated. Tree data and statistical packages used will be the same as for Project 1. 
The results will be reported alongside the non-phylogenetic analyses (i.e., those involving 
raw species data). It is important to note that correlative analyses involving phylogenetic controls 
do not replace other analyses and are not inherently more rigorous or correct. Instead, they 
answer different questions (Peñaherrera-Aguirre & Fernandes, 2018; Price, 1997; Thornhill & 
Fincher, 2013). Namely, correlative analyses without phylogenetic controls reveal whether there 
 
loadings of the different variables appropriately (Bobko et al., 2007, Figueredo et al., 1995, 
Gorsuch, 1983; and Schmidt, 1971). 
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is an association between variables irrespective of whether the measures being correlated 
evolved at the same time in history; that is, they test simply whether one characteristic is present 
in taxa that exhibit other characteristics being studied. Phylogenetic comparative methods 
involving controls, on the other hand, reveal whether the variables in question have co-evolved 
in tandem; in other words, they reveal the degree to which they have been in lockstep through 
evolutionary time, covarying on the same phylogenetic tree branches across evolution. As such, 
phylogenetic controls permit examining whether the novel evolution of one characteristic is 
associated with the novel evolution of another. On the other hand, correlative analyses without 
phylogenetic considerations permit examining whether the maintenance of one characteristic is 
associated with the maintenance of another, even if the two were not originally selected 
simultaneously (Thornhill & Fincher, 2013). It may be that changes existed first in one trait, 
which permitted, in subsequent lineages, the evolution of the second trait, and this association 
between them was maintained as it was adaptive (e.g., the subsequent characteristic enhanced the 
functional property of the former characteristic acquired, but they did not arise in evolutionary 
lockstep). Such an association can be detected without phylogenetic methods, as the degree to 
which the origins of the two traits were tied in time is irrelevant in this case (Peñaherrera-Aguirre 
& Fernandes, 2018; Thornhill & Fincher, 2013). 
Therefore, as both approaches reveal important information about data, results of both will 
be reported and discussed. Hypotheses forwarded in this study apply to raw species data analyses 
and phylogenetically controlled analyses; in other words, it is predicted that the effects of the 
common factor upon the strength of factor loadings were relevant both for the novel evolution of 
the integration of cognitive abilities and for its evolutionary maintenance. Descriptions of results 
for analyses that include phylogenetic controls will be prefixed with the term evolutionary or 
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postfixed with the term in lockstep, reflecting the notion that any association among traits that is 
identified using phylogenetic methods indicates an evolutionary association through time. 
Below, I detail the phylogenetic comparative method that will be used as a phylogenetic control: 
Phylogenetic Independent Contrasts (Felsenstein, 1985): Although the last three decades 
saw the emergence of multiple phylogenetic comparative methods (Peñaherrera-Aguirre & 
Fernandes, 2018), employing phylogenetic independent contrasts (PIC) remains one of the most 
statistically conservative. Different from other procedures, this approach fixes the level of λ (a 
measure of how conserved, that is, preserved a trait is across evolutionary time; Nunn, 2011; 
Peñaherrera-Aguirre & Fernandes, 2018) of traits to its maximum (1.0). In simpler terms, this 
means that this approach assumes that closely-related species will be more similar to each other 
than more distantly-related species. PICs are then computed by estimating the difference 
between the values of a continuous trait of two species sharing a common ancestor, and this is 
repeated for all lineages in the phylogenetic tree, yielding as many contrasts as there are pairs of 
lineages. Since species with a more distant ancestor are expected to display greater difference in 
the trait in question, PIC takes into consideration the length of the branches in the phylogenetic 
tree (Nunn, 2011). 
The estimation of PICs is illustrated in Figure 2.2. PICs are computed following a recursive 
pattern, beginning at the tip of the branches and going back in time through the phylogeny until 
the process reaches the root of the tree (Nunn, 2011). After each contrast is computed, the 
species that were involved in these calculations are excluded from the estimation of the 
subsequent contrasts. Consider three taxa, Pan troglodytes (B), Pan paniscus (C), and Homo 
sapiens (D). The first pair, B and C share a common ancestor (BC), whereas D shares a common 
ancestor with BC. While the first contrast is computed between B and C, the second contrast is 
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estimated between D and BC. It is worth noting however, since most analyses rely on data from 
extant species, PIC requires the reconstruction of hypothetical phenotypic values for the extinct 
common ancestors. The reconstructed estimate, in this case for BC, is not the average between 
species B and C, but alternatively, it is computed by weighing the values of B and C by the 
length of their corresponding branches. The second contrast is calculated as the difference 
between the reconstructed phenotype of BC with the observed phenotypic value of D.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Simplified illustrative model containing only 6 species, representing where 
phylogenetic independent contrasts (numerals) lie in the phylogenetic tree, relative to measured 
species (i.e., tip) data (letters). 
 
Note that phylogenetic independent contrasts for two variables are not necessarily 
orthogonal (i.e., uncorrelated and thus independent of each other). In fact, PICs are frequently 
used precisely to examine the strength of correlation among variables. PICs are only independent 
in the sense that, while original species data points were connected through a pattern of shared 
ancestry, once PICs are produced for a trait they can be used as data points that are no longer 
connected through ancestry (Felsenstein, 1985). In other words, PICs are independent of the 
phylogeny as if data had been residualized against it. 
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One of the advantages of employing the PIC method relative to other available 
phylogenetic methods is that a set of contrasts can be extracted as a dataset, and subsequent 
statistical analyses can be performed on the contrasts. For instance, the contrasts for trait X can 
be correlated to the contrasts for trait Y, to examine if the two traits have coevolved in lockstep 
through the phylogeny. Although several statistical procedures have phylogenetically informed 
homologue methods (e.g., path analyses and phylogenetic path analyses; generalized linear 
mixed models and phylogenetically generalized linear mixed model; meta analyses, and 
phylogenetic meta analyses; Peñaherrera-Aguirre & Fernandes, 2018), currently there is no 
phylogenetic equivalent for CPEM. However, extracting a set of PICs allows the computation of 
CPEs on the PICs after accounting for phylogeny. Put simply, a column of CPEs computed on 
PICs would reflect the evolutionary in-tandem correlation between two traits; but rather than 
leading to a single correlation coefficient for the entire sample like Pearson’s r, using CPEs leads 
to a correlation coefficient for each lineage in the dataset. 
To summarize: Entering species data for a trait into the phylogenetic tree permits producing 
phylogenetic independent contrasts for that trait, which are a column of data just as any other 
variable and as such can be used in subsequent analyses. Using PICs is equivalent to 
residualizing the trait against the phylogeny, thus eliminating the pattern of interdependence 
among the data points for that variable. Producing PICs for multiple traits separately permits 
subsequently entering them into correlative analyses just as can be done for any other variable. 
The correlations among traits, if the correlative analyses use PICs, are equivalent to partial 
correlation, where the effect of phylogeny is partialed out, whereas correlative analyses that 
purely use species data without any consideration of the phylogeny (e.g., without producing 
PICs) are equivalent to examining the zero-order correlations among traits.  
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3. Results  
Results below are reported for the factor loadings of G upon the five cognitive abilities, 
and for cognitive integration coefficients for the five cognitive abilities. Recall that factor 
loadings, in this case, indicate how correlated performance on a cognitive ability is to the set of 
cognitive abilities using species data. If factor loadings for a given cognitive ability are estimated 
using phylogenetic independent contrasts rather than using species data, they are termed 
“evolutionary factor loading” and reflect the degree to which G and the cognitive ability have 
coevolved in tandem. If positive and strong, this evolutionary factor loading thus indicates that 
changes in the given cognitive ability occurred in lockstep across evolutionary time with changes 
in other cognitive abilities that comprise the G factor. 
Recall also that the cognitive integration coefficient is the correlation of G values the 
factor loadings on a given cognitive ability. It is estimated across species, and if the coefficient is 
positive, species with higher G exhibit a stronger factor loading on that given cognitive ability. 
In turn, the evolutionary cognitive integration coefficient is the result of exactly the same 
procedure, but conducted on phylogenetic independent contrasts instead of on raw species data. 
If the evolutionary cognitive integration coefficient is positive, G and the factor loading for the 
given ability are tied across evolutionary time, changing in tandem and in the same direction 
through evolution. 
 
3.1. Average Factor Loadings 
While a continuous parameter estimate (CPE) for a given cognitive ability reflects its 
species-specific factor loading for that ability, the average of CPEs for that ability (i.e., taking all 
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species together) should be identical to factor loadings obtained by the unit-weighted factor 
scoring reported by Fernandes et al. (2014). Indeed as expected, identical average factor loadings 
were found by computing the average of CPEs for each cognitive ability, compared to the factor 
loadings reported by Fernandes et al.’s (2014) unit-weighted factor approach, and highly similar 
to those reported by Reader et al. (2011) which were produced by principal axis factoring. 
Results indicate strong and significant factor loadings for all five cognitive abilities, with 
loadings ranging from .684 to .904 without phylogenetic controls, and between .722 to .865 after 
accounting for phylogeny (see Table 2.1). In both sets of analyses tactical deception displayed 
the weakest factor loadings. Tool use and extractive foraging had the strongest loadings even 
after accounting for phylogeny, as also detailed (and discussed) by Fernandes et al., 2014.  
 
3.2. Variations in Factor Loadings as a Function of G 
 The relationship of G with the factor loadings on each of the five cognitive abilities is 
reported below for each ability. Also, it is possible to estimate an "omnibus" relationship of G 
with the set of factor loadings; in other words, a general integration coefficient, reflecting 
whether G predicts how strongly the cognitive abilities are interrelated on average. This is 
operationalized as follows: The factor loadings for the five cognitive abilities are entered into a 
unit-weighted common factor (i.e., their standard scores are averaged into a single variable); 
then, the correlation of G with this common factor is estimated. The correlation index resulting 
from this procedure serves as an omnibus, protective estimate of the relationship of G with factor 
loadings in general. If its magnitude is moderate to high, it suggests that species with higher 
levels of G have more integrated abilities. 
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G positively predicted stronger factor loadings for all cognitive abilities, as shown in 
Table 2.1. Effects were of moderate to high magnitude, consistently for all abilities. The omnibus 
integration coefficient was .657 (p < .05).  
 Once phylogenetic contrasts were used, however, the magnitude of cognitive integration 
coefficients reduced somewhat, as is common in comparative studies (Price, 1997). It remained 
moderate and significant for tool use, extractive foraging, and innovation, but weak and non-
significant for the two sociality-related cognitive abilities (social learning and tactical deception). 
Nevertheless, the omnibus cognitive integration coefficient remained significant and moderate in 
size (.283, p < .05), suggesting that G continues to predict stronger associations among cognitive 
abilities overall even when phylogenetic contrasts are used instead of species data. 
 
Table 2.1. 
Average factor loadings and cognitive integration indices for the five cognitive abilities, without 
and with phylogenetic control 
Cognitive ability Factor 
loading 
Evolutionary 
factor loading 
Cognitive 
integration 
coefficient 
Evolutionary 
cognitive integration 
coefficient 
Tool use  .905* .846* .636* .412* 
Extractive foraging .879* .865* .632* .349* 
Innovation .864* .788* .617* .284* 
Social learning .784* .809* .653* .113 
Tactical deception .688* .722* .604* .153 
Note: * p < .05. 
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A post-hoc hypothesis regarding the evolutionary cognitive integration coefficient 
involved the possibility that the cognitive abilities with a stronger evolutionary integration 
should be those that are, on average, more central to G. In other words, cognitive tasks on which 
G has a stronger factor loading should exhibit more integration as a function of increasing levels 
of G, because they are integral to the common factor. In fact the correlation between factor 
loadings and the magnitude of cognitive integration coefficients supported this hypothesis (r = 
.685). As for the analyses with species data, cognitive integration coefficients were largely 
similar (all between .604 and .653, as per Table 2.1), thus their size was not so strongly predicted 
by the factor loadings of the respective cognitive tasks (r = .396) although still positive. 
Considering that size and significance of all coefficients for the species data analyses, and 
of three out of five coefficients for the analyses involving phylogenetic contrasts, post-doc 
analyses were then run to unpack the cognitive integration coefficients exhibited in Table 2.1. 
Each such cognitive integration coefficient in the previous table involved the effect of G upon 
the relationship of each cognitive task with all other cognitive tasks. This could be unpacked so 
that one can examine which pairs of cognitive tasks are most responsible for these coefficients. 
To illustrate: while the relationship of tool use with other cognitive tasks was demonstrated to 
increase as a function of G, it is possible that what increases as a function of G in that omnibus 
relationship of tool use with all other tasks is driven only by the relationship of tool use to one or 
two other particular tasks. Alternatively, it is possible that the relationship of tool use to each and 
every other task really increases as a function of G. This ought to be explored. To that effect, 
Table 2.2 displays the effect of G upon the bivariate relationship of each pair of cognitive tasks. 
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Table 2.2.  
Predictive power of G upon bivariate correlations involving pairs of cognitive tasks; using 
species data (to the left of the diagonal) or phylogenetic contrasts (to the right of the diagonal) 
 
Cognitive ability Tool use Extractive 
foraging 
Innovation Social 
learning 
Tactical 
deception 
Tool use - .189 .368* .241* .189 
Extractive foraging .613* - .327* .136 .195 
Innovation .572* .552* - -.007 .146 
Social learning .607* .618* .643* - .068 
Tactical deception .547* .573* .601* .578* - 
Note: * p < .05. 
 
Although G positively and strongly predicted bivariate correlations among all pairs of 
variables at present (i.e., using extant species data), it can be noted that, when using phylogenetic 
contrasts to examine the historical predictive power of G upon the in-tandem coevolution of 
traits, only three coefficients are significant. Of these three, two involve tool use and two involve 
innovation.  
 
4. Discussion 
This study aimed to examine the pattern of correlations among performance measures of 
various cognitive tasks, as a function of general intelligence (G), across primate taxa. It also 
aimed to examine if results differed in a phylogenetically-controlled design compared to a design 
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relying solely on species data (i.e., without a consideration of the degree of inter-relatedness of 
the primate species). These goals permit testing if the strength of the positive manifold G varies 
predictably across primates. 
Data examination was guided by two evolutionary theory-derived hypotheses. Firstly, 
general intelligence should be an adaptation for organisms in generalist ecologies, which require 
not specialized cognitive phenotypes that permit dealing with a small set of adaptive problems, 
but rather should require cognitive flexibility to solve novel, complex problems and translate 
solutions across ecological subdomains. As such, it was expected that species with higher scores 
on the general intelligence factor (G) would exhibit stronger interrelations among the measures 
of cognitive performance (i.e. high factor loadings for the tasks), rather than a disintegration 
which would be indicative of specialization. 
Secondly, it was hypothesized that, as the adaptive usefulness of G would require 
integration among cognitive domains, supportive results for the aforementioned prediction 
should be found both without and with controls for phylogenetic non-independence. Such 
controls permit examining not only whether traits are associated presently, but also through 
evolutionary time (i.e., whether changes across traits happened in lockstep in evolutionary 
history). 
 Overall, results supported both hypotheses. The cognitive integration coefficient 
(representing the correlation between G and the factor loading for a given measure, as indicated 
in Figure 2.1) was moderate to high in size for all measures without phylogenetic controls, and 
moderate for three out of five measures after phylogenetic controls. The overall protective test 
was also moderate in size after the phylogenetic controls. Interestingly, the analysis employing 
the method of correlated vectors to examine the post-hoc possibility that the cognitive integration 
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coefficient was stronger for more G-central measures (i.e., those with a stronger average factor 
loading) led to a confirmation of this hypothesis. In other words, cognitive abilities that exhibit a 
high average factor loading in the primate order exhibit a stronger integration with other 
cognitive abilities as a function of G. 
 
4.1 Tool Use and Innovation as Drivers of Cognitive Integration 
 Post-hoc analyses indicated that, while all bivariate correlations among all cognitive tasks 
increase as a function of G in this sample of primate species, once evolutionary bivariate 
correlations are considered (i.e., using phylogenetic contrasts), only a few were significant and 
still moderate in size. Two of these involved tool use and two involved innovation. This means 
that the increases in correlations among cognitive tasks occurred in tandem with increases in G, 
whereas increases in correlations among other tasks occurred in different tempos (either before 
or, most likely, lagged behind). 
These findings reinforce the notion that tool use and innovation were central drivers of 
the evolution of intelligence in primates (Fernandes et al., 2014; Reader & Laland, 2002). While, 
conceptually, innovation is indispensable to novel problem-solving, tool use permits control and 
exploration of the ecology (Darwin, 1871; Gibson & Ingold, 1993; Washburn, 1959; Wynn, 
1988). Moreover, the centrality of tool use in the evolution of general intelligence may relate to 
the finding that the pattern of evolution of the cerebellum in primates is moderately 
commensurable to that observed for G (see Chapter 1), as activity in the cerebellum appears to 
be an important substrate for the coordination of motor skill necessary for the implementation of 
cognitive problem-solving (Doyon et al., 2003; Salman, 2002). This body of work reinforces the 
notion that tool use is an important mechanism for promoting the efficient exploitation of a 
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diverse, complex habitat in a variety of ways as unique opportunities arise (Parker, 1978), 
including novel ways due to the capacity for innovation. 
The present findings also agree with Parker and Gibson’s (1977, 1979) distinction 
between intelligent and context-specific tool use. They have proposed that, in order for tool use 
to qualify as “intelligent” it needs to be flexibly adjustable to novel situations in innovative ways. 
While tool use in the sample used in the analyses in the present study is exhibited by many 
species, it is an integral part of general intelligence in some taxa only. That is, it is highly 
correlated with other cognitive skills, especially with innovation, in only part of the sample. This 
tool use-innovation complex is, not surprisingly, supported by the evolutionary, lockstep 
correlation between these two variables as a function of increasing G. 
In line with the previous identification that sociality-related measures (social learning and 
tactical deception) exhibit the lowest factor loadings from G, slowest evolutionary rates and 
strongest conservatism among the five cognitive abilities used in this study (Fernandes et al., 
2014), here they were the only two abilities that failed to exhibit stronger factor loadings on the 
G factor as a function of level of G, in the phylogenetically-informed analyses. This suggests that 
they may be less central to G compared to other aspects of cognition. Nevertheless, these results 
are far from indicative that social cognition is independent from G – they still exhibit high factor 
loadings from G, less conservatism and much faster evolutionary rates than most traits in 
primates (even other behavioral traits; Blomberg et al., 2003; Kamilar & Cooper, 2013). 
Moreover, even though cognitive integration coefficients were not significant for social cognitive 
abilities after use of phylogenetic contrasts, they were high and significant when using species 
data. This suggests that while the integration of social cognition may not have coevolved as 
much in lockstep with so-called technical or physical cognitive abilities across time, they do 
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exhibit an association that has been maintained. Furthermore, social transmission has been 
implicated as an important potentiator of innovation rate across animals (Arbilly & Laland, 
2017). 
 
4.2. The Evolution of Cognitive Integration 
In primate studies, it is common to find descriptions of capacity for the comprehension of 
generalized object identity; categorization of abstract relations, and thus the capacity to 
interchangeably rely on different entities within a category to flexibly solve problems (de Waal, 
2016). These capacities suggest that many primates are capable of generalization from one 
domain of adaptive problems to another when problem solving, to translate applications. In other 
words, cognitive domains appear to interact. The present study suggests that some primate 
species exhibit a stronger correlation among their cognitive abilities. While this correlation does 
not necessarily imply that such species are able to translate applications of one cognitive skill to 
others, it would be difficult and unparsimonious to defend that the evolution of general 
intelligence and of stronger intercorrelations among its components would involve the opposite 
possibility: that of impenetrability and lack of communication, transfer, or interaction among 
domains of cognition. 
The notion that ecological generalism is tied to cognitive complexity is longstanding 
(Parker, 1978). The study of the so-called proactive-reactive axis of behavior has also converged 
with this notion for more than 50 years. Proactivity and creativity in problem-solving are 
exhibited in exploratory behavior and in response to environmental changes, and proactive 
organisms use behavior to control and manipulate environmental conditions. Proactivity and 
creativity appear to be associated with ecological generalism in comparative studies of primate 
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species (Glickman & Sroges, 1966; Visalberghi & Mason, 1983; see also Mettke-Hofmann, 2014 
for a review). More recently, it is becoming clearer that generalists are also better learners, and 
have evolved more connectivity in the brain (Mettke-Hofmann, 2014), along with more 
innovation and better performance on complex problem-solving cognitive abilities (Henke-von 
der Malsburg & Fichtel, 2018). The present study contributes to this long, albeit relatively sparse 
body of knowledge by adding a piece to the puzzle, as not only there is evidence of links 
between ecological generalism, complexification of the neuroanatomy, and performance on 
complex and creative problem solving, but the present study also adds evidence that overall 
cognitive performance has coevolved with the integration among cognitive abilities in the 
primate order. Arguably, this integration permits the use cognitive skills interactively. 
This growing body of knowledge can also offer insight to our understanding of the 
evolution of cognition in the human lineage: Several primate lineages, including hominins, were 
able to adapt to largely fluctuating environmental conditions in the late Tertiary. They are 
frequently proposed to have been generalists and opportunists (see Parker, 1978; Ripley, 1984). 
Reader et al. (2011) demonstrate that increased levels of general intelligence are also 
comparatively recent in the primate phylogeny, in largely the same lineages. The present results 
suggest that increasing general intelligence predicts increasing cognitive integration. Note that 
the correlation of G with the cognitive integration coefficients was observed both for species data 
and for phylogenetically-controlled analyses, which permit inferring that they have covaried in 
tandem across phylogenetic time. This implies that high levels of cognitive integration are a 
comparatively novel evolutionary feature. Moreover, Chapter 1 examined degree of change in 
the evolutionary rates for G in primates, using the same dataset compiled by Reader et al. (2011), 
and identified a strong acceleration pattern from the root to the tip of the phylogenetic tree. This 
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compounds the interpretation that high scores on G in several primate taxa are a considerably 
recent phenomenon, further solidifying the hypothesis that the evolution of integration of 
cognitive abilities should also be recent.  
It should be noted that the hypothesis that ecological generalism is behind the evolution 
of G and of stronger associations among cognitive skills is currently being tested (Peñaherrera-
Aguirre & Fernandes, in preparation). Preliminary analyses, both with species data and with 
phylogenetically-informed methods, indicate that habitat generalism (i.e., the number and 
diversity of habitats a species occupies) is predictive of general intelligence and of the 
intercorrelations among the five cognitive skills also used in the present study. While the 
correlative design used does not permit pinpointing empirically whether habitat generalism is a 
cause or an effect of cognitive evolution, it suggests that they have coevolved in lockstep in the 
primate phylogeny, being co-adapted, as hypothesized in the present work. 
 
4.3. Implications for the Understanding of Specialized Abilities 
 Framing the results in terms of increased integration among cognitive abilities as a 
function of G does not make explicit the implications to the other end of the G continuum: 
species with a lower G average exhibit more independent variation in their performance on 
cognitive tasks. To illustrate, some of the species with a low G score may excel in tool use but 
exhibit little of other cognitive abilities; another species may frequently execute extractive 
foraging but exhibit little social intelligence or use of tools. As such, there appear to be many 
alternative ways of being a low-G species, and due to the low covariation among performance on 
cognitive tasks in these species it is unlikely that any species performs poorly on all cognitive 
tasks. In other words, the present results suggest that in species with lower G, cognition is more 
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specialized and there is thus more diversity among them. Potentially this involves less 
communication and interaction among cognitive adaptations, although the neuropsychology 
behind the present results is still not explored. 
Considering this, contrary to concerns expressed by some researchers (e.g., Hodos & 
Campbell, 1969; Tomasello & Call, 1997), a discussion of G does not reinforce the antiquated 
concept of a scala naturae. Instead of suggesting that species with higher G are better adapted 
than others or superior in performance across domains, the present line of research and the 
present results suggest that species of low G exhibit a different pattern of interrelations among 
cognitive abilities, rather than having a cohesively low performance on all of them. In other 
terms, they are possibly low on the general factor simply because they do not require such an 
integrated factor for their ecology; instead, they exhibit specialized abilities and may excel in 
them, without requiring commensurable and interactive action in other domains of cognitive 
performance.  
Just as the present study employs the hypothesis that high G has evolved in ecological 
generalists, conversely those with lower G scores are expected to have evolved as ecological 
specialists. Through the lens of the generalism-specialism continuum, it is also impossible to 
reinforce a scala naturae argument with the present results: Specialization and generalization 
each have their particular advantages and disadvantages, in terms of evolutionary adaptedness, 
one not being intrinsically superior to the other (Parker, 1978). While generalism is 
advantageous when flexibility to cope with varying conditions is necessary, specialism is 
advantageous in more stable conditions where a few resources can be confidently and thus more 
efficiently used. 
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4.4. Contrast to the Spearman’s Law of Diminishing Returns 
In human samples of individuals, those with higher IQ scores tend to exhibit lower factor 
loadings on the general factor of intelligence, suggesting that cognitive performance is more 
specialized in high-performing individuals. This phenomenon Spearman termed “law of 
diminishing returns” (Spearman, 1927; see also Jensen, 2003). At first impression, the results 
described in the present study go counter to that well established phenomenon.  
Few evolutionary accounts of the law of diminishing returns have been proposed and 
only as post-hoc explanations (for a review, see Woodley, 2011), with most of the literature 
being atheoretical instead. Evolutionary accounts propose, for instance, that (a) pleiotropic 
deleterious mutations may have an effect across a wide variety of brain structures and processes, 
thus creating an apparent integration among low levels of ability in those with low IQ (i.e., 
jeopardizing efficiency across the brain); or that (b) cognitive differentiation among those with 
high IQ scores is best explained by individual differences in life history speed, while recognizing 
that contrary to cross-species and cross-population studies, individual differences in general 
intelligence and in life history speed paradoxically do not correlate. 
Like several relationships among variables that conflict in direction or strength when 
comparing within-species to between-species results (e.g., Rushton’s paradox of the relationship 
between intelligence and life history; Figueredo et al., 2017), Spearman’s law of diminishing 
returns among humans presents a paradox as it goes counter the results of the present study. It is 
clear that these proposed post-hoc explanations do not clash with the present theoretical 
formulation of the relationship of ecological generalism to the factor loadings; that is, they are 
not simply the reverse of the hypotheses forwarded in the present study. No hypothesis has been 
put forward, let alone supported, that the strength of the general factor of intelligence reduces 
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due to ecological pressures for generalism. Having said that, it is imperative that future studies 
make a comprehensive and simultaneous competitive examination of the effects of the need for 
ecological generalism, life history variation, and pleiotropic mutations affecting brain 
functioning to compare their putative effects upon factor loadings on general intelligence. That 
way, all hypotheses regarding variations in the strength of general intelligence factor loadings are 
directly compared. This is, however, not possible with existing data on primates given the 
considerably small overlap between datasets containing the aforementioned variables, and 
scarcity of data on the effect of mutations on a variety of species. Furthermore, such an empirical 
comparison of hypothesis would require using only one level of analysis (either cross-species or 
cross-individuals), whereas the present work is conducted at the cross-species level but the law 
of diminishing returns has been proposed for individual differences only. 
 
4.5. Limitations and Future Directions 
It must also be noted that the ethological variables used in this study were counts of 
behavior, rather than fine-grained measures of the degree of problem-solving success in the 
implementation of the behaviors. Still, previous conclusions drawn from studies using this same 
database largely converged with those derived from laboratory cognitive challenges (for a 
review, see Reader et al., 2011), and it must be noted that error is reduced when using pooled 
databases that integrate multiple sources such as the database used in the present study (Lubinski 
& Humphreys, 1996). 
 As described in the Method Section of this Chapter, the use of phylogenetic contrasts, 
rather than fitting the phylogenetic tree topologies to the particular phylogenetic signal of each 
measure, is a conservative approach and thus may lead to underestimates of correlations. As 
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such, the use of contrasts provides a strong test of the hypotheses, and protects against the 
possibility that the phylogenetic signal of the measures was lower than 1.0 (which is equivalent 
to using contrasts) in case of measurement error in the ethological observations.  
The possibility that the coefficients reported when using contrasts were underestimates is 
also likely if we consider that phylogenetic controls partly eliminate the effects of ecology as 
well, not only of phylogeny (Fernandes, 2014; Price, 1997)5. Closely-related lineages are 
phenotypically similar not only because they share a common ancestor (which is the premise of 
phylogenetic controls), but also because their niches tend to share many characteristics. Once 
there is speciation, the daughter lineages do not suddenly occupy niches that are the polar 
opposites of each other, nor randomly-distributed niches. Rather, their niches tend to have more 
similarities than those of distantly-related species. In line with this, in a study of phylogenetic 
signal across carnivoran species, all environment measures studied (local temperature, 
 
5It is also rarely pointed out that inertia in a trait exists in a lineage only if there is selection for 
the maintenance of the characteristic. In other words, if a trait confers selective advantage, it is 
maintained if already widespread in the lineage. Traits inherited from ancestor lineages do not 
need to undergo inertia. Cognitive and behavioral traits, especially, are continuous polygenic 
characteristics influenced by vastly numerous loci upon which selection can act, modifying the 
trait qualitatively or quantitatively (Plomin, Owen, & McGuffin, 1994). Such modifications can 
take place in few generations if important changes in ecological landscapes take place in 
speciation (Gangestad, 2011). As such, the argument that species that diverged phylogenetically 
millions of years ago should retain similarity simple because of shared ancestry (implying that 
only phylogenetically-controlled analyses are valid, or even that they do not contain biases) is 
hard to defend. 
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precipitation, evotranspiration, etc.) were moderately and significantly phylogenetically 
conserved (Fernandes, 2014). As such, controlling for phylogenetic non-independence through 
the use of contrasts or any other technique partially eliminates true adaptive variance due to the 
control for niche similarity. This undesirable effect is not particular to contrasts specifically, and 
thus still unavoidable when one wishes to examine the degree to which traits have covaried in 
lockstep through evolutionary history no matter what the phylogenetic technique employed is. 
It is also important to note that, although the present results stress a statistical integration 
among cognitive performance measures, it does not demonstrate or assume that integration 
among neuroanatomical areas, neural networks, or any subjacent physiological set of processes 
parallels the results exhibited. Even though differences among species in some neurological 
substrates must exist behind the reported cognitive integration, it is unclear what the species 
differences are: whether they lie in the correlations among sizes of brain areas, or in the 
connectivity among areas, or in diffusion of cognitive functions into less regional specificity. A 
stronger correlation among performance scores on different cognitive problems can potentially 
be explained by multiple different neuropsychological hypotheses. The present findings are not 
evidence for any particular alternative and cannot be used to discriminate among them. 
Considering the profuse reliance on volumetric measures in the primatological and 
anthropological literature on intelligence and the arguably pressing need to test the validity of 
this approach, Chapter 3 will have the goal of examining the first possible explanation outlined 
above for the findings exhibited in the present study: that brain structures are correlated in size 
more strongly in some taxa. 
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Chapter 3. Examining the Magnitude of Correlations among Sizes of Brain Regions across 
the Primate Phylogeny: Stable Magnitudes across Lineages of Different Brain Sizes 
 
1. Introduction 
As in the case of relations among cognitive abilities, the statistical relations among sizes of 
brain regions across species have been explored in a simple way only. The possibility that the 
strength of the relations among sizes of brain regions is stronger in clades of larger brains has not 
been examined. In other words, no hypotheses have been tested, in primates or other clades, 
regarding the possibility that the correlation among sizes of brain regions increases or decreases 
as a function of species brain size. While the finding that performance scores on cognitive 
abilities become more correlated among themselves in species of higher general intelligence (G) 
may suggest that this is the product of integration among brain regions, this is a large assumption 
that should not be made without examination. Furthermore, if brain regions are indeed more 
integrated, in what sense are they so? In terms of stronger correlations among sizes of regions, or 
in having more projections connecting them, or in other ways that do not necessarily involve 
neuroanatomical volumes? This is an empirical question that must be examined.  
This study has the goal of testing specifically the first possibility, namely that brain 
structures exhibit stronger associations, in species of larger brains, in terms of correlations 
among their volumes. The use of volume measures is widespread in the comparative literature, 
where they are taken as substrates for intelligence (as detailed in Chapter 1; for further reviews, 
see Deaner et al., 2000; Deaner et al., 2007) and they are even employed as proxies for it in the 
absence of robust ethological or laboratory measures of cognitive performance (Shultz & 
Dunbar, 2010). Chapter 1 examined the evolutionary rates and selection patterns of general 
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intelligence and several commonly-used neuroanatomical volume measures in primates, 
demonstrating that comparability is overall limited. In the present Chapter, I will present a test of 
possible increases in correlations among neuroanatomical volume measures as a function of 
brain size, which will serve as comparison test to the increases in correlations among cognitive 
abilities as a function of general intelligence documented in Chapter 2. If neuroanatomical 
volume measures do serve as good substrates for intelligence to the point of serving as proxies 
(e.g., Shultz & Dunbar, 2010), the highly consistent integration observed among cognitive 
performance measures should replicate when the same analytical approach in neuroanatomical 
volume measures. 
 
1.1. Concerted or Mosaic Volumetric Evolution of Brain Structures? 
 Multiple studies in the past several decades have attempted to examine whether, when 
comparing species of different brain sizes, the volumes of brain regions have evolved separately 
or in a coordinated manner. In other words, it is of interest to understand if brain regions have 
tended to vary in size proportionately to each other, or alternatively if in some taxa changes in 
the volume of brain areas were largely independent from changes in other areas (frequently 
called mosaic evolution; Gould, 1977)6. Conclusions drawn from these studies are conflicting, as 
 
6 Following the tradition of the field for consistency, the terms “mosaic” and “concerted” will be 
used throughout the text, respectively referring simply to (a) a lack of or low correlation between 
the sizes of various brain regions, when comparing species; and (b) the presence of correlations 
among the sizes brain regions, when comparing species. For instance, if regions A, B, and C 
have sizes 1, 2, and 3 in species x, and sizes 2, 4, 6 in species y, brain regions vary in a perfectly 
concerted manner in this dataset of species. When using these terms, no implications are made 
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some indicate that brain regions increase and decrease in size largely in a coordinated fashion 
(e.g., Finlay et al., 2001; Yopak et al., 2010), whereas others pinpoint specific regions that 
exhibit independent evolution in terms of size (e.g., Hager et al., 2012; Smaers & Soligo, 2013), 
although some recent essays propose that some regions or systems evolve in a concerted manner 
among themselves, but these sets of coordinated regions vary in size independently from other 
brain regions (Barton & Harvey, 2000; Smaers et al., 2011; Whiting & Barton, 2003). For 
instance, the size of the neocortex in primates is argued to have coevolved with the size of the 
cerebellum and with that of the diencephalon, but independently of the mesencephalon and the 
medulla (Barton & Harvey, 2000). A hybrid model between mosaic and coordinated evolution of 
brain structures is thus sometimes proposed (Barton, 2001). 
Such a hybrid model may introduce more detail and present a less extreme alternative for 
the explanation of neuroanatomical evolution. However, the state of this debate remains 
confusing. Some authors have attempted to organize the field by examining whether perhaps 
some clusters of taxa exhibit mosaic evolution in the brain, whereas in other clades brain regions 
correlate highly in their sizes (Barton & Harvey, 2000; Clark et al., 2001; Frahm et al., 1982; 
Smaers & Soligo, 2013). While informative, two issues arise with this clade-specific analysis: 
1) Demonstrating that the correlations of sizes of brain regions in one clade are different 
from the correlations observed in another clade tends to simply explain away the question of 
 
about evolutionary interpretations or about whether the sizes regions have evolved in lockstep; 
they are instead purely descriptive terms and any evolutionary hypotheses must be tested. 
Likewise, no assumptions are made about whether brain regions that exhibit concerted change 
are more connected, functionally interactive, or complementary in their purpose – these 
possibilities should be examined empirically. 
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what accounts for correlated versus independent neuroanatomical evolution. It does not elucidate 
what may be behind correlations among sizes of brain regions, rather it only shows that for some 
reason still unexplained, clades may differ to a certain degree in the strength of these 
correlations. As such, clade-specific analysis is a descriptive but not explanatory approach. 
2) Comparing a set of species of larger brain size to a set of species of smaller brain size 
as an effort to examine if brain size accounts for whether there has been independent (i.e., 
mosaic) volumetric evolution of brain regions or correlated evolution is an approach that leads to 
little sensitivity in the discrimination among brain sizes. It is akin to the common median split 
approach in individual differences studies: the n is reduced to half within each of the two 
analysis conducted (or to a third or a fourth if three or four sets of species are compared), and 
then comparisons among sets of species rely upon an n of two (or three or four) clades. This 
frequently leads to simply qualitative comparisons among sets of species, because an n of two is 
evidently not sufficient for any informed statistical comparison. As in Chapter 2, the continuous 
parameter estimation model addresses these statistical concerns by permitting fine grained 
analyses without splitting the sample into clusters, while still permitting analyses to be 
phylogenetically informed. 
 
Brain regions are not constrained genetically to covary in size; covariations, when they 
exist, arise due to selection favoring them, as the concerted action of multiple brain regions 
appears adaptive. This is evidenced by the identification of largely independent genetic loci for 
variation in different key parts of the brain (Hager et al., 2012). Therefore adaptationist-informed 
hypotheses of stronger or weaker covariation among brain regions in terms of their sizes can be 
generated and tested. 
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1.2. Objectives and Hypotheses 
A realization that needs to be considered and motivates the present work is that a 
correlation coefficient for the association between the volumes of two neuroanatomical regions 
permits only estimating the average association between variables in a given sample. It does not 
lend itself to examining whether variables are more associated in a certain part of the sample 
than in others; that is, other techniques are necessary to examine if the correlation strength is not 
constant across subsamples (e.g., certain species in a dataset of primate species). If, among taxa 
of larger brains, brain components start varying in size in a more interlocked fashion (i.e., in 
coordinated) or alternatively in a looser (i.e., more independent) fashion compared to way that 
occurs in taxa of smaller brains, a simple correlation coefficient as described above will not be 
able to detect this phenomenon. This will only be perceptible if one examines whether the 
strength of the correlation coefficient itself varies as a function of brain size (or as a function of 
any variable of interest). 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2 that cognitive abilities become more integrated (i.e., 
correlated) in taxa of higher general intelligence, it is difficult to imagine how this would not 
lead to questions about whether a similar phenomenon takes place at the neuroanatomical level. 
In other words, does the integration among abilities necessitate an integration among brain 
regions? No single hypothesis is proposed for this study, considering that correlations among 
sizes of brain regions are not the only possible avenue for explaining the already detailed 
increased correlations among cognitive abilities in species of high average intelligence (Study 
II). Instead, there are multiple working hypotheses: 
110 
 
1) Larger brains would exhibit greater inter-region integration; that is, the 
correlations among volumes of brain regions are larger than in small-brained species. This 
hypothesis is based on the premise that the general intelligence observed in species of large 
brains coopts activity from multiple brain regions. As such, it would be unlikely that some 
regions would evolve considerably in size in an independent fashion relative to other regions, 
and it could thus be expected that volumes of regions would exhibit high factor loadings from a 
common factor in a comparative analysis. 
2) Larger brains would not exhibit greater inter-region integration at the broad level 
(i.e., when analyzing the main fundamental brain parts), but rather inter-region integration would 
be observed among components within one fundamental brain part. This hypothesis rests on the 
premise that it is not the whole brain, but rather one fundamental part of it that is largely 
responsible for general intelligence. As such, other brain regions outside this fundamental region 
may vary in volume more freely, but subregions within this fundamental region would be largely 
integrated (i.e., their volumes would exhibit high factor loadings from a common factor in a 
comparative analysis). Specifically a hypothesis is here forwarded that the subregions of the 
telencephalon may be more strongly correlated in species with a larger telencephalon, as a) the 
telencephalon has long been recognized as an important target of selection for increases in 
primates, especially in more intelligent species (Stephan & Andy, 1964); b) it is the focus of 
most hypotheses of cognitive evolution (particularly in the neocortex – having even been 
described as ‘the crowning achievement of evolution’ (Rakic, 2009) – and the hippocampus; 
Shultz & Dunbar, 2010), c) somewhat detailed data on subregions exist for numerous primate 
species, but not for other major regions of the brain (Stephan et al., 1981). 
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3) No relevant difference would be observed when comparing species of larger 
brains to others in the factor loadings of brain regions. As volume measures were not 
commensurate with general intelligence in their evolutionary rates and modes of selection pattern 
(see Chapter 1; i.e., they do not appear a sufficient substrate for it, evolutionarily), volume 
measures of brain regions may also not be more integrated in larger brains as a substrate for 
general intelligence. In other words, the integration findings of Chapter 2 may not replicate for 
volumetric measures of neuroanatomy in the present Chapter, just as selection regimes for 
volumetric measures of neuroanatomy are disparate from those for general intelligence. 
 
2. Method 
Analyses will be done at two levels of brain structure division: 
1) An analysis conducted done estimating the predictive effect of total brain volume upon 
the common factor loadings of a high-order latent construct comprised of the volumes of its 
fundamental parts, including volume measures for the pons, medulla oblongata, cerebellum, 
mesencephalon, diencephalon, and telencephalon. These structures correspond to the initial, 
main subdivisions of the embryonic primate (and vertebrate, in general) brain.  
 
2) A second analysis will be conducted estimating the predictive effect of telencephalon 
volume upon the common factor loadings of a lower-order latent construct comprised of the 
volumes of its components. Specifically, components to be included are: The neocortex (i.e., 
isocortical grey and the underlying white matter), hippocampus, schizocortex(i.e., entorhinal, 
perirhinal and presubicular cortices), striatum, septum, lobus piriformis, bulbus olfactorius, and 
bulbus olfactorius accessorius. 
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2.1. Measures 
For the first set of analyses, regarding the brain and its fundamental, high-order 
components, volumetric data will be compiled for 67 primate species for all variables. Data 
sources are the database developed by Stephan and colleagus (1981) with complementary data 
from Matano and colleagues (1985) for pons volumes, and the recent dataset with data for the 
same brain components for additional species and for some of the same species (i.e., 
measurements on new specimens) by Navarrete and colleagues (2018). Averages for each 
species will be computed when data are taken from multiple sources. 
For the second set of analyses, regarding the telencephalon and its components, volumetric 
data will be compiled for 45 primate species for all variables, as fewer species have specific 
published details on the components of the telencephalon. The data source will be the database 
developed by Stephan and colleagues (1981), with complementary data (i.e., measurements on 
additional specimens) for some of the same species only for the neocortex, hippocampus, and 
striatum coming from Navarrete and colleagues (2018). Similarly, averages will be computed for 
each species, when data exist come from the two sources. 
These datasets exhibit advantages and limitations. Their main apparent limitation is that 
volume measurement, for most species, relied on few specimens, even in the case of the recent 
database generated by Navarrete and colleagues (2018). However, considering the paucity of 
alternative measurements, using these data permit comparison with other comparative studies, 
especially in the case of the Stephan and colleagues’ (1981) dataset, as it has for long been the 
main source for comparative analyses using neuroanatomical volume measures in primates (e.g., 
Deaner et al., 2007; Dunbar, 1992; Lindenfors et al., 2007; Sandel et al., 2016; Shultz & Dunbar, 
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2010). The inclusion of the recent, complementary data by Navarrete and colleagues permit 
reliance upon a somewhat larger number of species and specimens and thus higher confidence in 
parameter estimates. 
All measures will be log-transformed for all analyses, because of the well-known skewness 
in comparative data (Harvey, 1982). Considering the well-known allometric relations of brain 
structures with body size (Montgomery et al., 2016) but also concerns that residualization of 
volumetric measures against body size eliminates truly adaptive variance from brain regions 
(Fleagle, 1985; Jeschke & Kokko, 2009; Roff, 2011; Smith, 1980), analyses will be presented 
both for residualized and non-residualized (i.e., absolute) measures, with no single preferred 
approach. These two operationalizations of neuroanatomical volume measures permit examining 
(a) if their absolute sizes are more strongly correlated in species of larger brains, and (b) if their 
residual sizes net of body size are more strongly correlated in species of larger residual brain 
size, residualized against body size as well. 
 
2.2. Analyses 
The continuous parameter estimation model (CPEM; Gorsuch, 2005) will be employed to 
examine, at the first level of analysis, if overall brain size predicts the strength of factor loadings 
of the principal brain regions. In the second level of analysis, CPEM will be used to examine if 
telencephalon volume predicts the strength of factor loadings of its subregions. Recall that a 
factor loading represents a part-whole correlation whereby, in this study, the part refers to the 
volume of a specific neuroanatomical region, and the whole represents the set (i.e., aggregate) of 
all regions in the brain, or in the case of the second level of analysis, the set of all subregions in 
the telencephalon.  
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As defined in Chapter 2, CPEM produces continuous parameter estimates (CPEs, i.e., 
factor loadings) for each variable for each species by computing the product of its z-score and 
the z-score of the common factor (i.e., the aggregate or whole described above). Each species 
thus has a factor loading estimate, for each neuroanatomical region in the dataset. In the dataset, 
a column of the factor loadings for a neuroanatomical region (i.e., a list of the factor loading 
values, one by species, for a given neuroanatomical region) will be used for two purposes in this 
study, exactly as was done in Chapter 2: 
1) The values in the column will be averaged, to identify that average factor loading for 
that neuroanatomical region (i.e., the average part-whole correlation, where part is the region and 
whole is the set of regions). The average is exactly equivalent to the factor loading that would be 
identified if Unit Weighted Factoring were used, and very similar to the factor loading that 
would be identified if Principal Axis Factoring were used (see Chapter 2). Thus, were one to 
conduct a simple exploratory factor analysis using the present database of neuroanatomical 
volumes using data for primate species, the factor loadings identified in it represent simply the 
average factor loadings for the sample of species. 
2) That column can be correlated to a column of brain size for the respective species (or in 
the case of analyses involving only the telencephalon, the column can be correlated to a column 
of telencephalon size). This yields the “neuroanatomical integration coefficient”7, akin to the 
“cognitive integration coefficient” detailed in Chapter 2. 
 
7 Recall that the term “integration” is used without implying that regions are more strongly 
connected, share functions, or are connected in any other sense; rather, it refers to stronger 
correlations among neuroanatomical regions in terms of their sizes. 
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If the neuroanatomical integration coefficient is positive and moderate or strong, meaning 
that brain volume is positively predictive of factor loadings, it follows that in some taxa the 
factor loadings are more positive, whereas in others they are less strongly positive, or even 
somewhat negative. This potential integration would mean that, for some lineages, estimated 
factor loadings would be higher than the average factor loadings identified in (1), and for others 
they would be weaker or reversed in sign. This does not mean, however, that the average factor 
loadings estimated with a simple exploratory factor analysis are completely uninformative if an 
integration hypothesis is confirmed. As with any variable they would be informative of the 
central tendency for the sample, just not necessarily fully representative of the whole range of 
strengths of factor loadings observed. 
As in Chapter 2, all analyses will be conducted with and without phylogenetic controls, and 
compared. Analyses purely using species data (without taking into account their phylogenetic 
non-independence) permits assessing the current correlation among variables, but not whether 
they have coevolved in lockstep through evolutionary time. They may have evolved at different 
moments in evolutionary history, and all this analysis suggests is that there has been selection for 
the maintenance of the associations (Peñaherrera-Aguirre & Fernandes, 2018; Price, 1997; 
Thornhill & Fincher, 2013). Analyses taking into consideration the phylogenetic non-
independence among the species, on the other hand, permit examining whether traits have 
changed in tandem through evolutionary history (i.e. covarying on the same phylogenetic tree 
branches through time). Descriptions of results for analyses that include phylogenetic controls 
will be prefixed with the term evolutionary or suffixed with the term in lockstep, in order to 
reflect the notion that associations among traits that are identified using phylogenetic approaches 
indicate an association in tandem through evolutionary time. 
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To summarize: Results will be presented for (a) the average factor loading of the common 
factor of brain regions upon each individual brain region, (b) the relationship of brain size with 
the set of species-specific factor loadings of each individual brain region. (a) and (b) will also be 
reported for analyses using phylogenetic independent contrasts, respectively indicating the 
average evolutionary factor loading for each brain region, and the evolutionary anatomical 
integration coefficient. These four sets of results (a and b, without and with phylogenetic control) 
will first be reported with variables not having been residualized against body size, then they will 
also be also be reported with all variables having been residualized against body size. 
Exactly the same set of reports will then be exhibited for analyses involving telencephalon 
size and its subregions, after reports of analyses involving brain size and its regions. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Average Factor Loadings and Anatomical Integration Coefficients for Brain Structures 
Examining the correlations among the main brain structures, it is evident that a single 
common factor accounts for their covariance (see Table 3.1). This is observable both without and 
with phylogenetic controls, indicating that they are strongly correlated across evolutionary time. 
However, no changes in the factor loadings occur as a function of overall brain size, as 
anatomical integration coefficients (reflecting the correlation of brain size with factor loadings 
for a given brain region) for all regions exhibited low and non-significant magnitudes (Table 
3.1). The omnibus anatomical integration coefficient (operationalized as the correlation between 
brain size and the standardized average of all CPEs for all brain regions) was .015 (p > .05), and 
the omnibus evolutionary coefficient was .131 (p > .05), compounding the assertion that no 
integration of brain regions occurs as a function of brain size. Moreover, the correlation between 
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the vectors of average factor loading and anatomical integration coefficient was weak and non-
significant both for the case of raw and evolutionary coefficients: r = -.146 and .298 (p> .05) 
respectively. 
 
Table 3.1.  
Average factor loadings and integration indices for regions of the primate brain, without and 
with phylogenetic control 
Brain region Factor 
loading 
Evolutionary 
factor loading 
Anatomical 
integration 
coefficient 
Evolutionary 
anatomical 
integration coefficient 
Telencephalon .993* .982* .022 .141 
Diencephalon .998* .990* -.018 .137 
Mesencephalon .990* .921* .010 .157 
Cerebellum .994* .963* .072 .205 
Medulla .992* .919* -.014 -.009 
Note: * p < .05. 
 
Table 3.2 displays equivalent analyses to those reported in Table 3.1, but with each brain 
region’s volume being residualized against body size. While average factor loadings largely 
replicate the above reported results, anatomical integration coefficients exhibit differences: 
mesencephalic and cerebellar sizes appear more strongly correlated to other brain regions as a 
function of brain size. A non-significant but moderate correlation was found between the vector 
of factor loading and the vector of anatomical integration coefficients reported in Table 3.1 (r = 
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.474, p > .05), suggesting that it is possible that the reported integration effects are especially 
stronger for regions that are on average more central to the common factor. The omnibus 
anatomical integration coefficient (i.e., the overall effect of brain size upon factor loadings in 
general) was not of negligible size (r = .200) but failed to reach significance (p = .10). 
Once phylogenetic controls were employed, positive integration results for the few 
regions that did exhibit integration before did not replicate, suggesting that brain size evolved at 
a different pace compared to the volumetric integration of the cerebellum and the mesencephalon 
with other regions. No evidence was found that regions that are on average more central to the 
common factor (i.e., having stronger average factor loadings) exhibited stronger anatomical 
integration coefficients (r = -.416, p > .05). The omnibus anatomical integration coefficients was 
-.058 (p > .05), compounding the observation that no consistent changes occur in the strength of 
factor loadings of brain regions as a function of brain size. 
 
Table 3.2.  
Average factor loadings and integration indices for regions of the primate brain residualized 
against body size, without and with phylogenetic control 
Brain region Factor 
loading 
Evolutionary 
factor loading 
Anatomical 
integration 
coefficient 
Evolutionary 
anatomical 
integration coefficient 
Telencephalon .905* .945* .136 .010 
Diencephalon .959* .961* .205 -.112 
Mesencephalon .863* .851* .342* -.179 
Cerebellum .874* .877* .358* -.003 
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Medulla .801* .704* -.136 .024 
Note: * p < .05. 
 
Post-hoc analyses for the cerebellum indicated that, as a function of brain size, its 
correlation significantly (p < .05) increases with the telencephalon (r = .335), with the 
diencephalon (r = .381), and with the mesencephalon (r = .391) when using body size residuals, 
while with raw size its correlation with other brain regions does not change as a function of brain 
size. When using phylogenetic contrasts, the relationship of residual cerebellum size with 
residual mesencephalon size is observed to increase as a function of residual brain size (r = 
.240), but no other significant effects were detected. 
 Similarly, post-hoc analyses for the mesencephalon indicated that, as a function of brain 
size, its correlation significantly (p < .05) increases with the telencephalon (r = .318), with the 
diencephalon (r = .318), and with the cerebellum (r = .391) when using body size residuals, 
while with raw size its correlation with other brain regions does not change as a function of brain 
size. When using phylogenetic contrasts, the relationship of absolute mesencephalon size with 
cerebellum size is observed to increase as a function of brain size (r = .240), but no other 
significant effects were detected. 
 
3.2. Average Factor Loadings and Anatomical integration Coefficients for Telencephalic 
Structures 
Examining the correlations among telencephalic structures, most regions are on average 
related importantly (see Table 3.3). This is observable both without and with phylogenetic 
controls, indicating that they are correlated across evolutionary time. However, no changes in the 
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factor loadings occur as a function of overall telencephalon size, as anatomical integration 
coefficients (reflecting the correlation of telencephalon size with factor loadings for a given brain 
region) for all regions exhibited low and non-significant magnitudes (Table 3.3). The omnibus 
test of integration (i.e., the overall relationship of telencephalon size with CPEs in general) 
yielded a weak and non-significant result of .111 and of .180 respectively (p> .05). The only 
possible effect was the bulbus olfactorius accessorius, which exhibited weaker relations to other 
regions in species with a larger telencephalon, although this was not replicated using 
phylogenetic controls. Evidence was found that regions that are on average less central to the 
common factor (i.e., having weaker average factor loadings) exhibited weaker or more negative 
anatomical integration coefficients (r = .967, p < .05; but r = .434, p > .05 after phylogenetic 
controls).  
 
Table 3.3.  
Average factor loadings and anatomical integration indices for regions of the primate 
telencephalon, without and with phylogenetic control 
Brain region Factor 
loading 
Evolutionary 
factor loading 
Anatomical 
integration 
coefficient 
Evolutionary 
anatomical 
integration coefficient 
Neocortex .883* .942* .185 .172 
Hippocampus .955* .926* .102 .296 
Striatum .767* .469* .153 .145 
Bulbus olfactorius .604* .666* .065 -.258 
Bulbus o. -.135 .451* -.332* .113 
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accessorius 
Lobus piriformis .961* .955* .170 .216 
Septum .951* .966* .183 .197 
Schizocortex .967* .963* .164 .201 
Note: * p < .05. 
 
 Equivalent analyses to those presented in Table 3.3, but with all measures being 
residualized against body size, revealed a similar pattern. The volume for most, but not all, 
telencephalic structures exhibited strong and significant average factor loadings, and almost no 
changes in factor loading strength as a function of telencephalic volume were detected. The 
exceptions were the bulbus olfactorius, which is less correlated to other regions in species or 
larger telencephalon once phylogenetic controls are employed; and the lobus piriformis, which 
appears more correlated to other regions as a function of telencephalon size once phylogenetic 
controls are employed. The omnibus anatomical integration coefficient was weak and 
nonsignificant both for the raw and for the evolutionary approaches (.120 and .153 respectively, 
p > .05). Tentative evidence was found that regions that are on average less central to the 
common factor (i.e., having weaker average factor loadings) exhibited weaker or more negative 
anatomical integration coefficients, but this relationship was nonsignificant (r = .401, p > .05; r = 
.600, p > .05 after phylogenetic controls).  
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Table 3.4.  
Average factor loadings and anatomical integration indices for regions of the primate 
telencephalon residualized against body size, without and with phylogenetic control 
Brain region Factor 
loading 
Evolutionary 
factor loading 
Anatomical 
integration 
coefficient 
Evolutionary 
anatomical 
integration coefficient 
Neocortex .855* .405* .157 .134 
Hippocampus .806* .755* .175 .156 
Striatum .044 .146 -.046 .195 
Bulbus olfactorius .155 .473* -.051 -.403* 
Bulbus o. 
accessorius 
.438* .415* 
-.001 
-.065 
Lobus piriformis .864* .846* .150 .320* 
Septum .904* .824* .188 .250 
Schizocortex .880* .858* .175 .168 
Note: * p < .05. 
 
Post-hoc analyses for the lobus piriformis indicated that, as a function of brain size, its 
correlation significantly (p < .05) increases only with the hippocampus (r = .299) when using 
body size residuals, while with raw size its correlation with other brain regions does not change 
as a function of brain size. When using phylogenetic contrasts, the relationship of absolute lobus 
piriformis size with hippocampus size is observed to increase as a function of telencephalon size 
(r = .368) and to decrease with bulbus olfactorius size (r = -.306), and when using phylogenetic 
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contrasts along with body size residualization, telencephalon size positively predicts the 
relationship of lobus piriformis size with hippocampus size (r = .360), septum size (r = .385) and 
with schizocortex (r = .329), and negatively predicts the relationship of lobus piriformis size with 
bulbus olfactorius size (r = -.483). 
The correlation of the bulbus olfactorius accessorius with all other regions was lower in 
species of larger telencephalon (ranging from r = -.341 to -.391, p < .05), except with the bulbus 
olfactorius, using the non-residualized, non-phylogenetic approach. No significant relations 
between telencephalon size and the magnitude of the association between that telencephalic 
region and others was detected when using either residualization against body size, phylogenetic 
contrasts, or both. Somewhat similarly, the correlation of the bulbus olfactorius with all other 
regions was lower in species of larger telencephalon (ranging from r = -.425 to -.496, p < .05) 
except with the bulbus olfactorius accessorius and the striatum, using data residualized against 
body size and phylogenetic contrasts. No such effects were detected in the other analytical 
approaches. 
 
3.3. Post-hoc Analyses with on-Average Related Telencephalic Regions 
It is immediately perceptible that there were low (and in some designs, non-significant) 
factor loadings for the striatum, bulbus olfactorius and accessorius in factor analyses of 
telencephalic regions. The decision to keep them in the analyses, however, stems from the 
aforementioned realization that a factor loading identified from traditional factor-analytic 
methods refer only to the average part-whole correlation between the volume of a 
neuroanatomical region and the volumes of the set of regions. As using CPEM has precisely the 
goal of examining whether factor loadings are higher than average in some primate lineages 
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(and thus perhaps moderate and significant for the striatum, bulbus olfactorius and accessorius in 
some taxa), excluding these regions from analyses altogether would defeat the purpose of the 
present study. 
Nevertheless, in order to demonstrate that not excluding the three regions with low 
average factor loading does not importantly affect results, and for full disclosure, all analyses for 
the subregions of the telencephalon were repeated in full, but keeping these three regions out. 
Results are included in Appendix C, and were largely replicated in spite of these exclusions. The 
only exception was a slight increase (and crossing of the p < .05 threshold for significance) for 
the integration index for the hippocampus, and only in one of the four additional analyses 
presented in Appendix C. This suggests that, in species with a larger telencephalon, the volume 
of the hippocampus may be more strongly related to the volume of the other four regions kept in 
these analyses, but not with the striatum, bulbus olfactorius, and accessorius. 
 
4. Discussion 
 Many studies have aimed to elucidate the relationships among brain regions in terms of 
how their sizes evolve in primates and other mammals. They involve tests of mosaic evolution 
hypothesis (i.e., regions changing in size through evolutionary time independently of others), and 
alternatively of concerted evolution. Few papers have attempted to examine differences among 
species in the degree of mosaicism or proportionality in the evolution of volumes of regions, and 
they have done so by examining clusters of species separately, losing statistical power severely. 
The present study aimed to employ a relatively novel statistical approach (especially within the 
field of phylogenetic comparative methods) to examine if species with a larger brain exhibit 
more concerted evolution among components of the brain. This also had the goal to test if such 
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an integration of volumes among brain regions could be the factor behind the demonstrated 
increases in integration among cognitive abilities in primate species of higher intelligence 
(Chapter 2). 
 Unlike the clear and consistent pattern of integration observed for cognitive abilities as a 
function of G in Chapter 2, no such pattern was identified for brain regions as a function of brain 
size, or for telencephalon subregions as a function of telencephalon size. Although a few positive 
results emerged (discussed below), the overall trend appears to be for neither stronger nor for 
weaker correlations among neuroanatomical components as a function of brain size or 
telencephalon size. 
 In spite of the considerable level of nesting (which introduces complexity) in the analyses 
presented above, their meaning and possible interpretations are straightforward: The general lack 
of effect of brain size upon correlations among sizes of brain regions, barring a few exceptions, 
means not that the sizes of regions vary independently of each other. The positive and strong 
factor loadings already demonstrate clearly that the regions are highly correlated. The lack of 
effect of brain size upon these correlations simply indicates that they do not become stronger or 
weaker as a function of brain size. In other words, the results of the factor analyses represent 
well the strength of relations among brain regions in terms of their size, irrespective of the brain 
size of the taxon in question. The logic also applies to relations among subregions of the 
telencephalon: the magnitude of their associations is well represented in the results of factor 
analyses, not varying considerably as a function of telencephalon size. 
Smaers and Soligo (2013) have demonstrated that mosaic changes in neuroanatomy 
differentiate great apes (including humans) from other primates. Great apes also happen to 
comprise lineages that evolved larger brains. Contrary to hypotheses I and II outlined in this 
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study, this could suggest that the evolution of larger brains in primates involves more size 
independence among brain regions. In contrast, present results suggest neither stronger mosaic 
nor more concerted evolution in lineages that evolved bigger brains. In other words, sizes of 
brain regions are associated to each other across primates (suggesting a lack of mosaic evolution) 
in a constant strength, even after accounting for body size; that is, the strength of the associations 
among sizes of regions do not tend to become stronger or weaker as a function of brain size. 
Similarly, the correlations among subregions of the telencephalon are largely the same across 
taxa of different telencephalon sizes, suggesting neither a stronger mosaic nor a stronger 
concerted evolutionary pattern as a function of telencephalon size. Instead, regions exhibit a 
largely constant concerted pattern (as factor loadings are strong), with the exception of bulbus 
olfactorius, bulbus olfactorius accessorius, and the striatum. Thus, if clade specific variations in 
the importance of mosaic evolutions do exist as suggested by Smaers and Soligo (2013), brain 
size and telencephalon size do not appear to be the drivers behind that phenomenon. 
 
4.1. Few Inconsistent Exceptions: Cerebellum, Mesencephalon, Lobus Piriformis, and Bulbus 
Olfactorius 
Further analyses involving a larger number of species would be ideal to test whether the 
putative integration effects identified for the cerebellum, mesencephalon, lobus piriformis, and 
hippocampus are robust, and whether the disintegration of bulbus olfactorius and accessorius 
from other structures are robust as well. Considering their lack of consistency across methods 
(i.e., residualized and non-residualized, controlled for phylogenetic non-independence among 
species and not controlling for it), and considering the lack of significant omnibus integration 
effects throughout analyses presented in this study, any interpretations made for these regions 
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needs to be considered highly tentative and necessitates further examination. A review of the 
possible reasons for these effects identified is made below based on the primate neuroanatomy 
literature, although present results are highly tentative at best. 
Cerebellum and mesencephalon, when residualized against body size, appear to exhibit 
stronger correlations to each other and to other brain regions as a function of brain size. This was 
not replicated once phylogenetic contrasts were used. These results possibly suggest that (a) 
larger brains and (b) stronger correlations of the cerebellum and mesencephalon to each other 
and to other regions, did not coevolve in lockstep, but an overall association appears to exist that 
perhaps evolved out of tempo. 
The current analyses reflect that, as a function of brain size, the cerebellum specifically is 
tentatively more strongly correlated with the telencephalon, the diencephalon, and the 
mesencephalon. These possible results make sense considering the fact the cerebellum is 
involved in multiple functions besides motor performance (e.g., coordination, planning, and 
motor adjustments; Vanderah & Gould, 2015), including cognitive abilities, and the reception of 
visual and auditory information (Petacchi et al., 2005). These processes require a constant 
exchange of information, evidenced by the multiple tracts reaching this area. For example, the 
cerebral cortex sends and receives information to the cerebellar nuclei (Vanderah & Gould, 
2015), and the diencephalon (more specifically the ventral lateral and the ventral anterior nuclei 
of the thalamus) is also linked with the cerebellum (Hoshi et al., 2005; Middleton & Strick, 
2001), acting as intermediaries in the transmission of motor information between the cerebellum 
and the cortex in primates. 
Concerning the apparent increasing cerebellar-mesencephalic association in larger brains, 
the strongest effect observed in the present analyses, it is possible that some subregions of the 
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mesencephalon exhibiting direct paths to the cerebellum may be behind this positive and 
significant correlation identified. The tegmentum, for example, is connected with the cerebellum 
via the superior cerebellar peduncles. It also contains the red nucleus, a neural hub involved in 
motor coordination and receiving cerebellar projections via the interposed nucleus and the 
inferior olive (Vanderah & Gould, 2015). Even though the current comparative literature only 
provides data for some neuroanatomical regions, future studies should determine whether the 
volume for areas such as the cerebellar peduncles and the tegmentum are more correlated to 
evolutionary changes in the cerebellum as a function of brain size. 
 The hippocampus exhibited significantly higher correlation to the sizes of other regions 
of the telencephalon in species with a larger telencephalon, but the effect is weak and only 
present once the striatum, bulbus olfactorius and accessorius are eliminated from the analyses. 
Interpretations should be made with caution. It is possible, however, that this tentative effect 
reflects the multiple and important connectivity that the hippocampus has with other brain 
regions. The hippocampus has afferent and efferent fibers to multiple areas of the neocortex and 
to subcortical forebrain structures through the entorhineal cortex (Cammarota et al., 2005; Moser 
& Moser, 1998). Connections of the hippocampus with other regions are complex, as the 
posterior and anterior hippocampus areas exhibit different connections and thus help control 
many cognitive and affective processes (Rocca et al., 2018).  
 On the other hand, the bulbus olfactorius and the bulbus olfactorius accessorius appeared 
to exhibit markedly lower correlations to other structures of the telencephalon in species with a 
larger telencephalon, though these results were method-specific. Interestingly however, the only 
structures to which they remain as strongly correlated in species of larger telencephalon are each 
other, and in one particular approach, the striatum. This reinforces the notion that the striatum is 
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somewhat connected to the bulbus olfactorius in function (Newman & Winans, 1980; e.g., with 
the striatum using information obtained through olfaction to guide behavior; Setlow et al., 2003). 
Note that these three telencephalic regions were the three for which comparatively low factor 
loadings in the unit-weighted factor estimation were observed overall, compounding the notion 
that they covary to a certain degree independently of other structures of the telencephalon in 
terms of their size. 
 The lobus piriformis appeared to exhibit higher correlation to the sizes of other regions of 
the telencephalon in species with a larger telencephalon, but this is most likely not driven by 
cognitive evolution, given lack of indications of a role for the lobus piriformis in cognitive skills. 
Moreover, this stronger correlation with other regions in terms of volume is paradoxical to the 
aforementioned weaker correlation of other regions responsible for processing olfaction (i.e., the 
bulbus olfactorius and bulbus olfactorius accessorius). Unlike the relative independence of these 
latter regions from others in the telencephalon, it is possible that information from the lobus 
piriformis is being recruited for cognitive and affective processing in other regions of the 
telencephalon. 
  
4.2. Future Further Tests of Theory 
Future work from this research program will involve examinations of possible integration 
among sizes of brain regions as a function of G, however such work is in initial steps as larger, 
more overlapping datasets are needed, and thus is in the process of preliminary collation and 
analyses. Expansions to datasets of neuroanatomical volume measures would also increase 
reliability of any future estimates calculated – only in 2018 an expansion to Stephan and 
colleagues’ (1981) dataset was produced, and contributions to this field are unfortunately sparse. 
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Preliminary analyses of the relationship of G with the strength of correlations about volumes of 
brain regions indicate a lack of effect just as the effect of brain size upon correlations as 
presented in the present study. However parameter estimates in this preliminary study of the 
effects of G upon correlations among brain regions exhibit high standard errors considering (a) 
the small overlapping sample of G and neuroanatomical measures, and (b) the several controls 
that need be employed (for body size allometry and phylogenetic non-independence).  
 
4.3. Other Possible Forms of Integration 
A stronger correlation among performance scores on different problem-solving skills in 
primate species of higher general intelligence can potentially be explained by multiple different 
neuropsychological hypotheses. While the present study indicates that increased correlation 
among brain regions in species of bigger brains does not appear a likely avenue, other putative 
explanations exist. Firstly, it is possible that the increased integration observed among cognitive 
abilities reflects more effective communication among diverse brain regions. This would involve 
increases in projections across regions, and thus in white matter, but not necessarily concerted 
changes in the volume of those regions. Functional connectivity is a known mechanism for the 
coordination of activity among different neural assemblies in order to achieve a complex 
cognitive task (Fingelkurts et al., 2005; Sporns et al., 2000). 
Note however that this connectivity hypothesis for explaining the integration of cognitive 
skills in species of high general intelligence is not fully independent from the hypothesis of 
neuroanatomical correlation tested in this study, because regions that communicate more 
intensely through projections also tend to covary in their volumes (Park & Friston, 2013; 
Whiting & Barton, 2003). Furthermore, long-range connectivity has been noted to, on average, 
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decrease in species of larger primate cerebral cortices, and thus connections in such brains tend 
to be concentrated among contiguous, not distant areas (Herculano-Houzel et al., 2010). Such 
small-world networks potentially characterized by so-called “proximity-dependent modularity” 
due to short-association fibers in large primate brains (Gómez-Robles et al., 2014) counter the 
likelihood that it is increased long-range connectivity that is behind the observed integration 
among cognitive abilities in species of high general intelligence (demonstrated in Chapter 2).  
On the other hand, interconnectivity via short association fibers communicating adjacent 
regions has been proposed to be behind the advanced cognitive capacity of apes and especially 
humans (Schenker et al., 2005). Furthermore, even for longer-distance projections, increased 
myelination may, to some degree, compensate for reduced long-range connectivity (Schenker et 
al., 2005). As discussed in Chapter 1 however, these alternative explanations to the integration of 
cognitive abilities, involving connectivity and myelination, remain to be rigorously studied 
through the comparative approach, and are still yet to be related empirically both to general 
intelligence and the degree of integration among cognitive abilities. 
 
4.4. Limitations and Future Directions 
It must be noted that few specimens per species were included in the original data 
collection processes, given the difficulty and costs of detailed volumetric measures of structures 
of fresh and intact brains for, in many cases, primate species of comparatively rare and difficult 
access. This lack of representativeness may lead to biased estimates of average volume for many 
brain regions.  
Potential sources of bias in analyses and interpretations of their meaning involve lack of 
information on neuron density in most brain regions. Although a few studies exist, they involve 
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few species and few brain areas, not being fit for generalizable conclusions, as different regions 
exhibit different changes in neuron density as a function of brain size (Barton, 2012). As such, 
even though correlations between volumes of brain regions exist and may change as a function 
of brain size as tentatively demonstrated for a few regions in the present study, this does not 
mean that necessarily their numbers of neurons are proportionally increasing as well. Likewise, 
the correlations between brain regions in terms of their volumes are difficult to interpret with 
precision given limited information on how their interconnectivity varies. Future studies that 
address these limitations or provide more data for primate species, indirectly permitting further 
better-informed neuroanatomical analyses and interpretations, would be of great value. Further 
data that also increase the overlap between datasets on intelligence and neuroanatomical region 
volumes would be likewise essential. 
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Integrative and Concluding remarks 
1. The Evolutionary Trajectories of G and of Neuroanatomical Volume Measures 
 In cross-species analyses with primates, comparisons of general intelligence to potential 
substrates to examine which neurobiological structures account for it, had before the present 
studies relied on the correlative approach. As illustrated in the Introduction Section, even 
variables where species exhibit radically different absolute differences may exhibit a perfect 
correlation, because the r coefficient simply indicates whether the proportions among values 
within the two variables are comparable. As such, if forelimb size increases .1 cm per generation 
and hindlimb size increases 10 cm per generation consistently in a hypothetical lineage, the 
evolution of forelimb size and hindlimb size are perfectly correlated even though hindlimb size is 
under selection for more much more radical changes. Therefore, examining the evolutionary 
rates of G and of the most commonly used neuroanatomical volume measures (NVMs) was 
imperative to test this non-explored degree of comparability between variables. In other words, 
correlation is not sufficient as an indicator of comparability in terms of evolutionary trajectories. 
 Considering that not all measures examined in the preceding chapters were in the same 
metric (i.e., G is not measured in cubic centimeters as NVMs), their evolutionary rates were 
compared in terms of standardized (z-score) changes per million years. Limited comparability 
was found, with G evolving much faster than most NVMs. The exception of the cerebellum, and 
to a lesser degree neocortex size, was identified once they were residualized against body size, 
but even those regions evolved at most half as fast as G. Moreover, G was identified to have 
accelerated its evolutionary rate considerably more than even cerebellar and neocortical size, and 
considerably more than other NVMs. 
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 Furthermore, a point can be made that, even when correlations between hypothetical 
variables are moderate to high (for instance, around .5), it is possible that their considerable 
unique variance (in this hypothetical case, around 75%) means that they have been exposed to 
different selection regimes, of partly in different directions, or that one variable exhibits 
evolutionary changes in a consistent direction while the other more strongly fluctuates in a 
somewhat random walk. In Chapter 1, variables were compared in the fit of evolutionary regime 
models. Absolute (i.e., non-residualized) NVMs exhibited significant fit to the early burst model, 
whereby niche filling occurs early in the phylogeny and subsequently few changes occur in the 
daughter lineages. In contrast, not only did G exhibit positive acceleration (increasing rather than 
decreasing rates of changes), but it also exhibited a strong fit to the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model, 
whereby trait changes across evolutionary time in most lineages occur toward a direction and an 
optimal level. While it is clear that changes in G were not towards increases in all lineages at all 
times (with some exhibiting reductions in G; Reader et al., 2011), overall this trend toward a 
higher optimal level for G identified in Chapter 1 was much stronger than the trend observed for 
any NVM. Taken together, findings from Chapter 1 further compound concerns on reliance upon 
the simple correlative approach, and suggest that no NVM alone is comparable to G in terms of 
evolutionary history. 
 Chapter 2 showed that increasing G coevolved with increasingly strong associations 
(operationalized as factor loadings) among cognitive abilities. The same was not observed for 
brain regions in Chapter 3. Namely, at both levels of analyses conducted (the entire brain, and 
the telencephalon) regions were not more or less strongly correlated as a function of overall size. 
Some exceptions emerged, but not in a strong or consistent fashion across the methods used. 
Thus, even though G and NVMs exhibit correlations (Deaner et al., 2000, 2007; Dunbar, 1992; 
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Shultz & Dunbar, 2010), the evolution of their internal structure is not highly comparable. In 
other words, while the strength of the positive manifold for G has varied predictably and in line 
with G levels themselves, the same is not true for the positive manifold of brain regions or 
telencephalic regions. The strengthening of associations among cognitive abilities may be due 
primarily to other neurobiological factors to be explored further, such as possibly inter-region 
connectivity. 
Just as the encephalization quotient contributed, in the history of the academic study of 
the neurological bases of intelligence, to a complex understanding of species differences in the 
evolution of the brain and overall cognitive processing power, but eventually being deemed 
suboptimal in light of new findings and giving way to alternative measures (Falk & Gibson, 
2001), similarly NVMs, either in their absolute metric or controlled for the covariation with body 
size, seem to show signs of strong limitation. Other measures can be argued to be necessary to 
further understand not only correlation but shared evolutionary processes and causes with 
intelligence. 
 
2. Substrates for General Intelligence: Beyond the Traditional NVMs 
 The exceptions to the observation that NVMs are not comparable to G in evolutionary 
patterns were residual cerebellar volume and, to a lesser degree, residual neocortical volume. 
These two measures showed moderate similarity to G in their evolutionary history, in Chapter 1. 
Previous evidence discussed at length in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 indicate that cerebellar size is 
indeed greatly underrepresented in studies of substrates of intelligence, as it has coevolved with 
cognitive abilities, increased in size especially in apes, and has not exhibited decreases in neuron 
density in species with larger cerebellum. While it is not known precisely how the cerebellum 
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permits or enhances cognitive abilities, it is likely that (a) it acts as an enhancer or augmenter of 
the activity of cerebral regions involved in cognition (Leiner et al., 1989; Snider, 1950), or that 
(b) it facilitates motor coordination (Doyon et al., 2003; Salman, 2002), permitting technical 
skills such as tool use, extractive foraging, and thus manipulation of environments and ultimately 
niche construction. Interestingly, in Chapter 3, among the few regions that exhibited some signs 
of stronger correlations with other brain structures as a function of brain size was the cerebellum. 
Although this particular result must be interpreted with caution given the lack of consistency of 
integration effects in Chapter 3, it would be in line with recent evidence suggesting that the 
cerebellum is intensely connected to other regions and thus interacts with their functions 
(Vanderah & Gould, 2015). Connections with the neocortex are especially notable, perhaps 
compounding the findings, from Chapter 1, that these two regions to a moderate extent have had 
similar trajectories to those observed for G. It is possible that these (and perhaps other NVMs) 
together account for a larger portion of the evolutionary trajectory of G, even though separately 
none has exhibited strong similarity to G in Chapter 1. This notion is counter to the tendency, in 
primatology, to attempt to find which one NVM accounts for intelligence. 
 Alternatively, several non-volumetric measures have been proposed as permitting 
complex cognition (Barton, 2012; Dicke & Roth, 2016; Hofman, 2001; Roth & Dicke, 2012). 
Examples are neuron density, myelination, gyrification, and their case is reviewed at length in 
Chapter 1. Little data exists for robust examinations among primates however, and it is beyond 
the scope of the present work to forward speculations about their importance without careful 
analysis. It must at least be noted that, while it is improbable that any of them individually fully 
accounts for the evolutionary history of intelligence, a shift of further attention towards them 
may help explain primate G. 
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Future initiatives to examine the phylogenetic history of genes implicated on G, NVMs, 
and other neurobiological measures can also be highly informative (Enard, 2014; Montgomery & 
Mundy, 2012). Extensions of such studies to other neurological indicators could do a great 
service to understanding the evolutionary trajectories of potential substrates of intelligence. Like 
studies that identified “generalist genes” behind multiple cognitive capacities in humans (and 
thus possibly behind general intelligence; Kovas & Plomin, 2006), the degree of pleiotropy in 
genes behind NVMs and other neurobiological traits would further illuminate the degree of 
comparability between general intelligence and neurobiological measures. 
It is possible that the future study of these or other aspects of the brain may account for 
the high, accelerating, and largely directional evolutionary rates of G, but it is also possible that 
no aspect of the brain has seen comparable evolutionary rates. It may be that, instead, 
intelligence has accelerated its evolutionary rate in many primate lineages through a runaway 
process that does not require commensurate increases in cognitive processing; this process has 
been termed "ratcheting" (Tennie et al., 2009). While most discussion of the ratcheting effect has 
focused on making a binary contrast between humans and other primates (Last, 2014; Tennie et 
al., 2009; Tomasello, 2011) in the rate of complexification of cultural developments derived 
from cognitive skills, it is also possible to think of the ratcheting phenomenon as having 
gradations (being more extreme in humans, but perhaps present in varying degrees in other 
species). Humans’ cognitive feats have exponentially increased in a runaway complexification 
that seems to greatly surpass rates of change in brain size or other neuroanatomical measures. 
This is possible because we do not need to reinvent the wheel in each generation – previous 
innovations, insights, and solutions to problems are accumulated, socially transmitted, built 
upon, and combined for exponentially advanced developments that are not made by single 
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individuals, but in complex collaboration. As such, to an observer who simply took a modern 
cross section of the state of human problem-solving, it could seem like humans possess 
incredibly advanced cognitive skills that would necessitate a much more advanced biological 
substrate, if we were to achieve in a single generation everything that we are capable of 
achieving because of cumulative and transmissible knowledge.  
Although authors discussing ratcheting in humans hypothesize that humans are the only 
species to surpass the threshold necessary for this runaway process (Laland, 2018), it may exist 
at a slower rhythm in other primates, especially apes, although to a much less extreme extent. It 
is possible that in non-human primate species innovations, coupled with social learning (in fact 
two of the measures used in Chapters 1 and 2 as indicators of G), permit this emergent property 
of culture whereby more complex problem-solving is permitted because of previously existing 
cognitive resources in the cultural pool. Such a ratcheting effect would not necessarily require a 
commensurate and in-tandem increase in brain volume or neural characteristics enhancing 
processing power. Accelerating innovation rate may be possible in species of sufficiently high G 
simply because previous innovations exist and have been socially transmitted. As such, the 
increasingly evolvability of G reported in this study may partly reflect runaway increasing 
possibilities of use and combination of previous solutions transmitted socially. 
 
3. The Validity of G: Signs of Adaptive Design 
 Blomberg and colleagues (2003) seminal study identified that behavioral measures 
exhibit lower values in tests of phylogenetic signal (i.e., phylogenetic inertia or conservatism), 
and posited that perhaps error in measurement in behavioral traits could be behind this 
observation. Anatomical and biometric life history measures, in contrast, were presumed to be 
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more reliably assessed and also exhibited more conservatism. If this were true in the case of G in 
Chapters 1 and 2, whose observable indicators were also behavioral, G’s evolutionary history 
would show signs of random variation, thus exhibiting (1) no consistent acceleration or 
deceleration in evolutionary rates, (2) no direction towards which most of changes occur. 
Moreover, if the patterns identified for G reflected measurement error, this would have been 
identified especially by the λ and K estimates, which would be precipitously lower for G than for 
other variables. In fact estimates for some NVMs were even lower than those for G. The results 
presented in Chapters 1 and 2 demonstrate that the low evolutionary conservatism on G in 
primates is unlikely to be the product of measurement error: Very high acceleration has occurred 
in its rate of change on average, and a clear pattern of directional selection towards a higher 
optimum emerged. Moreover, selection regime differences using this dataset appear strongest 
when contrasting apes and other primate species (Fernandes, Peñaherrera-Aguirre, Woodley of 
Menie, & Figueredo, in preparation), a finding converging with previous discussions of primate 
intelligence using other data (Deaner et al., 2006; Parker, 1978; Reader et al., 2011; MacLean et 
al., 2014; Seed et al., 2009). The evolutionary history for G was clearly not one of random 
variation and the dataset employed in the present studies exhibit signs of reliability and 
convergence with other sources.  
The low conservatism identified for G, therefore, is much more likely due to quick 
differentiation from ancestor lineages, along with the observation that higher general intelligence 
evolved in multiple primates lineages (Reader et al., 2011). As multiple lineages exhibited 
convergent evolution, closely-related species are not extremely more similar to each other than 
more distantly-related ones in their level of G. This is, by definition, the core of low evolutionary 
conservatism (Felsenstein, 1985). 
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These indications that the evolutionary history of G exhibited directional, accelerating 
evolution in multiple lineages are signs of adaptive design for general intelligence. A hypothesis 
that G is an epiphenomenon or a by-product of other cognitive processes without function would 
lack parsimony (for a review and critique of the by-product hypothesis, see Burkart et al., 2017). 
This especially appears to be the case when it is realized that: 
(1) Cognitive skill measures on which G loads more strongly exhibit faster evolutionary 
rates and less conservatism (Fernandes et al., 2014), thus the locus of selection 
appears to be G itself, not the unique variance in diverse cognitive skills; and 
(2) As demonstrated in Chapter 2, there has been coevolution between level of G and the 
strength of its manifold, suggesting that as selective pressure pushed for more general 
intelligence, the more generalized (i.e., incorporating, or drawing from, multiple 
specific abilities) it became. 
Considering these multiple lines of study altogether, the longstanding concern that a common 
factor among cognitive performance measures may simply reflect an artifact of measurement and 
does not measure a true latent construct (and thus has no functional, adaptive design; for a 
review, see Jensen, 1987) also loses credibility considering the multiple signs of non-random, 
non-neutral evolutionary processes behind G. Such concerns about measurement validity have 
also been placated previously in reports of high comparability between laboratory and 
ethological measures of general intelligence (Burkart et al., 2017; Reader et al., 2011) and in 
agreement of these approaches with expert-based rankings of primate species (Reader et al., 
2011). 
 
141 
 
4. Implications to Evolutionary Psychology 
Insights gathered from the present set of studies and from the blossoming recent 
literatures on general intelligence altogether suggest that: 
(1) Rather than a single or newly developed ability, general intelligence appears to recruit 
from existing abilities, based on findings from Chapter 2: Species of high general intelligence 
integrate several skills that are individually and more independently present in taxa of lower 
general intelligence.  
(2) Rather than simply complementary but independent modules exhibiting 
impenetrability and autonomy in a Fodorian sense, it appears that cognitive skills interact and 
that there is considerable transfer among them (de Waal, 2016); that is, solutions applied to one 
specific cognitive problem are translated to solutions to different cognitive problems (e.g., from 
abstract reasoning to social reasoning; Girotto & Tentori, 2008) or to different learning contexts 
even if only partially.  
(3) Rather than dealing with an adaptive problem of limited sphere, it appears that 
general intelligence in primates involves problem-solving in several aspects of foraging, solving 
technical challenges, and navigating the social world. Clearly, the scope of adaptive problems 
dealt with by general intelligence is finite, otherwise each and every psychological measure 
would be part of its manifold (including personality traits, life history characteristics, perception-
related traits, sexuality tendencies, etc.). In that sense, general intelligence has a limited (in the 
sense of finite), but broad domain. However, this domain is not specific to one adaptive problem; 
rather it is arguably general, including situations that present novelty in diverse ways.  
(4) Finally, rather than evolving specifically in ancestral environments in human 
evolutionary history, it is clear that increasing (a) levels of general intelligence (Deaner et al., 
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2006; Fernandes et al., 2014; Reader et al., 2011) and (b) integration among cognitive abilities 
(see Chapter 2) evolved in multiple lineages in the primate phylogeny, with accelerated 
evolutionary rates (see Chapter 1) not being limited to the human lineage. 
The present findings contrast with the tendency, in evolutionary psychology, to frame 
adaptations as arising in response to domain-specific problems of narrow scope. For instance, 
Kanazawa (2004, p. 512) proposed that general intelligence is a true adaptation but that it 
“evolved as a domain-specific adaptation for the originally limited sphere of evolutionary 
novelty in the ancestral [human] environment.” Instead, the present findings and the broader 
comparative literature they are inserted in suggest that general intelligence evolved as a set of 
adaptive, increasingly integrated cognitive systems for the complex and broad sphere of 
evolutionary novelty in many primate lineages. Preliminary findings that habitat generalism and 
diversity is associated with both G and with stronger relations among cognitive abilities in 
primates (Peñaherrera-Aguirre & Fernandes, in preparation) strongly compound the notion that 
novel challenges were not an uncommon problem for many primate lineages. Moreover, several 
cognitive abilities included in the G factor in the present studies appear associated with success 
rate in artificial introduction to novel environments and with invasion rates, suggesting that they 
do facilitate navigation of novel niches (as reviewed in Chapter 2), which, by definition, present 
evolutionary novelty. 
The common claim, in evolutionary psychology, that a class of situations must be narrow 
and specific (rather than general and novel or varying) to exert consistent selection pressure is 
insufficiently justified (Kaufman et al., 2011). Any environmental regularity may exert selection 
pressure, as long as it poses a challenge or opportunity. The rise of an adaptation simply reflects 
the likelihood that genetic variation might lead to variation in the ability to address the challenge 
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or take advantage of the opportunity. This logic applies just as well to the class of novel 
problems: Regardless of the fact that they are apparently distinct, selection can exist for 
increased general ability to identify the structure of the novel problem, to find novel solutions or 
abstract and transfer from solutions applied to other, previous problems (de Waal, 2016). 
It is important to stress that the evidence for the existence of G and for its interaction 
among cognitive skills does not necessarily negate plausibility for the massive modularity 
account from evolutionary psychology. In contrast to a Fodorian view of modules, massive 
modularists have repeatedly proposed that encapsulation and impenetrability among modules are 
not necessary (Tooby et al., 2005). In discussing interactions among modules, Barrett and 
Kurzban (2006, p. 633) also exemplify that “for systems involved in inference, reasoning, 
judgment, and decision making [...] —and indeed, for most systems other than very early 
perceptual processing—there is every reason to expect both interactivity and the integration of 
information from multiple sources.” Furthermore, it is argued that modular systems permit 
components to be combined in novel ways, not precluding flexibility to tackle novel challenges 
or opportunities. The present studies exhibit evidence that performance on different problems 
became more strongly correlated across primate evolutionary history, potentially suggesting 
combination and interaction among already existing (and apparently more independent) 
cognitive abilities. It remains to be examined, as a future step, how such combination takes place 
– possibly through stronger connections among neural systems, or through an integrator or 
centralizer that organizes and mediates their communication. Possibilities are further discussed 
below. 
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5. The Nature of General Intelligence 
It must also be noted that, as informative of the evolution of G as this study might be, 
considering that the present work included only species mean scores, and no within-species 
variance, it is impossible to make assertive inferences about the evolution of g (the individual 
differences level general factor of intelligence) for any particular species based on these analyses 
and its relation to neuroanatomical regions. It is unwise to forward assertive conclusions about 
whether the nature of G is commensurable to the nature of g, as the neural characteristics that 
differentiate species in cognitive performance may or may not be the same as those that 
differentiate individuals (Arden & Zietch, 2017). To assert that G and g are reflective of the same 
phenomenon, further research is needed to examine whether their nomological nets overlap 
(Burkart et al., 2017) and if differences among individuals of different species also lead to a 
general factor when a mixed (i.e. both species and individual level data) approach is used (as 
suggested by preliminary evidence; Woodley of Menie et al., 2017).  
As acknowledged by Burkart et al. (2017), the methods presently available do not permit 
confidently asserting how general intelligence exists in the brain. As mentioned above, it may be 
that general intelligence exists as strongly connections among neural systems, or perhaps an 
integrator exists that recruits from several systems. The findings from the present work and from 
recent literatures, summarized above, suggest that some information is available about how 
general intelligence is organized in terms of its nature. However, much about it is still unclear. It 
is even hypothetically possible that rather than being a latent trait reflecting an integrated system, 
general intelligence assists in the performance of multiple specific cognitive abilities that operate 
on multiple domains. Even if general intelligence arises as a result of process overlap because 
cognitive performance on various domains all tap the same domain-general executive process 
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(e.g., working memory), there is still covariation among them that is due to a cognitive process 
that assists in problem-solving in many types of adaptive problems. How exactly the positive 
intercorrelations arise (i.e., the nature of their relations) does not matter for claims that (a) they 
are correlated abilities, and that (b) general intelligence was a target of selection, whatever its 
nature (Burkart et al., 2017). Of course, understanding its nature is of interest, but is not a 
necessary step for examinations of the evolutionary history of its aggregate level and of the 
strength of its manifold.  
A comparison of general intelligence to another abstract concept can help illustrative this 
point. Consider the case of movement speed. No single muscle or hormone is solely responsible 
for it just like trying to pinpoint a specific region in the brain responsible for general intelligence 
is an illusive endeavor. Multiple tissues need to be engaged for increased movement speed, thus 
speed derives from a system. No single gene is directly responsible for speed either, they simply 
lead to synthesis of molecules that will ultimate carry on various tasks in many tissues necessary 
for speed, among other things. However, debating whether movement speed is (1) a latent trait 
among the actions of tissues in the system, or (2) an emergent property of their actions, or (3) 
any other alternative conceptualization, does not invalidate the fact that movement speed exists 
as a phenomenon of interest and as a target of selection. Individuals and species can be compared 
on it. The important focus, at least at first, should arguably be (1) that different approaches to 
assessing it and its outcomes converge into the same similar patterns of individual and species 
differences, thus exhibiting validity, (2) establishing whether movement speed is an important 
biological capacity that affects genetic replication success and has been the target of selection, 
and (3) examining which biological structures best function as substrates for movement speed. In 
this analogy, the study of G has so far contained studies that help these three questions, with 
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early contributions addressing (1) (Burkart et al., 2017; Deaner et al., 2006; Fernandes et al., 
2014; Reader et al., 2011), and the present work contributes especially for (2) and (3). 
To that effect, in the case of general intelligence, steps taken in the present work are important to 
further clarify the nature of G. Not only is G replicable in primates (Burkart et al., 2017; Deaner 
et al., 2006; Fernandes et al., 2014; Reader et al., 2011), but now evidence exists that it has been 
a main and largely consistent target of selection (Chapter 1), that it has coevolved with stronger 
associations among its components (Chapter 2), and that explaining its evolutionary history 
necessitates more than the commonly used neuroanatomical volumetric approach (Chapters 1 
and 3). Still, much further work is necessary in years and perhaps decades to come to further 
elucidate the nature and substrates of G and of within-species g, in spite of the growing number 
of pieces assembled in this puzzle. 
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Appendix A: Operationalizations of Ethological Measures of G 
  
 This appendix includes conceptual definitions, operationalizations, existing taxonomies 
of behavior, and examples of behavior for each of the five broad categories of problem-solving 
used as measures of G in Chapters 1 and 2.  
 
1. Extractive Foraging 
Extractive foraging refers to the manual acquisition of foods from hidden locations or 
protective matrices, from which they are therefore not obviously or clearly retrievable (King, 
1986). Food items foraged extractively by primates include nuts, roots, tubers, shellfish, adult 
and larval invertebrates that are embedded within protective exoskeletons or that reside in 
mounds, hives, thorns, crevices, branches, under bark, or furrowed in leaves (Gibson, 1986; 
Melin et al., 2014). Invertebrates provide a valuable source of protein and fat, which are essential 
and often limiting resources to primates (Melin et al., 2014). In a few species, extractive foraging 
may also include eggs, bone marrow, and brains (Gibson, 1986). 
Scholarly attention to this trait has increased, both in ethological and laboratory works, 
following the proposal of the extractive foraging hypothesis of cognitive evolution (Parker & 
Gibson, 1977). This hypothesis proposes that species that detect and extract hidden food items, 
though lacking specialized anatomy for that purpose, should have high sensorimotor 
coordination and high cognitive ability to compensate, in order to exhibit successful extractive 
foraging (Parker & Gibson 1977; Byrne 1995). Note, however, that a few species do possess 
specialized anatomy for extractively foraging one type of food item, such as the aye-aye’s 
middle finger for tapping along branches and rotting logs, its fourth, long, finger for extracting 
148 
 
grubs out of holes on the brances, and its ears specialized for ecolocation of signals from the 
tapping. 
Detailed ethological observation in gray snub-nosed monkeys (Xiang, Liang, Nie, Li, 
2013) has permitted a taxonomy of extractive foraging behavior. Four categories of extractive 
foraging were identified in this species, a model yet to be replicated within other species and at 
the comparative level: 
(i) Removing the casing of a plant (e.g., peeling bamboo);  
(ii) Excavation (i.e., digging or surface scratching);  
(iii) Prying or picking (e.g., removing bark to reach objects underneath it); 
(iv) Searching under obstacles (e.g. overturning rocks or probing under them). 
 
Published reports of extractive foraging also predict performance in response to novel 
extractive foraging tasks under experimental conditions in primates (Day et al., 2003), 
supporting the use of literature counts, as the database used here collated by Reader and 
colleagues (2011), to estimate species differences in extractive foraging. 
Note that, for some acts of extractive foraging in certain species, tools are used. However, 
for the collation conducted by Reader and colleagues, a decision was made in such cases as to 
whether (1) each such specific report made in the literature was characterized primarily as tool 
use or primarily as extractive foraging (e.g., in case tool use was secondary, rudimentary, or 
unsuccessful), or if (2) such a distinction could not be made, and thus the report was not 
considered for inclusion in the database. This was intended to avoid inflation of the G positive 
manifold. 
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Categorization of species into the classes extractive forager and non-extractive forager 
was common prior to Reader and colleagues (2011) non-binary database of registering counts of 
extractive foraging reports per species. Still, the binary categorization, Reader and colleagues 
(2011) more fine-grained organization of data, and captivity data on researcher-developed 
extractive foraging tasks converge highly, corroborating the validity of the measure employed in 
the present study (Day et al., 2003). 
Judgment of whether a given behavior pattern qualified in one of the five categories of 
behavior was made the expert author of each original article (Reader et al., 2011). For instance, 
behaviors originally described as “novel”, “innovative”, “creative”, “never seen before”, among 
close synonyms, were included in the “innovation” category. Similarly, behavior descriptions 
containing keywords that connoted that an individual learned about resources, the environment, 
or others from conspecifics (rather than by themselves) were included in the “social learning” 
category. As previously argued by Lefebvre and colleagues (1997) and Reader and colleagues 
(2011; Reader, 2003; Reader & Laland, 2001), this approach avoids subjective bias on the part of 
the researcher responsible for collating data for the database. It must be emphasized that the 
behavior reports were not derived from uninformed casual observations, but rather came from 
experienced, established scientists extensively familiar with their subjects (Reader, 2003). 
Furthermore, observers themselves have more information about the context in which behaviors 
occurred than Reader, Hager, and Laland had for the collation of the database, and the context 
matters for the categorization of the behavior: for instance, the act of placing a potato inside a 
small body of water (as observed in Japanese macaques; Kawamura, 1959) may be indicative of 
innovation, of tool use, or of deception, depending on the context in which it happens, and the 
particular purpose it serves in that specific behavior instance. If it is a novel occurrence, it may 
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be classified as innovation; if instead the behavior is common in the species (as it is today in 
Japanese macaques) but the behavior in the case of this particular instance served to conceal the 
food item from conspecifics, then it may be classified as deception; and so on. 
Behavior descriptions and their categorization were admittedly sometimes broad enough 
to could satisfy more than one of the five broad categories. For instance, it was not uncommon to 
find descriptions of social tool use, innovative tool use, innovative deception, among other 
combinations. To avoid conflation and thus overestimation of the strength of the positive 
manifold, such cases were not counted as duplicates, but rather only counted once if one aspect 
predominated (e.g., either tool use or innovation in the case of innovative tool use), or deleted 
altogether from the database if no clarity existed (Reader et al., 2011). 
 
2. Tool Use 
Perhaps the most studied of the five categories of problem-solving, tool use is also 
perhaps the one with the most debated and inconsistent definition, up until recent decades. 
Perhaps most gravely, this initial variability in how to understand whether a behavior constitutes 
tool use or not certainly affected ethological reports, with comparatively low inter-rater 
reliability for certain behaviors, although for the vast majority there was high agreement 
(Shumaker et al., 2011). 
Examples of variations in tool use definitions, as detailed extensively by Shumaker and 
colleagues (2011), include the notions that: 
a) tool use involves the use of an external object as functional extension of mouth, 
break, hand or claw, in the attainment of a goal;  
b) rather, the external object must be held; 
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c) the target of tool use behavior must be another object (i.e., the goal is reach it, or 
modify its form, position or condition) with the intention of improving its efficiency; 
d) rather, the target of tool use can also be self, a conspecific, or another living 
being; 
e) any useful definition must be narrower, to avoid broad definitions whereby 
passive objects, such as a tree, would be considered a tool in the case of an individual 
climbing it to reach a fruit; or such as the ground, in the case of an individual dropping an 
egg on the ground to break it. 
The most widely used definition of tool use, however, states that it is “the external 
employment of an unattached or manipulable attached environmental object to alter more 
efficiently the form, position or condition of another object, another organism, or the user itself, 
when the user holds and directly manipulates the tool during or prior to use and is responsible for 
the proper and effective orientation of the tool” (Shumaker et al., 2011; for close definitions but 
with small variants in wording, see Beck, 1980; Amanat & Horton, 2008). Examples of tool use 
in primates conforming to this definition include the use of sticks to forage for invertebrates (van 
Lawick-Goodall, 1968); the use of stone hammers to crack open nuts, folded leaves for drinking 
water, poles as ladders, and arguably even branches and stones as weapons (Silva & Silva, 
2016). 
 Having been a focus of interest for many primatologists in the field for decades, forms of 
tool use are commonly included in detail in ethograms, and detailed descriptions are available in 
the literature. Some examples illustrate the high level of care in the reports: 
The behaviour consisted of three main steps: (i) the monkey approached the nest, 
reaching for and then tapping (firmly and quickly, as when capuchins tap hard surfaces) 
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the nest exterior immediately in front of him using both palms (when in front of the nest, 
the body in a squatting position; semi-prehensile tail used to anchor the body on a stable 
horizontal branch (10–15 cm in diameter)); (ii) the monkey tore off a branchlet 
(hereafter, stick) approximately 20–30 cm long from the tree where the nest was located 
(to tear off the stick, the capuchin may temporarily adopt another body position), 
perforated the nest with it (approximately in the middle) and then inserted it into the nest 
(5–10 cm deep). (Souto et al. 2011, pp. 533-534). 
 
Other highly detailed step-by-step descriptions include how orangutans use stick tools to 
extract honey from bees’ nests (van Schaik et al., 1996); how they also use sticks to pry open and 
remove the hairs of Neesia fruits (van Schaik et al., 2003); how capuchin monkeys use hammers 
and anvils to crack open nuts and seeds (Aguiar et al. 2014; Fragaszy et al., 2004); and how 
long-tailed macaques use stones in two alternative but highly organized ways to break oysters 
(Gumert et al., 2009). 
Other times, especially with uncommon tool use behavior that is not part of an organized 
ethogram, descriptions are highly anecdotal. Admittedly, such observations might be accidental 
tool use or even overinterpretation on the part of the primatologist, whereas in reality the 
behavior was a happenstance. Examples abound, especially for complex behavior: A Western 
lowland gorilla was observed using a handheld detached tree branch seemingly as a walking 
stick to test the depth of the pool of water she was crossing (Breuer et al. 2005); the same 
individual used the trunk as a bridge to cross a deep section of swamp (Breuer et al. 2005). A 
female wild mountain gorilla was observed extending a bamboo pole to her infant who then 
climbed the pole so that it functioned as a ladder (Grueter et al. 2013). Orangutans were observed 
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who first bit through the bottoms of vines to free them and then used the vines to swing across a 
gap in the forest (van Schaik et al. 2006). A gorilla was observed throwing a detached branch 
toward researchers, and a group of gorillas threw fistfuls of grass at a man who threw stones at 
them (Wittiger & Sunderland-Groves 2007). Such behaviors, once observed for the first time, 
may subsequently become the focus of future ethograms if believed to possibly be recurrent, but 
are not included in the database compiled by Reader and colleagues (2011) and used in the 
present study, if described by the original observers as only a possible instance of tool use. 
A few taxonomies of tool use have been proposed, though none is consensually used. 
Parker and Gibson (1977, 1979) proposed a taxonomy based on the motor aspects involved in the 
behavior, including simple prehension, simple object manipulation, object-substrate 
manipulation, complex object manipulation, and social-object manipulation. This classification 
derived from Piaget’s (1952) theory of sensorimotor stages in human children. In contrast, Silva 
and Silva (2016) taxonomy distinguishes forms of tool use based on their function, and therefore 
the context of the behavior, rather than on motor aspects. It includes use of stick tools for 
foraging; the use of hammers and anvils for foraging; the use of a variety of tools (such as 
sponges made of moss or leaves, or husks) for fluid transportation; the use of tools for climbing 
or assisting other motion behaviors; and the use of weapons in agonistic encounters. This 
taxonomy takes into account the fact that species differ in how they achieve a goal, but their 
behaviors may serve similar purposes. For instance, in contrast to blonde capuchins who fish for 
termites above the ground, chimpanzees fish for this insect on the ground. Considering the lack 
of consensus on the taxonomic organization of tool use, and the fact that Reader and colleagues’ 
(2011) interest lied primarily on the G factor (i.e., the highest level of the factor structure of 
complex problem solving) rather than on subtypes of each specific problem-solving ability, they 
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did not divide tool use behavior reports into subtypes, but rather on the catch-all “tool use” 
classification. 
 
3. Social Learning 
Social learning is defined as learning that is facilitated by observation of, or interaction with, 
another individual and/or the products of its behavior (Box, 1984; Galef, 1988). Social learners 
are not uncommonly characterized as information scroungers, as they exploit the information, 
skills, and resources obtained or devised through asocial learning (Laland, 2004). While 
intentional teaching may be included in human social learning, it is so rarely observed in non-
human animals (and even so, dubious in most cases) that this animal literature definition does not 
include teaching. Rather, the social learning can usually happen: 
a) through observation; starting with the acquisition of a trait by individual A, followed by 
performance of trait by individual A, with concomitant observation by individual B, and 
ultimately followed by performance of the trait by individual B; or less commonly 
b) through exposure to products; starting with the acquisition of a trait by individual A, 
followed by the performance of trait by individual A, followed by the occurrence of 
product of the trait (e.g., an open nut), subsequent exposure of individual B to the 
product, and ultimately followed by performance of the trait by individual B (Hoppitt & 
Laland, 2013). 
Note however, that the term “trait” is open-ended in the above definition, and thus such an 
operationalization is somewhat vague. In some cases, the trait is the capacity to interact with the 
same kind of object, irrespective of how; in others, the trait is the capacity to repeat the behavior 
irrespective of the target being the same object (Hoppitt & Laland, 2013). For social learning 
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with the highest fidelity however, the trait refers to the capacity to interact with the same kind of 
object, through the same behavior. 
 To organize the observation and understanding of social learning theoretically it is 
proposed that social learning involves the observations of (1) a specific kind of individual (the 
“who” aspect), (2) performing particular behaviors or acting upon particular targets (the “what” 
aspect), (3) under suitable circumstances (the “when” aspect) (Kendal et al., 2018). For instance, 
the “who” aspect might be preferentially kin, successful individuals, or older individuals. The 
“what” aspect might be behavior that is consistently emitted by kin but not yet by the social 
learner. The “when” aspect might be especially in situations in which the individual is uncertain, 
or when asocial learning is too costly, as in fact several primate species have demonstrated to 
socially learn primarily in more complex tasks (Kendal et al., 2018). 
 This theoretical proposal to guide the observation of social learning is too recent though, 
and until now relatively little effort has been put int investigating the form and basic 
mechanisms, rather than the functions, of social learning in non-human animals. Researchers 
have amassed large data banks containing the social diffusion of innovations, and even included 
geographical variation in many species, yet the contexts in which individuals tend to copy others 
remain largely unexplored (Heyes, 1994; Hoppitt & Laland, 2013; Laland, 2004). Already in 
1994, Heyes identified that “it is rarely possible to assign an example of social learning to one 
category rather than another with certainty, and there is little consensus regarding the use of 
category labels”, and as a consequence of the continued lack of study on how social learning 
occurs and is characterized, that statement is still true. As such, a taxonomy of kinds of social 
learning not possible, with all reported instances of it collated by Reader and colleagues (2011) 
being included in the same single category. 
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Upon ethological observation of behavior, the notion that "social learning" has happened 
is an assumption based on the temporal contiguity between noting that an individual observed a 
behavior and subsequently enacted the behavior, and the similarity between the behavior it 
observed and the one subsequently enacted. The following description of a methodology to 
record social learning instances in tufted capuchin monkeys, by Coelho and colleagues (2015, p. 
913), illustrates the process:  
[...] we adopted a protocol in which the focus was maintained on an ongoing event until 
it ended, simultaneous events being ignored. We named this method “Focal Event” as the 
focus was the activities surrounding a nut-cracking episode itself and not the monkey 
performing the behavior. A Focal Event began when a monkey approached an anvil and 
began to manipulate the elements there present and ended when it left the anvil or—in 
the event of a conspecific observer being present (after the capuchin manipulating the 
tool had left the anvil), when the observer also left the nut-cracking site. With this 
methodology, we could access not only observation and scrounging opportunities during 
a nut-cracking event but the subsequent actions of the conspecific observer, including 
delayed scrounging and manipulation of the elements within the nut-cracking site. 
 
4. Tactical Deception 
The definition of tactical deception has been less variable in the literature, perhaps 
because of its being predominantly influenced, both in terms of numbers of publications and 
their impact, by a few authors: Richard Byrne, Andrew Whiten, and collaborators. Tactical 
deception involves "acts from the normal repertoire of an individual, used at low frequency and 
in contexts different from those in which it uses the high frequency (honest) version of the act, 
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such that another familiar individual is likely to misinterpret what the acts signify, to the 
advantage of the actor" (Byrne & Whiten 1985, p. 672). It is uncommon for deception to involve 
novel behavior, with a few exceptions having been observed in great apes. Rather, it involves 
behaviors already present in the repertoire of the individuals, but in a different context or with 
slight modifications (Byrne, 2003). "Tactical" therefore refers to this ability of shifting one 
aspect of one’s behavioral repertoire into another (deceptive) role. One example involves a 
baboon suddenly taking an alert posture and shifting its body and gaze towards the horizon (a 
behavior normally exhibited when a predator or a threatening neighboring group is spotted), 
when being chased aggressively by a familiar conspecific (Whiten & Byrne, 1988). The pursuer 
stopped to look for a threat in the same direction, and never resumed the chase, though no real 
threat existed. 
Instances of tactical deception are frequently observed being repeatedly enacted by the 
same individual (sometimes in quick succession, sometimes sparsed over many hours or days; 
Whiten & Byrne, 1988), sometimes on the same victim and other times the animal will have tried 
the tactic on other victims before; therefore instances of tactical deception are rarely behavioral 
innovations. Note that the main definition of tactical deception quoted above specifies that 
victims are "familiar individuals", to emphasize that the behaviors take place in a group of 
mutually recognizable individuals with frequent re-encounters; therefore, pressures exist to make 
the deceptive behaviors be complex, manipulative, and convincing as giving the appearance of 
non-malevolence, rather than simply being overt acts of desertion, exclusion, exploitation, 
appropriation, or thievery (Cheney & Seyfarth 1985; van Rhijn & Vodegel 1980). 
Most tactical deception behaviors appear to be simply a product of associative learning 
(Byrne and Whiten, 1990; Byrne, 1997), whereby an individual primate associated the behavior 
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implementation with successful acquisition of rewards. However, records that seemed unlikely to 
be explained simply by associative learning were mostly of great apes (and not of monkeys or 
non-simian primates), with Byrne and Whiten (1992) therefore suggesting that they had some 
form of theory of mind, and the ability to anticipate deception and its potential outcomes. 
 
Some categorizations of tactical deception behaviors into a taxonomy have been 
proposed, with the most detailed being that forwarded by Whiten & Byrne (1988). Categories 
proposed are emergent from data, and based on the inferred functional consequences of each 
deceptive act. Being data-driven, it is important to note that future ethological records may 
contribute to the identification of new classes of tactical deception; for instance, were examples 
of deception involving imitation of predators to be described, a new category to encompass that 
may emerge). 
Five major functional forms of tactical deception were categorized by Whiten & Byrne 
(1988), each with subtypes: 
1. Concealment (i.e., the agent conceals something from the target), including: 
 a) hiding (an object, part of self, or whole self) from view; 
b) accoustic concealment; that is, acting quietly so as not to attract the target's attention; 
c) inhibition of attending to a desirable object; that is, (temporarily) avoiding looking at 
or approaching something the agent desires so as not not to lead one or more targets to notice it. 
As an example of concealment, among gelada baboons, individuals involved in extra-pair 
copulations are less likely to vocalize (le Roux et al., 2013). 
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2. Distraction; that is, the agent diverts the target's attention from some locus toward a second 
locus, so that the agent can subsequently focus on the first free of competition. This category 
includes: 
a) distracting by looking away; 
b) distracting by looking away with linked vocal signal; 
c) distracting by leading away; 
d) distracting by intimate behavior, including presenting, grooming, and exhibiting facial 
expressions. 
As an example of distraction (Jolly, 1985): A male who did not usually share food items 
caught an antelope. A female who was known by the researchers to be particularly fond of meat 
approached him and groomed him for a while until he lolled back. As soon as that happened, she 
snatched the antelope carcass and ran away. 
 
3. Creating an image of self; that is, affecting the way the target interprets the behavior(s) of the 
agent. This category includes: 
a) presenting a neutral image; that is, present oneself as non-threatening; 
b) presenting an affiliative image. 
As an example of this class of deception (de Waal, 1982): A female chimpanzee was 
observed that, if unable to grab hold of her opponent successfully during a fight, would invite the 
opponent to reconciliation. She did that by holding out her hand, but when the other hesitantly 
put her hand in to agree to a reconciliation, the deceiver would suddenly and aggressively grab 
hold of her.  
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4. Manipulation of target individual using social tool (a third individual); that is, in this triadic 
relationship the agent's behavior is directed toward one individual but ultimately affects another 
through the mediating individual. This category includes: 
a) deceiving tool about agent's involvement with target; 
b) deceiving tool 1 about tool 2's involvement with target (here, four individuals are 
involved in total); 
c) deceiving target about agent's involvement with social tool. 
As an example (Byrne & Whiten 1985): An adult female chacma baboon was observed feeding 
in a specific patch, when a young juvenile tentatively approached and, though the adult female 
made no threat, the juvenile screamed. The only adult male of the group ran towards them and 
the adult female retreated, leaving the juvenile to feed on her food source. 
 
5. Deflection of target to fall guy; that is, diverting an individual posing a problem, toward a 
passive victim. As an example (Whiten & Byrne, 1988): An adult male who was feeding was 
approached by a better-ranked male; when he noticed that he attacked a feeding female nearby 
briefly. The higher-ranked male then barked and chased her, leaving the former male feeding by 
himself. 
 
Alternative categorizations of tactical deception have been made, such as by Byrne 
(2003). This categorization does not constitute a multi-level taxonomy, but rather a simpler 
grouping of behaviors into 11 single-level classes of behavior: exaggeration of behavior, 
ignoring signals, modifying one's own or another's body, suppression of signals, suppression of 
signs, hiding (part of) body or object, showing affiliation or neutral behavior, displaying or 
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calling at nothing or at neutral stimulus, leading others to/from something, use of "displaced" 
actions, and invention of actions. For a detailed description of these alternative, less commonly-
used categories (relative to the Whiten and Byrne's 1988 taxonomy), see Byrne (2003). 
Importantly, note that most of the four other cognitive abilities have not been intricately 
decomposed to this degree. Because of this, and also because of the low numbers of clearly 
already-categorized instances of tactical deception into a specific taxonomy, and also because of 
their interest in higher levels of the hierarchical organization of G and not in specific abilities 
within, Reader and colleagues (2011) included only the broad level “tactical deception” in the 
database used in the present study. As the present study is equally interested in G and not in the 
intricacies of specialized abilities, the lack of reliance on taxonomic subdivisions of tactical 
deception imposes no limitations to the goals outlined above for the analyses that will follow 
here. 
 
5. Innovation 
Innovation is commonly defined as a behavioral solution that departs from the standard 
repertoire of behaviors of the species (Kummer & Goodall, 1985, 2003; Lefebvre et al., 1997). 
While it is difficult to assert what the “normal repertoire” is, especially in species with wide or 
flexible repertoires, some behaviors especially contrast with actions described before for the 
same species, or resemble only actions used in other contexts (Byrne, 2003). An innovation can 
thus not only be a novel solution to a novel problem, or a novel solution to an old one, but also 
an already-existing solution but applied to a different problem. Note that the term “invention” 
need not connote the notion that there was intention or planfulness in its development, as it may 
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arise through explorative behavior, experimentation, and associative learning (Ramsay et al., 
2007). 
Operationally, the range of behaviors that can be classified as innovative is wide, as an 
innovation can arise in any area of problem-solving (feeding, communicating, mating, parenting, 
agonistic interactions, etc.). It is difficult to identify innovations in the wild partly because many 
are progressively incorporated into the behavioral repertoire of the community – potato washing 
in Japanese macaques, for example, spread through social learning rather quickly (Kawai, 1965). 
Therefore, if the initial, seminal invention had not been observed and registered, the subsequent 
somewhat widespread implementation of potato washing would not be perceived as the product 
of innovation, but rather as a common, at most cultural aspect. Innovations in fact commonly 
spread socially, including not only potato washing, but also wheat sluicing by Japanese 
macaques (in fact both invented by the same individual; van Schaik, 2003). 
Experience and familiarity with the components of the situation seem to be associated 
with higher innovation rates (Kummer & Goodall, 2003). Individual differences in personality, 
such as in boldness and proactivity, appears to affect responses to novel objects, affecting 
innovation. Species differences in the tendency to explore novel objects also exist (Glickman & 
Sroges, 1966), perhaps affecting innovation rates. 
It is possible that focusing on exploration and curiosity, rather than on innovations per se, 
would ease the difficulty of operationalizing the observations and thus facilitate the identification 
of relevant behaviors. However, Reader and colleagues (2011) chose to keep with the decision of 
collation innovation instances. 
Some more detailed examples of innovation are listed below: 
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a) A male chimpanzee was observed keeping somewhat close to an attractive female 
during the night, rising before other males then signaling to her in order to lead her 
away before others would notice (Tutin, 1979). 
b) An older female chimpanzee was observed terminating the provocative, challenging 
and aggressive behavior of an adolescent male by tickling him. Usually such 
behaviors provoke either fear and avoidance, or retaliation (Kummer & Goodall, 
1985) 
c) A female chimpanzee was observed sitting in between two aggressive, disputing 
males to facilitate their reconciliation: both would groom her and she would 
subsequently step quietly away and leave them grooming each other (Kummer & 
Goodall, 1985). 
d) An infant chimpanzee was observed using the same approach commonly used to open 
hardshelled Strychnos fruits with a rock, to smash an insect possessing a hard 
exoskeleton (Kummer & Goodall, 1985). 
e) A tufted capuchin monkeys were observed, for the first time in its community, 
washing sandy food, and when the behavior spread by social learning, another 
individual developed the unusual strategy of stealing only already-washed food rather 
than learning how to clean it by itself (Visalberghi & Fragasy, 1990). 
 
As can be readily noticed, there is no consistent pattern across instances of innovation 
recorded in the literature, making it difficult to implement a specific and clear ethogram to 
identify novel innovations. Rather, it is by noting unusual problem-solving behavior that such 
innovations are identified 
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Appendix B: Supplementary Analyses to Chapter 1 
 
1. Confirmatory replication with a set of overlapping datasets 
Many previous examinations of the evolutionary patterns behind primate traits using 
cross-species data relied on datasets of diverse sizes and compositions (e.g., Blomberg et al., 
2003; Cooper & Purvis, 2010; Deaner et al., 2006, Kamilar & Cooper, 2013), each drawing 
conclusions by comparing only partly overlapping databases. This is somewhat justified by fact 
that species within taxonomic groups in primates have largely shared their history and partly 
share ecological conditions and thus adaptations as well, thus serving, to some extent, 
interchangeably in “samples” of primate species from which ancestral characteristics can be 
estimated. Nevertheless, species are clearly not perfectly representative of each other, especially 
in traits that exhibit evolutionary lability rather than conservativeness. To examine whether the 
results identified in Chapter 1 hold when including only species present in all databases, all 
phylogenetic coefficients were re-estimated for the set of species for which all datasets overlap. 
The resulting database contained 32 species. All the same analytical steps were followed as in 
the original paper, resulting in the estimates displayed on Table A2.1. 
 
Table A2.1.  
Parameter estimates for phylogenetic conservatism, evolutionary rate, rate acceleration, early 
burst, and selection regime strength, for the perfectly overlapping sample of 32 primate species. 
Measure λ K σ2 δ a α 
G .722 .264 .063 10.500 .000 .075 
Residual brain .999 .598 .035 1.816 .000 .006 
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Residual neocortex .902 .487 .043 3.228 .000 .023 
Residual cerebellum .699 .331 .050 7.631 .000 .059 
Neocortex ratio .999 1.360 .012 .749 .000 .000 
Brain size .999 1.589 .013 .740 -.024 .000 
Neocortex size .999 1.352 .016 .946 -.010 .000 
Hippocampus size .999 .761 .022 1.600 .000 .004 
Cerebellum size .999 1.344 .014 .779 -.029 .000 
Body size .999 1.425 .013 .917 -.016 .000 
Correlation (r) with 
full dataset estimates .850 .928 .846 .962 .948 .827 
 
 It can be observed that the comparability with the original results is high as: 
1) G and residual cerebellum size exhibit the lowest phylogenetic conservatism as measured 
by λ and K, followed by residual neocortex size. Most other variables conformed to the 
Brownian motion expectation when examining λ, or were even more conserved than 
expected in Brownian motion, just as in the original analyses; 
2) G exhibited the fastest evolutionary rates, again followed by the residual cerebellum and 
residual neocortex size measures. 
3) G exhibited the strongest evolutionary rate acceleration as measured by δ, and strongest 
selection regime towards an optimum, as measured by α, similarly followed by residual 
cerebellum size, and to a lesser degree residual neocortex size. 
4) Non-residualized NVMs exhibited negative a values, indicating an early burst of changes, 
but subsequent deceleration of rates, just as in the original results. 
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In line with these observations, correlations between the original estimates and the estimates 
(examined for each of the columns in Table A2.1, and displayed at the last row) ranged from r = 
827 to .962 (p < .05 for all indices). While these are not perfect correlations, they indicate largely 
converging patterns. The main differences reside in the magnitude of some estimates, although 
the rankings remain the same as in the original results. Notably, evolutionary rates, acceleration 
estimates, and selection regime strength estimates were lower than in the original analyses, 
consistently across measures. This may indicate that the high rates, acceleration, and strength of 
regimes observed in the original analyses were partly driven by some taxa removed in the 
present replication. As mentioned in Chapter 1 however, clade-specific analyses are one of the 
future steps already in preliminary implementation, to examine how different primate taxa 
contrast in the phylogenetic patterns described in that Chapter and in this Appendix section. 
 
2. Fit of evolutionary models 
 Examining the relative fit of models can permit identifying to which the data best 
conform, and which models are poor representatives of the real data. This can be informative in 
the case of Chapter 1, where the following models are tested for each measure: acceleration, 
early burst, Ornstein-Uhlenbeck, and phylogenetic signal. However, considering that several of 
these models can be complementary (e.g., acceleration may go hand in hand with the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck expectation of a strong selection regime toward an optimal value), it is not 
necessarily the case that one needs to be selected while others are discarded. As such, as these 
models are not alternative, contrasting their fit statistically is not strictly needed. Still, displaying 
their relative fit is a transparent demonstration of how well the models explain the data. 
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The Akaike Information Criterion is a statistical fit index that takes into consideration the 
log likelihood of a model for a particular variable, and penalizes more complex models (i.e., 
those with more parameters being estimated) if they do not add explanatory power (Hurvich, 
Simonoff, & Tsai, 1998). Thus AIC is ideal to select parsimonious models. No absolute cutoffs 
exist (e.g., 0 or 1), but AIC can be used to compare the fit of different models on the same 
dataset, as lower AIC values reflect better fit. For small datasets, AICc is used to correct for 
possible biases.  
Weights associated to each Akaike Information Criteria (AICc) value can be used to 
determine the best model (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004). Instead of subjectively comparing 
AIC values across models, they can be transformed into Akaike weights (for a detailed review 
and description of this approach, see Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004), which can be interpreted as 
conditional probabilities for each model. 
AICc and weights (AICc wi) are displayed in Table A2.2. It can be observed that G and 
residual cerebellum size were best explained by the same models (acceleration and the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck model of strong selection regime towards an optimum). Other residual measures were 
better explained by phylogenetic signal (i.e., evolutionary lability), suggesting that while they are 
not conserved as would be expected under Brownian motion, they are lability in not so consistent 
directions and not so much in an accelerating way. Finally, absolute measures conformed either 
to early-burst (suggesting they decelerate over time in terms of their evolutionary rate of change) 
or to Brownian motion, indicating that they are phylogenetically conserved variables. These 
results compound the results outlined in Chapter 1, complementing rather than contrasting.
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Table A2.2. 
Absolute (AICc) and relative (AICc wi) statistical fit of evolutionary models, along with the favored model for each trait based on 
AICc wi 
Measure 
Brownian 
motion 
Acceleration Early burst 
Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck 
Phylogenetic 
signal 
Favored 
model 
AICc (AICc wi) AICc (AICc wi) AICc (AICc wi) AICc (AICc wi) AICc (AICc wi) 
G factor 176.94 (<.01) 131.51 (.36) 179.13 (.00) 131.49 (.36) 132.38 (.27) δ / OU 
Residual brain 333.01 (<.01) 321.25 (<.01) 335.08 (<.01) 319.01 (<.01) 287.031 (.99) PS 
Residual neocortex 61.05 (<.01) 51.95 (.21) 62.91 (<.01) 51.20 (.23) 49.40 (.56) PS 
Residual cerebellum 62.04 (<.01) 28.93 (.41) 64.23 (<.01) 28.75 (.44) 30.88 (.15) δ / OU 
Neocortex ratio 27.84 (.29) 29.43 (.13) 29.95 (.10) 29.41 (.13) 27.54 (.34) PS / BM 
Absolute brain size 83.63 (<.01) 76.92 (<.01) 60.38 (.99) 85.71 (<.01) 85.66 (<.01) EB 
Absolute neocortex size 120.28 (.42) 122.41 (.15) 122.45 (.14) 122.38 (.15) 122.52 (.14) BM 
Absolute hippocampus size 99.04 (.36) 100.19 (.20) 100.96 (.14) 100.76 (.15) 100.84 (.15) BM 
Absolute cerebellum size 123.41 (.21) 124.87 (.10) 121.55 (.54) 125.61 (.07) 125.61 (.07) EB 
Absolute body mass 226.91 (.07) 226.61 (.09) 222.42 (.69) 227.89 (.05) 226.24 (.10) EB 
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3. Interpretability of evolutionary rates 
The interpretability of comparing several measures in terms of evolutionary rates can be 
influenced by how much absolute variation they exhibit (i.e, the size of their standard deviations 
relative to their respective mean). Take i and j as two hypothetical neuroanatomical volume 
measures. If the vector of scores on i is [1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, 1005] and if the vector of 
scores for j is [1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000], i has a much lower coefficient of variation than j. 
It is easier to evolve from 1001 to 1002 than from 1000 to 2000. While z-scores are the same in 
both hypothetical vectors, j exhibits more variation relative to the mean. In other words, the 
scores are more dispersed among themselves relative to the mean, in spite of z-scores for both 
vectors being equivalent. If i were to exhibit a higher standardized evolutionary rate than j, that 
would unfortunately not mean that i evolves faster in absolute terms, because a faster 
evolutionary rate for i compared to j would simply mean that species’ scores change from 1001 
to 1002, to 1003, etc. faster on i than they do from 1000 to 2000, to 3000, etc. on j.  
The coefficient of variation on variables compared in terms of their standardized 
evolutionary rates (i.e., evolutionary rates based on z-scores) is especially informative in the 
context of coefficients of variation. The coefficient of variation of a variable equates to its 
standard deviation divided by its mean, reflecting how much relative variation exists in it. 
Variables that exhibit both (a) higher evolutionary rates than others and (b) either comparable or 
higher coefficient of variation can be interpreted as truly evolving faster in absolute terms than 
others. As such, care was taken to examine if variables presented in Figure 1 which exhibited 
higher evolutionary rates had comparable or higher coefficients of variation compared to others. 
The coefficient of variation for all neuroanatomical measures ranged from .14 to .16, being thus 
highly comparable among themselves. G, which exhibited higher evolutionary rates than 
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neuroanatomical volume measures, exhibited a coefficient of variation of .36. It can be inferred 
that its faster evolutionary rates compared to volume measures involve even more absolute 
change across evolutionary time than if G and volume measures had equivalent coefficients of 
variation. As such, it is possible that the estimate of evolutionary rate of G presented in Chapter 
1 is somewhat underestimated, though any assertive statement or correction is unlikely to be 
precise considering that the relationship of coefficient of comparability to standardized 
evolutionary rates is still not well known (Adams, 2013). 
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Appendix C: Supplementary Analyses to Chapter 3 
 
1. Reanalyses with only five highly correlated telencephalic regions 
Although located in the telecephalon, the volumes of the striatum, the bulbus olfactorius 
and the bulbus olfactorius accessorius exhibited low (and in some designs, non-significant) 
factor loadings in the common factor among telencephalic regions, in Chapter 3. Considering the 
possibility that their inclusion in all analyses involving regions of the telencephalon in spite of 
their lack of important association with other regions in terms of their sizes across species, 
analyses of anatomical integration for the subregions of the telencephalon were fully repeated 
without their inclusion. Thus the only included regions were the neocortex, hippocampus, lobus 
piriformis, septum, and schizocortex. 
Table A3.1 displays results of analyses without body size controls. Factor loadings were 
similar in strength to those observed when the striatum, the bulbus olfactorius and the bulbus 
olfactorius accessorius were included, both without and with phylogenetic controls. Although all 
were positive, anatomical integration coefficients were small and nonsignificant. 
 
Table A3.1. 
Average factor loadings and anatomical integration indices for regions of the primate 
telencephalon, without and with phylogenetic control 
Brain region Factor 
loading 
Evolutionary 
factor loading 
Anatomical 
integration 
coefficient 
Evolutionary 
anatomical 
integration coefficient 
Neocortex .999* .994* .210 .151 
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Hippocampus .928* .911* .147 .228 
Lobus piriformis .965* .966* .210 .216 
Septum .981* .975* .216 .230 
Schizocortex .949* .948* .196 .258 
Note: * p < .05. 
 
 Table A3.2., in turn, displays results after body size is controlled for, in all variables. 
Factor loadings were overall somewhat slightly stronger than those observed for the equivalent 
analysis in Chapter 3. It can be observed that telencephalon size positively predicted the strength 
of the relationship of hippocampal size to the size of other regions. 
 
Table A3.2. 
Average factor loadings and integration indices for regions of the primate telencephalon 
residualized against body size, without and with phylogenetic control 
Brain region Factor 
loading 
Evolutionary 
factor loading 
Anatomical 
integration 
coefficient 
Evolutionary 
anatomical 
integration coefficient 
Neocortex .984* .985* .223 .188 
Hippocampus .961* .685* .326* .197 
Lobus piriformis .970* .861* .265 .296 
Septum .989* .883* .244 .292 
Schizocortex .980* .759* .242 .219 
Note: * p < .05. 
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 Closer inspection revealed that residual telencephalic size positively and significantly (p 
< .05) predicted the relationship of residual hippocampal size to the size of each and every other 
telencephalic region (r = .297, r = .368, r = .322, r = .298 for neocortex, lobus piriformis, 
septum, and schizocortex size). However, no integration of residual hippocampal size with the 
residual size of other regions as s function of residual telencephalon size was observed once 
phylogenetic control was conducted. 
 These complementary analyses suggest that, barring a possible integration of 
hippocampal size with the size of other regions as a function of telencephalon size, the original 
results were strongly replicated, both in factor loadings and in the overall lack of anatomical 
integration, lending validity to the analyses presented in Chapter 3. This indicates that the size of 
the telencephalon does not generally predict whether the evolution of its components undergoes 
more strongly mosaic or more strongly concerted evolution; rather, the degree of correlation 
among telencephalon components is largely the same across taxa of different telencephalic sizes. 
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